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Abstract 
This thesis is an empirical investigation of the strategic use of information in the 
airline industry, and explores the development of competition in the airline 
industry from an information perspective. The research traces the evolution in the 
environmental conditions facing airlines from World War I to the present. The 
research also analyses evolution of the uses of information. Information is an 
enabler, allowing things to be done, but information can also be a resource in 
itself. The research finds growing strategic use of information from automation to 
using information as a resource for strategic flexibility. 
The main sources of information that airlines use in their strategic efforts are 
analysed, as well as the ways in which airlines procure this information and the 
uses they make of it in strategy. The research finds evidence of distinct phases in 
the evolution of the uses made of information by airlines. Crucial to airline 
strategic flexibility is local market information acquired informally. However, the 
evidence also illustrates the serious difficulties airlines face in using the external 
information about the markets in which they operate in their strategy. Different 
streams of academic literature support the findings of this empirical research. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Introduction 
This research is an empirical investigation of the strategic uses of information in 
the airline industry. The airline industry has suffered dramatic changes over the 
last few decades. The technology utilised today by airlines, from the aircraft to 
the sophisticated communication equipment and computer systems, has 
undergone dramatic development which greatly affected the economics of the 
industry. Protective industry regulations were initially applied in order to 
facilitate the technology and infrastructure development necessary to grow and 
develop the airline industry into providing the world-wide coverage and reliability 
that it does today. 
International deregulation movements such as the US deregulation in 1978 and 
the European liberalisation in process, intensified competition significantly over 
the last two decades, and rnany airlines have restructured, down-sizing 
considerably. The airline industry carries today in excess of two billion passengers 
"k per year and 
has demonstrated sustained growth over the last 25 years (Figure 1). 
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Figure I- Growth of Scheduled World Airline Industry 1972-1993 
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With mature aircraft technology, airlines today realise that although efficiency is 
extremely important to keep costs in line with competitors, the opportunities for 
competitive advantage lie in their degree of strategic flexibility. Many airlines are 
using sophisticated computer systems to better predict demand, in order to guide 
Al- - their pricing efforts and assist in the fundamental issue of matching their supply 
with demand. But airlines are also realising the serious limitations of those 
computer systems, and of their organisations in acquiring and using strategically 
the qualitative market information required to achieve strategic flexibility. 
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1.1 Purpose and rationale of the research 
The airline industry is one of the most information intensive of industries, 
together with media, banking, and insurance. Therefore, it can be considered an 
apt domain in which to observe and analyse the acquisition and use of the ultimate 
strategic resource - information. The study focuses on the link between 
information and strategy. This important link is under-explored in management 
research and literature. It also receives, insufficient attention from industry 
practitioners and is therefore a source of much difficulty for organisations in the 
airline industry. 
Airlines possess vast amounts of information and face a difficult task when 
attempting to use this information strategically. A vast proportion of airlines' 
information is operational, and this is t6e type of information with which they 
appear to be most at ease. However, the airline industry is also an increasingly 
competitive arena, and airlines are increasingly dependent on market information 
to survive. This market information consists of up-to-date data about the socio- 
economic characteristics of each of the many markets in which each airline 
operates. The more qualitative nature and external origin of this information pose 
a crucial problen-L This information has, by definition, to be procured outside the 
organisational boundaries, and it is not easy to internalise in a manner which does 
not jeopardise its usefulness to tactical and strategic efforts. 
The great diff icultY airlines have in acquiring and using information strategically 
\ is very evident in the general problems that airlines manifest in matching supply 
and demand adequately and in reacting to competitors in the different markets in 
3 
which they operate. This contributes to the cyclical nature of the economic health 
of the industry. One very typical symptom is that, in periods of industry 
prosperity airlines increase the capacity they offer on routes excessively, only to 
find their prices under pressure because of half empty flights (Doganis, 1991). 
This occurs despite the very sophisticated decision support systems now available 
to airline managers and route planners. 
This study emphasises the difference between operational and strategic uses of 
information, and most importantly, the benefits of using information strategically. 
It also observes the roles of both internal information and external information in 
airline competition, as well as identifying the most important sources of external 
information for airlines, and analysing the extent to which these sources are 
explored for strategic or tactical purposes. 
By concentrating on the characteristics of information rather than those of the 
organisation, it discusses some obstacles to the use of information, and in 
particular, the blending by the organisation of internal information with that which 
is external to it. This blending is as crucial to the organisation as controlling the 
mixture of air and fuel in an internal combustion engine. 
1.2 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of ten chapters including this introductory chapter. Chapter 
two describes the logic of enquiry and methodology employed in this study in five 
iterative phases of data gathering and analysis. Chapter three describes the 
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development of the airline industry from World War I to the present, analysing the 
role of regulations in the development of the industry, the development of aircraft 
technology, and the various competitive contexts that faced airlines. Chapter 
three also describes the processes of deregulation both in the US and in Europe, X- - 
drawing on the economic principles and objectives behind them. It also analyses 
the intensification of competition which was responsible for the vast development 
of airline strategic thinking. 
Chapter four characterises the nature of the airline business, from the influence of 
politics and regulation, to the constructs behind its extreme information intensity, 
it describes the different product features which constitute the production of 
airlines, and the sensitivity of the airline business to changing socio-economic 
conditions. It also describes the characteristics and nature of airline markets and 
illustrates the extremely narrow margin for error that faces airline management, 
emphasising the importance of strategic flexibility. 
Chapter five studies the development of computer reservation systems (CRS), 
from their inception as manually maintained inventories of seat availability, to 
their powerful role in market distortion, to vital sources of information for 
strategy formulation. It conceptualises the development of CRS as a clear 
evolutionary process in the use of information from automation to strategic 
flexibility. Chapter six analyses the role of travel agents in airline competition. 
Travel agencies have a great influence on consumers' choice of airline, and are 
important targets for airlines' market distorting efforts. Most importantly, travel 
, %agencies are one of the main sources of competitive information to airlines. 
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Chapter six also analyses the evolution in the role of travel agencies in the airline 
distribution chain, their bargaining power, the incentive mechanisms that airlines 
offer them, and the factors behind their importance to airlines as competitive 
information sources. 
Chapter seven analyses airlines'use of the information generated by CRS. It 
begins by describing MDT technology and its use by airlines in monitoring sales 
and in guiding competitive information acquisition efforts. It then studies the 
development of frequent flyer programs, the strategic principles behind them, and 
their importance in airline competition. Finally it analyses the development of 
revenue management systems which evolved into extremely sophisticated 
decision support systems for airline managers, drawing on the strategic principles 
'behind them, and emphasising the role of qualitative information in maximising 
the usefulness of such systems to airlines. Chapter seven analyses the trading of 
such systems by information technology firms owned by the very airlines that 
developed the systems, emphasising that the need for acquiring and using external 
information by airlines is behind the difficulty in making such important decision 
support systems useful. 
Chapter eight analyses the role of airline sales offices in the acquisition of local 
market information so important for the strategic flexibility required to competing 
in turbulent environments such as airline markets. It describes the information 
that the sales offices are employed to acquire, and studies the difficulties airlines 
feel in using the very information which they go to great lengths to acquire. 
\Chapter nine is a compact case study which illustrates the difficulty of an airline 
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in making use of a revenue management system which it acquired. The case 
study is not an attempt to analyse the difficulties in implementing an information 
system, rather, it studies the difficulties in making the system useful for the 
airline's strategy formulation processes. Important dimensions of the difficulties 
encountered are the need to acquire and use competitive market information 
acquired from the local markets, and the need to blend qualitative information 
with quantitative information. 
Chapter ten exposes the theoretical underpinnings of the research, which is 
strongly empirical, drawing on several perspectives from different academic 
disciplines to conceptualise the issues found in the research. Chapter ten 
concludes the thesis integrating theory and practice to provide contributions to 
both. 
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CHAPTER 11 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
2. Research Methodology 
2.1 The Iterative Steps of the Methodology 
The methodology described below was devised to be as consistent as possible with 
the purpose and nature of this research. It is qualitatively based, using semi- 
structured interviewing techniques and participative observation, complemented by 
both acadernic and industry literature in order to acquire the infonnation required. 
Quantiýring or modeffing the use of information in the airline industry is not the 
objective of this study. A study of the strategic use of inforrnation in the airline 
industry which intends to contribute to further understanding of the link between 
information, tactics and strategy, must have a strong qualitative component. The 
methodology is also explorative. This has been necessary because of the obscurity 
of this subject in academic literature and mariagement research. Qualitative 
methods of investigation were therefore widely used, not only to deal with the 
complexity of the subject in terms of quantity of variables, but also to maintain a 
useful degree of explorative orientation. The research assumes a fundamental level 
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of analysis. It aims to study what uses airlines make of information, how and why. 
The methodology as a whole is therefore supported by the research principles of 
grounded theory typified by Mintzberg's research. It studies what managers do, 
how and why by applying a detective work type of research method. 
To complement the explorative nature of the researck and to increase its potential 
to contribute both to theory and practice, the sequence of activities Mowed a 
somewhat unconventional design and order. The literature review was divided into 
two main parts: airline industry literature and academic fiterature. In order to 
maximise the guidance of industry management practices to the research, its 
findings, arguments and conclusions, the review of the industry literature was the 
starting point of the research. The review of literature was not a traditionaUy 
exhaustive compilation of philosophies and perspectives within a particular 
discipline. For the most part, it was a filtering of theoretical issues from the 
various disciplines that proved relevant to the purposes and industry findings of the 
research. It was also an integration of the two to enforce the coherence of the 
arguments and the applicability of the conclusions both to theory and to practice. 
This section will describe the various aspects of the methodology adopted to 
perform the fieldwork and reach the findings of this study. It ainis to show how 
the sequence and integration of research activities has served the objectives of the 
study. It has also the objective of demonstrating the merits of flexibility, 
progressive design and incremental adaptation of methodology, obeying 
restrictions and circumstances contingent to the research, and the continuing 
-1 
guidance of intermediate research findings, clues and indications. 
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Five main iterative phases can be discemed in the methodology of this study: 
1. Acquisition of basic infonnation about the airline industry 
2. Review of airline industry literature 
3. Setting of broad research objectives 
4. Fieldwork 
5. Analysis of the fieldwork in the context of industry and academic 
literature 
2.1.1 Acquisition of basic information on the airline industry 
The acquisition of basic information about the airline industry entailed the 
compilation and analysis of the basic characteristics of the airline industry. It was 
this phase that led to the selection of this industry as the object of study. This 
phase also involved the establishment of some industry contacts for the fieldwork 
to follow, and stimulated several ideas for the general objectives, approach and 
perspective to adopt in the research. This phase took place during the two years 
preceding the enrolment on the PhD progran-L It comprised approximately five 
months of semi-structured interviews and participative observation in a medium 
sized European airline. 
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2.1.2 Airline industry literature review 
This phase entailed an extensive review of airline industry literature. There are few 
works specific to the airline industry. However, the industry is prominent in 
business newspapers and magazines, wWch perform regular economic analyses and 
surveys. Because of its transitory state of regulation, the airline industry is also 
very prominent in regulatory and political debates in the media and airline industry 
literature. The activities involved in this phase of the research provided an 
important, but not high, level of focus, and generated its general objective: to study 
'The Strategic Use of Information in The Airline Industry'. They also provided 
much of the material for the sections on the industry background, characteristics of 
the business and regulatory envirom-nent both in the US and Europe. 
lUs phase of the research suggested that the study of the strategic use of 
information in the airline industry required detailed investigation of strategy and 
tactics in airlines, and of what information and which information systems are used 
for those purposes. However, this type of material constitutes, undoubtedly, 
extremely sensitive information. 
During this stage of the research, two issues emerged: 
1. Because of the strategic sensitivity of the inforniation required for the 
study, great investment, in terms of time, resources, and investigation 
was required. 
II 
2. Only a contact network could reliably provide such sensitive infonnation. 
This contact network, if successfully developed, could lead to a desirably 
high level of access to airlines. 
Acquiring these contacts and participating in their networking activities were 
fundamental to the methodology. Therefore, during this phase, there was an 
intensive cultivation of a network of contacts. This entailed extensive travelling in 
the UK, Europe and US. The initial set of contacts served as a base for the 
acquisition of yet rnany more contacts. Each contact acquired possessed his/her 
own network of contacts. Only by developing a close working relationship would 
each contact feel sufficiently secure to introduce some of the contacts in his/her 
network. Attendance at some of the frequent airline industry conferences 
organised by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) and by such 
airline industry magazines as AvmarkAviation Economist, Airline Business and Air 
Transport World also proved an invaluable source of contacts. 
Another important aspect of this phase of the research was the review of the media 
and airline industry literature. This was assisted by the industry contacts, with 
whom issues of relevance to the strategic use of information were frequently 
discussed. Considering the various contacts' inputs and points of view proved an 
effective method of stimulating industry interest in the research, and therefore in 
the cultivation of the network of contacts. It also constituted an effective method 
of validating literature information, research findings and the various arguments 
developed during the research. 
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It also became clear that, to fulM the objectives of studying the strategic use of 
information in this industry, no single airline could provide all research material 
required. Therefore, a conventional case study approach would prove inadequate. 
The approach initially chosen was to select the airlines that seemed exemplary in 
using inforrnation for tactics and strategy. Although guidance for the airlines to be 
selected was provided mostly by the airline industry literature, it was strongly 
complemented and validated by frequent discussions with industry contacts. 
In order to explore the main aspects of contribution from each airline to the 
research, the qualitative approach would have to comprise semi-structured 
interviews. This would give the flexibility of adapting the fine of investigation to 
each particular subject. In general, airlines use much the same type of information 
to set their tactics and devise their strategy. However, each airline has different 
strategic processes, attributes varying degrees of importance to different 
information. This information is procured in different manners, stored and 
processed by different information systems and organisational structures, 
embedded in different organisational cultures, etc. This rendered a quantitative 
survey-type approach unsuitable for the objectives. 
The initial application of the semi-structured interview method proved successful in 
unding the basic sources of strategic inforniation for airlines and the basic 
processes of using that information. Most airlines have sales offices in the markets 
they serve which are of significant strategic importance to them. They acquire 
, 
local market infon-nation through them. This local market information is being 
considered by an increasing number of airlines as the core of strategic and tactical 
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information. The local market information has its main source in the travel 
agencies that sell airline products in each market, and is procured by sales 
representatives of the airlines in each market. Airline sales representatives visit 
travel agents as they constitute the dominant distribution channel for airlines. Sales 
representatives promote their airline's products, and investigate the reasons why 
certain agents do not sell them at desirable levels of market share. Airline 
managers respond to identified market needs, and make the product adjustments 
they deem necessary in order to become competitive. 
Local market information acquired by sales representatives, is complemented by 
information sold by computer reservation systems - market information data tapes 
(MDT), which most airlines today acquire. The main strategic decision support 
systems are revenue management systems (also known as yield management 
systems), which are used by airlines to maximise the revenue of each route. These 
systems are basically vast historical databases and sophisticated statistical models 
which predict the behaviour of demand and quantify deviations from typical or 
predicted demand levels. Local market information is also used to provide 
qualitative accounts of demand behaviour and justifications for deviations in sales 
from what is typical or expected. 
The basic findings from this research phase provided the guidance for proceeding 
with the research. It became clear that in order to study the strategic use of 
inforniation in the airline industry, the research would have to address the 
, 
foHowing rmin issues: 
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1. The role of travel agencies in the airline industry distribution chain 
2. The role of CRS in the airline industry 
3. The role of sales offices for airlines 
4. The role of NUDT in the airline industry 
5. The relationship between airline sales offices and headquarters 
management; 
6. The use of decision support systems such as a revenue management 
system (RMS), in the industry; 
7. The use and influence of local market information in the way airlines 
manage the many markets they serve. 
The main fines of enquiry outlined above became the orientation parameters for the 
semi-structured interviews which initiated the fieldwork activities. The exponential 
growth in the network of contacts developed provided the coverage in ternis of 
number of organisations to be studied. However, it became evident that the 
organisations to be consulted should not be restricted to airlines. The initial 
enquiries identified the need to study also CRS, travel agencies, and decision 
support systems vendors. This implied the design of four different types of 
interview guides (see appendix I) to serve the main fines of enquiry. 
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2.1.3 The fieldwork 
Semi-structured interviews were used throughout (Appendix 1). However, 
because of the nature of the study, intensive research relationships were required, 
particularly with the airlines. This required extensive travelling in Europe, North 
America and South America throughout the whole duration of the research. 
Intensive research relationships were achieved with three organisations - two large 
American airlines and one medium-size European airline. The relationship with the 
latter evolved into a participative observation level of access, which has been 
maintained for over two years and yielded much-needed sensitive information, in 
depth understanding of the organisational aspects of strategic inforniation use. 
Although the latter airline is clearly far from exemplary in the strategic use of 
information, it revealed useful issues, which identified obstacles to procuring and 
using information strategically. These issues, too, are useful in understanding the 
practice of linking information and strategy. 
Table I describes the distribution of the interviews recorded on tape. As 
mentioned earlier, a great number of less formal discussions and consultations with 
the various contacts in the network were important sources of fieldwork 
information. They were not recorded. 
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Subject No. of managers 
interviewed 
Ma or American airline 1 6 
Major American airline 11 7 
Major American airline 111 5 
Major European airline 1 6 
Major European airline Il 5 
Major European airline 111 5 
Medium European airline 1 8 
Medium European airline 11 7 
Major CRS 1 3 
Major CRS 11 3 
IT vendor 1 2 
IT vendor 11 2 
Travel agencies 8 
TOTAL 69 
Table 1- Distribution of Recorded Interviews 
The above interviews were focussed on senior managers of the companies 
involved. The participative observation, which took place in the medium-sized 
European airline, continuing over a period of two years, consisted of several 
periods of one to two weeks, spread throughout the two years. In total, 21 weeks 
of participative observation were completed. The observation involved 
participation in top and middle management meetings, participation in working 
groups which purchased and implemented decision support systems, and 
performed various re-structuring projects both in headquarters and sales offices 
situated throughout countries in Europe, North America and South America. 
The findings and arguments revealed in this thesis were based on the integration of 
the review of the airline industry literature, frequent informal meetings with the 
contacts established, the recorded interviews, the participative observation, aU of 
which were supported by the relevant academic literature. 
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2.1.3.1 Airlines 
The main interview guide served as reference to study the strategic procurement 
and use of inforrnation by airlines. The guide focussed on what market inforrnation 
they focussed on to compete, how and where it was procured, and how the 
organisation coped with and used the information to guide strategic efforts. In the 
first stage, ident4ing the market information that airlines use to compete required 
a review of tactical and strategic variables on which managers based their 
decisions. Analysing internal reports and statistics that were distributed to 
managers revealed mainly the quantitative aspects of their decision making. 
However, it also revealed that those statistics and reports, were not the only 
sources inforniation to guide strategic efforts. There were two main reasons for 
this: 
(1) In the best of cases, the reports and statistics referred to the previous 
month or two of operations, and in a business which is so intensive in day- 
to-day tactical decisions, this seemed insufficient; 
(2) The reports lacked qualitative explanations for variations in sales and 
results. Most importantly, they did not provide competitive information 
about neither of the rnarkets responsible for the generation of the results. 
With the above indications in mind, it became clear that an appropriate method to 
further knowledge about what information airline managers used to make strategic 
,, decisions would be to follow the analyses of statistics and internal reports with 
interviews of the managers involved. Semi-structured interview techniques were 
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applied at senior and middle manager levels. The interviews began by focussing on 
past decisions that were made, and attempted to reconstruct the managers' 
procurement and analysis of the respective information. 
This provided an important breakthrough in the research. Managers were 
inundated with statistics and internal reports, which many considered to be 
information overload. Most managers were particularly anxious to obtain more of 
the kind of information that was most useful to them - qualitative information. 
This consisted of information which would help them not only to interpret the 
plethora of statistics, but also help them to make more timely decisions, and in turn 
would contribute more directly to the improvement of the airline's competitive 
position. The trend towards valuing competitive information, which is 
predominantly qualitative in nature and external to the airline, accompanied the 
intensification of competition in the industry generated by deregulation. 
2.1.3.2 The Sales Offices 
The above competitive information has one clear main source - the sales offices 
situated in the markets that the airlines serve. The sales offices procure this 
information to react to the local manoeuvres of competitor airlines. The local sales 
manager then requests product and marketing mix changes in order to respond. 
So, the various sales managers often compete for resources from headquarters 
managers, who are employed to apply those resources in an optimum manner. 
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Semi-structured interviews were used to investigate the relationship between 
headquarters and sales offices in organisational terms and, most importantly, in 
terms of exchange of information. This required studying what information sales 
offices are exposed to in the local markets, and how they procure it. Sales 
managers are typically positioned at the middle management level in airlines. They 
report to area managers, who in turn report to a commercial director. The 
communication between sales offices and headquarters was also a target of 
investigation. 
2.1.3.3 CRS 
The use of CRS by airlines had four main evolutionary phases: 
1. Automating the reservation tasks in airlines, making the process more 
reliable and more efficient 
2. Automating the communication link between the travel agents making 
the bookings, and the airlines that processed them 
3. Realising competitive advantage through information bias created by 
airlines; 
4. Acquiring new market information. 
These four phases clearly represent a shift from using CRS for efficiency to using 
,, them for strategic advantage. The basic interest in the CRS emerged, not just 
because they are a main component of the airlines' distribution chain, but because 
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they were created, and are presently owned and marketed by airlines. The 
information provided by CRS has become essential to strategy formulation by 
airlines. 
2.1.3.4 Travel Agents 
The basic relevance of travel agents to this thesis consists of their prominent role in 
the airline distribution chain as vendors of airline products and users of CRSs. 
More specifically, interest in the travel agencies is twofold: 
1. Travel agencies have great influence on the consumer's choice of 
airline, and therefore on the airlines' market share in every market. 
2. Travel agencies are one of the main sources of competitive information 
to airlines. 
Travel agencies are therefore a crucial element in the strategic use of information 
by airlines. Enquiry concentrated on (1) the type of infomiation they provide 
airlines, and their interests in providing this information, (2) their influence over the 
passengers' choice of airline. The two points are closely linked to the strategic use 
of information by airlines. This is because the travel agent is both a crucial source 
of competitive information, and a very appetizing target for nwket distorting 
efforts. Having distorted the market forces in their favour, airlines have to procure 
additional competitive information - what are the other airlines providing as 
\ 
incentives to the very same agents? 
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2.1.3.5 Information Systems and Information Systems Vendors 
The airline industry is today characterised by great many very sophisticated 
information systems to support competitive decisions. The strategic use of 
information in the airline industry cannot be studied without addressing the impact 
that these information systems have on the way airlines compete. In an effort to 
support and automate their tactical efforts, airlines have developed sophisticated 
information systems to assist them in three main areas: optimising yields on each 
route (RMS), optimising schedules according to demand patterns (scheduling 
systems), and focussing their efforts to visit and influence travel agents (NUDT). 
The development of those systems has achieved such a level of success that the 
airlines which developed them created subsidiaries to sell the very systems to their 
competitors. This posed three main questions: 
1. How have these systems achieved such success? - This implied 
investigating the origins, the development, and the operating principles 
of these systems. 
2. Why are the airlines which developed these systems selling them to the 
competition? - This meant investigating the reasons why airlines seffing 
the systems think that their competitive positions are satisfactorily 
safeguarded. 
I How these systems, particularly RMS and NRDT, which are basically 
quantitative, are used by airlines in conjunction with more qualitative 
extemal infon-nation? 
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Semi-structured interviews were carried out with senior and middle managers of 
several companies selling such software to airlines. The interviews were also 
complemented by participation in a medium-size European airline's various 
working groups assigned to purchase and implement such infon-nation systems. 
2.2 The Literature Review 
Essential to the methodology of the research is the role of the academic literature 
in furthering understanding of the strategic use of information in the airline 
industry. The research is dependent upon various streams of academic literature, 
including information economics, organisation, information systems, and strategy. 
Exhaustive reviews of each disciplines' literature would not be feasible. So, in 
order to make full use of the academic literature, the findings of the fieldwork and 
those of the review of the airline industry literature were used as contributors to 
building arguments which integrated theory with industry practice. 
So, the research for this thesis did not, as it is traditional, begin by reviewing the 
literature in order to guide the setting of objectives and the fieldwork. It used 
industry practice to indicate the theoretical issues relevant to the study of the 
strategic use of inforniation in the airline industry, and in turn, used theory to 
conceptualise the arguments and findings of the research. 
Therefore, the thesis does not present the traditional 'Literature Review" chapter, 
but instead a chapter that integrates theory with practice, and uses that integration 
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to provide a contribution to both. This chapter also serves to present the overall 
conclusions of the thesis in the rich context that the integration between theory and 
practice constitutes. It also means that the general conclusions of the thesis are 
innnediately preceded by the arguments that lead to them. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
AIRLINE INDUSTRY 
3. The Development of the Airline Industry 
This chapter will describe the airline industry and attempt to discern its 
predominant characteristics. Historical, social, economic, regulatory, political, and 
technological characteristics constitute the enviromnent in which firrns exist. The 
development of the industry environment goes some way to explaining firm 
behaviour; it moulds the way airlines compete and hence the uses they make of 
infomiation. 
The chapter overviews the evolution of the airline industry, from its deployment in 
the world wars, its extraordinary technological development, the political attention 
it has always attracted, the dramatic regulatory changes, to its present shape in 
what some caU the competitive I 990s, and many caU the Information Age. It does 
not endeavour to be an exhaustive description of aU events pertaining to this 
'industry, but it aims to address developments which, given their significance, 
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contributed to the considerable mutation of the airline industry into the unique and 
peculiar business that it is today. 
It also assembles a characterisation of the airline business, with a more focused 
commercial perspective. It will begin the characterisation with the political 
dimension, which is largely covered in the analysis of the regulation of the industry. 
It wiU then analyse the characteristics of the product that airlines offer and those of 
the demand for that product. Following a building-block approach, it will continue 
with a discussion of the information intensity of the business. This WiU 
demonstrate not only the abundance of information, but the vitality in using it in 
this industry. The final stage wiU discuss the nature of competition in the airline 
business. Here a brief and opportune snapshot of the present economic state of the 
industry (with emphasis on the US and Europe) wiH be taken. 
3.1 Some History 
World War I 
Significant interest in the powered aeroplane emerged during World War I. 
Govermnents in both Europe and the US were enthused by the military potential of 
such flying machines. Consequently, aeroplane development and production on 
both continents intensified tremendously. Military aviation has historically been the 
technological catalyst of civil aviation. In the US, every commercial engine 
,, 
designed began fife to military specifications, powering military aircraft (Solberg, 
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1979). By the end of World War I, leading countries in Western Europe began to 
support the development of air services for the public. This support was founded 
on realisation of the capabilities of aircraft in the war, the devastation of the 
ground transport infrastructure, and the suspicion that fellow leading countries 
were contemplating the same idea - spurring a competitive spirit. Also, most of the 
conditions for establishing an airline industry were present: war surplus aeroplanes, 
ex-military pilots seeking civilian employment, government financial support, and 
individuals who believed strongly in the future of commercial passenger 
transportation. 
In the US, however, ground transport had not been affected by the war. There 
was no abundance of war surplus aeroplanes, and the aeroplanes were not 
sufficiently fast or comfortable to compete with trains. There was no tangible 
justification or stimulus for the government to take initiatives to support civil air 
transportation. Hence, the US goverrunent did not develop a coherent policy for 
the development of the air transportation industry. It had also restrained any 
incentives to design or build new aircraft. The US goverment, in its 
preoccupation with defence, insisted on owning the design rights of the relatively 
few aeroplanes it purchased. Without the essential injection of vast capital 
resources (the kind of capital only goverraments have) and the political support to 
develop such capital intensive technology and infrastructure, the aircraft 
manufacturing industry in the US was, by the 1920s, reduced to a smaU fraction of 
its wartune size. 
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Despite the initial neglect by the US government of the development of passenger 
services, the Post Office Department recognised the potential applicability of the 
aeroplane in the transportation of long distance mail. In fact, the beginnings of 
commercial aviation in the US can be traced to a grant of US$ 100,000 from the 
federal government to the US Post Office for an experimental airmail service for 
the fiscal year ending June 30,1918 against vehement protests from the railroads 
(Frandenburg, 1980). The Post Office, however, would take advantage of the used 
and cheap war surplus aeroplanes. Thus there was still little incentive for 
American aircraft manufacturers to develop and produce new aircraft. 
President Coolidge ultimately became concerned about the US weakness in the 
area of aircraft design and production. The Aircraft Board was set up to assess the 
condition of the aircraft industry and the aviation needs of the nation, and 
subsequently, to develop a long-term policy to fulfil those needs. The Aircraft 
Board was Wghly instrumental in the development of the domestic aviation 
industry during this critical period and influenced four major events which boosted 
the development of the industry (Taneja, 1989): 
* The Air Mail Act of 1925, which transferred airmail operations to private 
carriers on the basis of competitive bids (Taneja, 1976). This encouraged 
many new entrants and subsidised the development of passenger services by 
airlines. 
* The Air Commerce Act of 1926 (Frandenburg, 1980; Taneja, 1989), which 
initiated the government-backed development of civil airways and 
navigational aids, providing the safety regulations preceding the current 
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Federal Aviation Regulations. The Act subsidised the heavy investment in 
ground facilities for air navigation which the private carriers would 
otherwise have had to make. 
* The estabUshment of a five-year plan (1926-31) to re-equip the army and 
the navy air services with modem aeroplanes, thus stimulating aircraft 
manufacture and design (Bowers, 1986, p. 3). 
* The Guggenheim Fund for the advancement of aeronautics, endorsed the 
development of schools of aeronautical engineenng in 1926 which, 
produced such famous aircraft designers as KeRy Johnson of Lockeed and 
Wellwood Beall of Boeing. It also financed Lindbergh's transatlantic flight, 
greatly accelerating public acceptance of air travel, and provided a subsidy 
to the Western Air Express airline to initiate a passenger service between 
Los Angeles and San Francisco (Solberg, 1979). 
* Henry Ford also contributed to the stimulus of public demand for aircraft 
industry products by producing the famous Ford Trimotor (the 'Tin 
Goose'), a reliable three-engine aeroplane. These planes were sent on 
'Ford Reliability Tours' to help overcome the general public fear of flying 
(Bowers, 1986). 
In contrast to the US focus in the 1920s on ainmil services, European focus was 
on the development of passenger services to replace the ground transport systems 
destroyed by the war. However, geographical characteristics greatly complicated 
the task. Air transportation in Europe involves crossing national frontiers. This 
called for extensive political and diplomatic negotiations. 
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The Paris Convention of 1919 established the basic international law regulating 
commercial aviation: every nation has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the 
airspace above its territory. The concept of national air sovereignty was invoked 
from property law with its idea of private ownership of land to the centre of the 
earth. The Convention also established the International Comn-dssion for Air 
Navigation (ICAN), which, as the predecessor of the present International Civil 
Aviation Organisation (ICAO), provided a mechanism for governments to hold 
discussions and standardise aviation facilities and services (Dobson, 1991). 
In the area of commercial air transportation, six European nations in 1919 jointlY 
created the International Air Traffic Association (IATA), which facilitated the 
convenience and acceptability to passengers of air transportation by standardising 
the international systern; for example, by introducing the standard airline ticket 
(Taneja, 1989). 
In the US, the McNary-Watres Act of 1930 (an amendment of the Air Mail Act) 
eliminated competitive bidding. Instead, the Post Office Department subsidised 
selected airlines with the apparent intention of transforming the industry from a 
random assortment of short unconnected mail routes to a more stable, integrated 
and self-sufficient nationwide airline system. In addition, mail payments were 
made on the basis of capacity offered, rather than the amount of mail transported, 
thus encou'raging the industry to acquire faster, larger and longer-range aircraft. 
The smaller carriers were-undercapitalised and nearly all of them were completely 
dependent on government contracts. Competitive bidding was eUrninated, and use 
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mail fees were used as indirect subsidy to support the carriers that were strong 
enough to contribute to the development of commercial aviation (Taneja, 1976). 
The transport companies, some of wl-dch were owned by aircraft manufacturers, 
began to consolidate and strengthen their operations. This also happened in, 
Europe, particularly in Britain, France, Holland, Belgium and Germany. One of 
these consofidations, the agreement between the German Luft Hansa in 1927 and 
the French airline, Farman, gave birth to what are currently known as 'pooling 
agreements', whereby airlines agree to share revenues and traffic on given routes 
(Davies, 1964). The 1930s was the decade when the initiative in commercial air 
transport passed irretrievably from Europe to America, and the reason is not hard 
to find. America had developed with startling speed something which Europe was 
still lacking thirty years later, namely a competitive airline industry in a large 
domestic market. Already in 1934, the so called 'big four' US carriers (American, 
Western, TWA and United) had emerged from the mass of airlines which had 
grown up in late 1920s, and the competition between them produced pm-aUel 
rivalry among aircraft manufacturers (Lyth, 1995). 
The US McNary-Watres Act was eventuaUy found to have been subject to 
considerable abuse. The findings of collusion brought the Air Mail Act of 1934, 
which tightened control over the industry. The Post Office Department awarded 
airmail contracts based on competitive bidding, the Interstate Commerce 
Commission was put in charge of setting 'fair and reasonable' airmail rates, and the 
Department of Commerce was responsible for the safety and maintenance, 
operation and development of the route network. The Act also made holding 
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companies illegal, disintegrating the historical vertical integration of airlines and 
aeroplane manufacturers. A division of Boeing became United Airlines, North 
American was divided into TWA and Eastern, and a division of AVCO became 
American Airlines. In effect, the 1934 Act was an anti-trust bill tailored to the 
airline industry and designed to prevent a recurrence of the level of concentration 
that had existed in 1933 (Caves, 1962). However, the Act introduced a highly 
bureaucratic system of control, involving no fewer than three separate bodies. As 
Levine (1975) comments, given this dispersion of responsibilities, carriers were 
able to abuse the system by subn-dtting extraordinarily low bids for air mail 
contracts in the certain knowledge of having them later made profitable by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission. 
By this time, investment in the airline industry was shrinking, partly because of vast 
losses experienced by the airlines attributable to fierce competition. The instability 
of mail routes, and the delays in providing ground and airspace infrastructures 
caused various crashes, weakening the public faith in air transportation. The Civil 
Aeronautics Act of 1938 in the US provided a set of guidelines for the 
development of econon-dc and safety regulations for the air transportation industry. 
Some expressed reservations about such policies. Caves (1962, p. 127) faulted the 
Act on the grounds that it required "an impossibility by suggesting the 
simultaneous maximisation of things that probably cannot be maximised". Lasting 
conflict centred on the issue of whether the CAB policy prescriptions should be 
pro-airline, designed to achieve a self-sufficient industry, or pro-competition, 
designed to achieve low-cost air services available to all (Brown, 1987). 
1 
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In Europe, the major airlines from Britain, France, Germany, Belgium and Holland 
began focusing on the linking of empires, most notably with colonial destinations in 
Asia and Africa. 
"During the 1920s and 1930s the political importance of cohesion in the continental 
United States and the British Empire respectively was highly valued. In the United 
States this resulted in political discretion being exercised in the award of mail 
contracts, in order to establish four large, viable commercial domestic carriers which 
would help unite the country. In Britain, similar considerations resulted in the 
creation of Imperial Airways (IA), the Empire Airmail Scheme (EAMS), 
government concentration on Empire routes, and the mobilisation of diplomatic 
pressure to try to get Empire and Commonwealth co-operation in negotiating 
commercial rights" (Dobson, 1991, p. 2). 
World War 11 
World War II greatly transformed the aviation industry. The airlines became 
extensions of the armed forces, learning many logistical and operational skills in the 
process. The war provided both the pressure and the opportunities for the aircraft 
manufacturing industry to expand facilities and improve technology. The US 
goverranent even passed a series of Acts (with respective subsidies and incentives) 
to ease the transition from war-related to peace-time production. Also, a dramatic 
technological breakthrough took place - the introduction of the jet propulsion 
engine, based on the work of Frank WWttle in England in 1930, and that of Hans 
von Ohain in Germany in 1935 (Constant, 1980; Sterling, 1982). 
After the war, five fundamental changes occurred in the air transportation industry 
(Taneja, 1989, p. 12-15): 
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The development of better general aviation aeroplanes, helicopters, and 
faster, longer-range commercial aeroplanes. 
The resolution of contradictory political attitudes towards the development 
of international air transportation services. In 1944, the Chicago 
conference produced the International Air Services Transit Agreement, 
aflowing civil aircraft of the signatories to fly across another signatory's 
national borders without landing, and to land for non-commercial purposes 
when necessary (Ist and 2nd freedom rights). The International Air 
Transport Association (IATA) was established to provide a conference 
forum for international airlines to negotiate fares, rates, and conditions of 
transportation; and the Bermuda agreement in 1946 resulted in the 
estabfishment of the famous 'five freedoms of the air" 
9 The great expansion of US airlines. The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) 
approved the start-up of local-service carriers to operate routes between 
major metropofitan areas and smaHer communities (feeder routes), charter 
services, air-taxi operators, and commuter carriers to provide scheduled 
services in markets with very low density of passenger traffic. The larger 
'trunk-line' and mail service carriers received vast subsidies until the early 
1950S. 
The five freedoms (which have actually been updated to six freedoms of the air) are: (1st) the 
privilege to over fly the territory of another country without landing; (2nd) the privilege to land in a foreign country for non-traffic purposes; (3rd) the privilege to put down passengers, mail 
and cargo taken on board in the territory of the country which gives nationality to the aircraft; (4th) the privilege to take on passengers, mail and cargo destined for the teff itory of the country 
, which gives nationality to the aircraft; (5th) the privilege to fly passengers, mail and cargo between two foreign countries; cabotage rights: the right to carry traffic wholly within a foreign 
country-, (6th) the right to carry traffic between two countries via the airline's home country. 
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e The large scale development of airports. The Federal Airport Act of 1946 
increased the size of the airports program by providing investment capital 
totalling US$ 500 million over a seven-year period. 
* The expansion of existing national airlines and the emergence of national 
airlines from newly independent nations. 
The Jet Era 
In 1939, aeroplane, development accomplished a major breakthrough when the 
Germans flew the Heinkel 178, the world's first turbojet aeroplane. The jet engine 
would, however, be much refined by engineers in the UK and lead the development 
of a broad diversity of commerciaIjet planes. The first commercialjet was 
introduced in the United kingdom by 1952 - the de HaviHand Comet. This project 
was fruit of a recommendation by the Brabazon Committee (which was also 
behind the development of the first turboprop aircraft - the Vickers Viscount), 
established in England in 1942 to examine the need for post war aeroplanes. The 
French put their CaraveRe jet into service in 195 8. 
From a global perspective, however, the most significant development was the 
introduction of the Americanjet in 1958 - the Boeing 707 - by Pan American 
Airways, into commercial service. The jet was much more econon-dcal than its 
propeller predecessors, and allowed for a much larger payload and cheaper fares. 
Airlines were rushing to be the first to introduce B707s and to capitalise on that 
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innovation by making a good impression on the travelling public (Petzinger, 1995). 
The Boeing 707 was Wghly instrumental in developing mass tourism. 
The vast superiority of the US aircraft manufacturing industry had long been clear. 
In the 1930s, the geographical characteristics of Europe meant that small countries 
in a non-unified commercial area (trade protectionism prevailed) would have 
insufficiently large markets for any aircraft they may have developed. Also, the 
development of commercial air transport in Europe was severely delayed by the 
exigency of extensive political and diplomatic negotiations to regulate a trade that 
had to cross so many national borders. This weakened the potential large scale 
demand for air travel and subsequently the demand for larger, faster and more 
technologicaRy advanced aircraft. In contrast, the US had, by the 1930s, 
developed a competitive domestic airline industry and was endowed with a large 
territory unrestricted by national frontiers. The rivalry between airlines meant 
strong demand for better, faster, larger, more comfortable aircraft. Designing, 
building and then operating the planes proved to be an early and precious 
integrated laboratory for R&D in aircraft technology, and provided privileged 
access to inforniation on the economics of operating different aircraft (this would 
prove especially valuable in the jet era with the B707 and B727). The vast, 
decisive and sustained financial support from the government (on a scale wlich 
none of the European countries could single handedly accomplish) and pro-airline 
regulations proved essential in the rapid development of US civil aviation and 
aircraft manufacture industries. 
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"The United States has tended to promote the U. S. airline manufacturing industry in 
dealing with air transport policy. This is probably a reflection of the political power 
of the manufacturing industry as well as a recognition of its importance to national 
defence. This consideration leads the United States to promote the American airline 
industry as a market for U. S. -made aircraft and it also leads the United States to 
provide competitive opportunities for foreign airlines so they will buy U. S. -made 
aircraft" (Murias, 1989, p. 194). 
The 1960s represented an emphatic demonstration of the superiority in aircraft 
manufacture which was developed by the US. This decade also gave a major boost 
to international commercial aviation. The immense passenger acceptance of the 
Boeing 707 and the DC-8 is widely regarded as one of aviation's most significant 
developments. European manufacturers were deeply concerned about the new 
aeroplanes developed in the US, and were eager to challenge the American 
manufacturers' dominance. In 1964, the British government appointed Lord 
Plowden to lead a committee to examine the aircraft industry. The committee 
recommended that, because of the limited size of local markets, the aircraft 
manufacturers of major European countries should combine forces to compete 
with the US aircraft industry. The committee's efforts subsequently led to the 
forrmflon of Airbus Industrie in the late 1960s (Taneja, 1989). IronicaUy, 
however, Britain was never more than a junior partner in that consortium (LYth, 
1995). 
3.2 Dependence on Aircraft Technology 
The growth of the air transportation industry has traditionaUy been paced, to a 
large extent, by the increase in the productivity of the aeroplane. Airlines of the 
''I United States, for example, experienced a growth in passenger traffic of 15 per 
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cent during the 1950s and 13 per cent during the 1960s. During each of these 
decades, airlines introduced aeroplanes that could fly at almost twice the speed of 
their predecessors (for example, the DC-7 relative to the DC-3, and the Boeing 
707 versus the DC-7). Lower unit operating costs in turn allowed airlines to offer 
lower fares, which stimulated the personal and leisure travel markets. These trends 
of increasing productivity and lower fares continued with the introduction of wide- 
body aeroplanes, even though such aeroplanes provided no increase in speed 
(Taneja, 1989). 
Over the past few years, civil aircraft technology has matured. There are quieter, 
more fuel-efficient aircraft with larger payloads, but the days of dramatic technical 
developments are long gone. Airlines have largely realised that market growth, 
reduced operating costs and higher profits will not come from the development of 
aircraft technology. This realisation is recent - only a decade ago did airlines begin 
to look at themselves to discover that their costs were highly bloated, and that 
many of their managers were not commerciaUy competent. In America this was 
discovered in the early 1980s with early deregulation, when new carriers invaded 
markets. In Europe this realisation has occurred from the late 1980s, when 
privatised carriers initiated restructuring. The state-owned airlines are still having 
rationalisation forced upon thern. The main point here is that airlines are nowadays 
largely focused on commercial management instead of relying on the developments 
of technology and favourable regulations to improve their fates. 
D- 
Regulation of the airline industry still attracts enormous political attention. Airlines 
in America have now been operating in a deregulated market since 1978, and in 
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Europe complex diplomatic and political negotiations over regulation are still 
taking place. The next two sections observe the US deregulation process and its 
outcomes, and analyse the more gradual process of European airline industry 
liberalisation. This is important because it contributes to the portrayal of the 
nature and enviromnental characteristics of this business. This will be useful for 
the discussion on the strategic use of inforrnation in the airline industry in the next 
chapter, which will inevitably delve into strategic management in the airline 
industry. 
3.3 Regulation of the Airline industry in the US 
3.3.1 The US Regulated Era 
A major characteristic of the regulated era was the very limited scope it offered 
management to influence the performance of airlines. The Civil Aeronautics Act of 
1938 established the Civil Aeromutics Board (CAB) as the goveming body to regulate 
the airline industry in the United States. The CAB was given the authority to set prices, 
control routes, and to extend anti-trust immunity to carrier business practices and 
mergers (Caves et aL, 1985). This last created almost insuperable barriers to entry to 
the airline industry: "from 1938 until deregulation in 1978 the CAB had not allowed 
entrance of a single new trunk airline" (RakowskL 1990, p. 506). 
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The basic goal of the CAB throughout the bulk of the airline industry' s regulated years 
was to maximise service while keeping the firms in the industry financially healthy. As 
the industry evolved, cross-subsidy became the chief mechanism for achieving this end. 
This policy had identifiable political sources and important strategic implications. 
Through cross-subsidy, the CAB worked to divert returns earned on prime services, 
such as New York-Chicago and the transcontinental routes, into uneconomical but 
politically desirable goals, such as service on sparse marginal routes, maintenance of 
weaker carriers, and sizeable labour settlements (Byrnes, 1985). 
In the industry's forniative years (before 1960), the CAB' s policies worked relatively 
wel Because primary demand was steadily expanding and many customers were 
relatively price- insensitive, the industry prospered while services grew. In the late 
1950s and early 1960s, however, the growth rate in demand slackened considerably and 
new customers became increasingly price-sensitive. Consequently, the industry's 
dynamics turned from a non-zero sum game competition into a zero sum game 
competition. In this watershed period, cross-subsidy began to cause systematic 
differentials between the smaller carriers' returns (recipients of cross-subsidy) and the 
larger carriers' returns (generators of cross-subsidy). This trend was obscured in the mid 
1960s as newly developed jets radically decreased operating costs and led to a spurt in 
industry growth and returns (Byrnes, 1985), but the inadequacy of industry regulation 
would later become evident. 
During the brief period of 'jet-induced' prosperity, airlines turned to diversification as a 
form of comn-dtment to the airline business. Most carriers in this period entered the 
hotel business in key locations in attempts to establish or protect an 'historical interest' 
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in important destinations, thus meeting the CAB-articulated criterion for awarding 
routes. Ironically, these attempts to 'play the regulatory game' failed. The CAB itself 
largely ignored its own route award criteria, and ultimate decisions were basically 
political (Bymes, 1985). 
As the industry matured and the regulatory pattern evolved, increasingly standardised 
CAB policies reduced managerial prerogatives to the point where passenger service was 
the only competitive variable available for manipulation (Meyer and Oster, 19 8 1). 
Fruhan (1972) looked at why some airlines were more successful than others, and what 
less successful firms could do to improve their performance. He discovered a limited 
ability of management to effect changes in the regulated environment: 
11 ... managers have a very narrow choice of directly controlled parameters to which 
an effective competitive strategy might be tied. Indeed ... CAB decisions in the 
areas where it exercised direct control were more important to an individual carrier's 
overall profitability than the decision of that carrier's own management team 
(Fruhan 1972, p. 155) 
Carriers had virtually no control over the two main influences on their profitability: fares 
and routes. Amongst nine variables often used in airline profitability studies, Fruhan 
developed three broad categories: route structure, fare structures and equipment policy. 
It was in this third category that "boom and bust cycles of airhe profitability were 
causally linked to the competitive environment" (Frulmn, 1972, p. 156). His regression 
model, using data from 1955 through 1966, could find no clear relationship between 
relative airline profitability and management controlled variables. This result led Fruhan 
to conclude that in matters of profitability the CAB represented each carrier's first string 
rnamgement team; the second string team (the ones with shareholder responsibility) 
were allowed to play only when the outcome from the game was essentially decided. It 
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is possible to speculate, as Levine (1987) has done, that this heavily regulated 
environment denied airline management many of the strategic options available in other 
industries, and drew attention to possible alternatives. 
"In effect, the CAB operated a controlled cartel, not only for the production of 
airline output, for which deregulation demonstrated that substitute production could 
be easily arranged - just as academic analysts had predicted - but also for the 
production of information about an exceptionally complex consumer service. " 
(Levine, 1987, pp. 427-28) 
Kaharn (1988) found that while passenger service included amenities, such as low 
seating density and better food and liquor, the service features with most industry impact 
were scheduling and equipment. This limited range of strategic options available to 
airlines in the regulated enviromnent may explain their long terin survival despite what 
Caves has described as grossly ineffective managements (Caves, 1988). Davis (1988) 
remarked that "the CAB, through its much-maligned, patemalistic authority to award 
rate increases and additional routes, insulated the industry from such external factors of 
recessions and the vagaries of fuel pricing. Perhaps most important, however, was the 
CAB's ability to insulate the industry from inadequate management. " Reed (1993, p. 
148) added, 
" ... To prevent airlines from disembowelling themselves with the sword of stupidity, 
the CAB invariably allowed fare increases that otherwise would not have been 
necessary. Or it granted new routes to carriers that desperately needed additional 
sources of revenue to cover the huge debts run up by their undisciplined 
managements. " 
Although American airline executives complained about bureaucratic delays and 
decisions that went against them individuaUy, they found the system to be addictively 
%comfortable. 
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"Though denying the airlines significant profits, regulation at least protected them 
against loss, regardless of economic conditions. Airline shareholders never had to 
fret over bankruptcy; failure was impossible. The system freed the airlines from 
worrying about the cost of doing business. The airlines, creating vast internal 
bureaucracies of their own, told the CAB how much money they required to run 
their businesses, while the CAB, using the airlines' numbers, merely calculated the 
fares necessary to cover those costs, plus a modest profit". (Petzinger, 1995, p. 16) 
In November 1976, when Jimmy Carter defeated Gerald Ford in the US presidency, 
Frank Lorenzo of Texas International was immediately granted permission by the CAB 
to cut the fares on certain interstate routes by fifty per cent. Texas International dubbed 
those fares the 'peanuts fares'. There was, however, a drawback: 
"The very success of 'peanuts fares' suggested that airlines could manage their own 
affairs - that they could stimulate their own markets, widen the population of people 
who had shared the privilege of flying, even create jobs and demand for new 
airplanes. But as delighted as he was at the outcome of peanuts pricing, Lorenzo did 
not want John Robson or anyone else in Washington getting the wrong idea about 
his intentions. Lorenzo went out of his way to say that peanuts fares were limited, 
isolated illustration of the virtues of flexibility in Government regulation. They were 
not, he emphasized, an argument for doing away with it. ... Even to an 
innovator, 
even to Frank Lorenzo, the system was fine just as it was. " (Petzinger, 1995, p. 48) 
3.3.2 The Importance of the Regulated Era in the US 
In conclusion, despite the negative effects of regulation discussed above, its wide 
benefits remain undiminished. The US, throughout its pre-deregulation era, financed 
development of an integrated air transportation system which served the whole country. 
It also stimulated important technological breakthroughs, vastly contributing to the 
development of a powerful aircraft manufacture industry, it created millions of aviation 
,, related jobs, and generally promoted trade and economic growth. There were abuses of 
regulation, as there are in many other industries, by airlines trying to play the regulatory 
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game to their advantage, but that should not be taken to indicate that policies were 
essentially wrong. Instead, they represent stages in a normal regulation learning curve. 
It is difficult to regulate such a complex, social, political, technological, and 
economically prominent industry. There is no such thing as perfect regulation. The 
judgement of its effectiveness is subject to commercial and political scrutiny as well as to 
public opinion. Pleasing all parties involved is impossible and cannot be the objective of 
regulators. Recognition of the significant points of inadequacy is inevitably blurred by 
many circumstances, including vested interests, political trends and pressures, lobbying 
parties and so om 
There could be a purely rational and theoretical argument that deregulation of the US 
airline industry could or should have happened earlier, but while the theory of economics 
is constituted by rational exercises and models, the practice of it in industry is very far 
from rational. Industry involves many interests and considerations of very different 
nature and high complexity. Therefore, the assessment of the practice of economic 
policy, should not be made against purely rational and theoretical models. It must 
involve a degree of tolerance for specific instances of inadequacy, and a wise 
appreciation for the larger picture portraying the wider and essential effects of policies. 
Finally, it must be recognised that the practice of economic policy is an evolutionary 
exercise. Regulatory policies have to evolve to an adequate degree with the change in 
the contingent social, economic, technological and political circumstances of the 
industry. It is only natural in the life-cycle of regulations that even the best will become 
inadequate at some point. Moreover, policies must become recognised as inadequate 
before change can be politically, economically and socially justified. 
t 
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3.3.3 Towards US Deregulation 
In the early 1970s, the airline industry's growth and returns declined dramatically 
as the underlying regulatory problems took grip. Because the CAB controlled 
most key decision variables, competition became fierce amongst the dimensions left 
to management. Since price competition was largely prohibited, the airlines turned 
to service and capacity competition. This led to chronic overcapacity on prime 
routes (Byrnes, 1985), which contributed to the industry's economic downturn. 
By the mid- I 970s, severe inflation and slow economic growth had spawned 
challenges to the philosophy of economic regulation. Evidence was cited that the 
continuous flow of regulatory rule adjustments was not serving the nation's best 
interests (BaUey et aL, 1985). Petzinger (1995, p. 78), affimis that: 
"... to call deregulation a mistake - as many people would, for at least the dozen 
years to follow - was a waste of breath. Whether wise or misguided as a piece of 
public policy, deregulation had to happen. Government protection had its place in 
helping to establish the modem airline industry; certainly this protection fostered the 
technical development of the industry, particularly the birth of the jet age. Butby 
the 1970s, if not sooner, airline regulation was as unnatural and anachronistic as 
Prohibition had been in thý 1920s and poll taxes in the 1960s; each resisted the 
onslaught of common sense only through the political wiles of an entrenched 
constituency, and each crumbled only when the constituency was overwhelmed with 
political force. " 
The overwhekning weight of evidence compiled by researchers during the 1960S 
convinced most observers that the CAB's preoccupation with protecting the 
airlines ( its responsibility since 1938), could no longer be regarded as being in the 
public interest. Forty years of tight regulation had resulted in an inefficient and 
stultified scheduled airline industry. A major concern of those regulating the 
t, industry had been to protect licence holders, with comparatively little regard being 
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given to matters of efficiency and the interests of consumers. However, rather than 
pressing for a gradual change in the regulatory systern, most interested parties 
favoured complete economic deregulation (Williams, 1993). 
US policy advisors, during the move towards deregulation, argued that optimal 
regulatory policies would permit free market entry and exit as well as a set of 
safety and pollution standards. The threat of entry would force the market 
participants to act in an econon-dcally optimal way. Markets would be contested 
by potential new entrants. This is the essence of the regulatory approach based on 
the theory of contestable rnarkets. Perfect contestability ensures a welfare 
maximising outcome via the threat of potential competitors, provided that firms 
have the ability to enter and exit a market costlessly. This requires negligible sunk 
costs, equitable access to the incumbents' technology, and the speed to act before 
the incumbents can change their prices. Given this theory, concentration of firms 
in a particular sector of the economy should not effect market efficiency (Baurnol 
et al., 1982). Some of the fears of deregulation stemmed from the belief that 
econornies of scale are present in the production of aviation services. This belief 
leads to the conclusion that markets will become highly concentrated and airlines 
will abandon marginal-cost pricing in an attempt to extract monopoly rent, thus 
resulting in consumers' welfare loss (Weisman, 1990). 
Passage of the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) of 1978 was facilitated by two 
important factors. First, most major US airlines came to support deregulation. 
Second, during 1978 the industry posted substantial profits and the public had 
\ access to a wide variety of discounted fares. Politicians thus faced little risk of an 
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outcry from either the industry or the public. A ten-year Essential Air Service 
program relieved concerns about the loss of service to smaU communities. 
Concerns of unions were matched by the commitment of federal assistance 
payments ifjobs were lost as a result of deregulation (Taneja, 1989). 
3.3.4 US Deregulation 
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, and the two years of regulatory reform that 
preceded it, introduced carrier managers to a much larger array of competitive threats 
and opportunities. No longer were airline managers to be second string team players 
enjoying a gentlemanly game on a level playing field. They were forced to rationalise 
existing operations and to become strategists. By providing both the incentives and the 
means for improvements in productivity and efficiency, the fundamentals of strategic 
airline management were changed. While exogenous factors, such as the fuel shock of 
1979 (WI&h reduced econon&ally feasible capacity), and the air traffic controllers! 
strike of 1981 (which limited capacity at major airports), had significant influences it was 
the airlines' new found freedom over pricing and route structure decisions which shaped 
their strategies. However, airlines did not enter the deregulated era well adapted to a 
world of free competition. Four decades of CAB control had not only shaped entry, 
price, supply and demand, but had penetrated to the operational core of the regulated 
fmw. Route structure and fleet composition, the essential plant and operating methods 
of the airline business - work rules and crew assignments, terminal and gate investments, 
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organisation of maintenance, and all critical marketing activities - were shaped to fit the 
routes and the fleet (Vietor, 1989). 
Many airlines had (and AM have) labour costs higher than those of new entrants. 
Virtually all had route structures that were artefacts of regulation and unrelated to 
customer demand in the new liberalised markets. VirtuaRy all had been driven by 
regulation to pursue pricing policies different from those demanded by the marketplace, 
and very different from those which had been predicted for unregulated markets (Levine 
1965). Contractual commitments, including unproductive and expensive long term 
labour, purchase debts, and long term leases of unsuitable equipment, inflated the costs 
of incumbent airfines weR above those of new entrants. Reed (1993, p. 148) clahned 
that: 
"Prior to deregulation, airline managements were notorious for their free spending 
ways. Airline employees, from pilots to bag handlers, were among the best paid 
workers in the world, even though most of them - except for pilots and certified 
aircraft mechanics - had no special skills that they could transfer to other businesses 
and receive anything close to their airline pay. " 
The regulated era not only gave power to trade unions and greatly disturbed the 
cost/productivity balance, but provided no incentive for any airline. to take measures to 
counteract that very situation. Petzinger (1995, p. 155) observed that: 
66 ... airline bosses were pushovers because they knew that the contracts each of them 
signed were always quickly matched by every other airline, fixing costs on an equal 
footing. it was no concern to the airlines that these costs marched higher and higher, 
as long as the regulators in Washington simply waved through the fare increases 
necessary to cover them. " 
The heavy cost structures and the strength of unions were important factors in slowing 
%ý 
the pace at which incumbent airlines adapted to deregulation. But there were also other 
no less important difficulties, such as redesigning route networks, renovating fleets at a 
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time when new aircraft were dramaticaUy more cost efficient, and most importantly, 
there were management cultures which would find competition in the airline industry a 
dramatically new paradigm. Many airline managers resisted deregulation with political 
lobbies, and others believed it would never happen. When deregulation did happen, the 
surprise of air ( 
line managers was proportional to the time that they had invested in 
resisting it instead of preparing strategies for their airlines to succeed in a competitive 
enviromnent. Byrnes (1985, p. 15) reasoned that: 
"Four important factors slowed the pace at which the established airlines adjusted to 
deregulation, giving a temporary, but important, edge to new entrants. First, most 
established a substantial degree of residual political leverage. Wages fell only when 
new, low cost entrants made significant inroads and several heavily unionized 
incumbent firms faltered. Similarly, the marginal buyers used their remaining 
political clout to slow price rises and [route] abandonment. Second, as new types of 
equipment, such as fuel efficient, short haul aircraft, were required for the new 
strategies, backlogs in equipment manufacture and tight markets impeded the 
transition. Finally, at times, the incumbent managements' values and orientation 
blocked the transition on two levels. Several carriers' management teams were not 
geared up for the fast moving competitive, deregulated industry, and thus failed 
either to change strategies aggressively or to implement new ones aggressively. " 
Deregulation represented a threat to incumbent airlines and an opportunity to potential 
new entrants. 
"If committed costs, information lags, transaction costs, firm-specific investments, 
and sheer human inertia play a role in the behaviour of real world airlines, holdover 
firms should have been at a disadvantage in comparison with the new entrants 
(Levine, 1987, p. 406) 
The irony was that, despite a larger number of competitive variables available to 
strategists, the new freedom also meant that strategic options were limited. Defensive 
strategies and cost cutting were required and the only realistic way incumbents could 
Iýsurvive was by exploiting their incumbency status and the larger number of manageable 
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variables to re-create barriers to entry and to develop the economies of scale and scope 
previously ignored by academics and regulators but which were essential premises for 
the contestabBity theory to work. Airfines have learnt to compensate for above-market 
cost by successfully pursuing revenue-earning strategies which generate rents through 
sheer market power. - They have also leamt to use their incumbency and large size to 
impose costs on rivals (especially new entrants), thus making the production cost 
differences less significant by changing the nature of competition. As Bleeke (1990, p. 
162) has noted, 
"... it is crucial not to under estimate the power of large competitors over time to 
make big better again. In the deregulated airline industry, the use of hub control, 
computerized yield management systems, and frequent flyer programs have been 
powerful tools for competitors to regain clout and pricing power. The top eight 
airlines now control 92% of revenue passenger miles compared with 80% before 
deregulation". 
Weisman (1990) has noted that recent events have shown that the sector does eventually 
tend towards Mgher concentration after deregulation. More recently, Maldutis (1993) 
challenged the traditional measures of industry concentration, arguing that they are not 
representative of airlines' competitive structure. He maintained that competition 
between airlines takes place at the airport, not at the national level. To test whether the 
airline industry really was concentrated, he looked at major airports, calculating the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (IH-H) for the 50 largest US airports, representing 98 per 
cent of total scheduled passenger boardings. His overall conclusion is self explanatorY. 
As he points out, the weighted average index shows that prior to deregulation, the 
industry was already Wghly concentrated. The entry of numerous new airlines in the 
1978-80 period kept the HHI at about the 2,200 level. Since 198 1, the index has been 
steadily rising, and, as of 1992, totalled 4,007. Therefore, the airline industry today is 
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highly concentrated. He declares that had this alternative approach to measuring 
concentration in the airline industry been used, it is possible that the authorities would 
have adopted very different attitudes to mergers in the 1980s. They would certainly 
have had to provide more detailed explanations to justify their approval decisions. 
Hammarskj6ld (1987) claimed that deregulation, which was meant to eliminate the 
regulated oligopoly of airlines, has pennitted the industry to form a privately-controlled 
oligopoly because anti-trust laws were not adequately enforced. Despite all the 
controversy, he claimed that since the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, which allowed 
new entrants into the industry and permitted airlines to chose the routes they wanted to 
fly and to set the prices they wanted to charge, US consumers have benefited from real 
price falls of an average of 20%, and up to 35% on long-haul routes. Winston (1993), 
in a comparison of economists' predictions about deregulation with the actual effects of 
deregulation, claims that economists largely underestimated the extent to wWch airlines 
would change their methods (notably their move to hub-and-spoke operations) and 
reduce their costs significantly. Secondly, he claimed that economists overestimated the 
extent to which deregulation would promote competition. As a result, revenues held up 
better than expected. Levine (1987, p. 423) claimed that the principal outcomes of 
deregulation were: 
(1) a wave of mergers and consoRdations; 
(2) a higher than expected degree of vertical integration in the industry, 
especiaUy among commuter airfines; 
(3) the dominance of hub-and-spoke systems; 
(4) the surprisingly complicated fare structure which has become characteristic of 
deregulated markets; 
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(5) the important role of frequent flyer programs; 
(6) the increasing significance of travel agents and the proliferation of incentives to 
them; 
(7) the important role of computer reservation systems; 
(8) the emphasis of firm strategy on the control of airport. slots and gates; 
(9) the apparent persistence, despite physicaRy easy entry and exit, of predation; and 
(10) as a consequence of all these factors, the high casualty rate among new 
entrants. 
In the years following deregulation, free market forces began to change the 
structure of the US airline industry dramatically, primarily by fostering the 
mushrooming of new lower cost entrants. The new entrants encouraged a wave of 
rationalising and re-structuning programs, the pooling of vast financial resources, 
and more aggressive strategies by the incumbents. A focused, low-cost strategy 
centred on dense linear routes was seen to be the natural entry point for small non- 
unionised new entrants and hence it was not particularly defensive in the long run. 
The incumbents largely overcame the challenges that this type of strategy posed 
and re-assumed a superior competitive position. However, a variety of other 
focused niche strategies was seen to offer the best prospect of long-run returns for 
the majority of the airlines. Carriers in this group could develop geographically 
focused, hub-based or gateway feeder strategies, or they could focus on particular 
segments of passengers to differentiate themselves (Byrnes, 1985). 
The lower fares and the new services produced a large increase in passenger 
numbers, but the combined effects of fare cuts and excess capacity sent the 
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industry into heavy losses. Bankruptcy not only took its toll of the new entrants, 
but started hitting established carriers, such as Braniff International and Continental 
Airlines. But the process did not stop there. In spite of a brief period of 
profitability during the economic boom of the late 1980s, the airline failures went 
on. By 1992, bankruptcy had claimed 117 carriers, including some of the best 
known in the industry, such as Eastern Airlines, Trans World Airlines, and Pan 
American World Airways (Tomkins, 1994) 
While the successful incumbents built on strong competitive bases within the airline 
industry and the successful new entrants developed defensible niches, the 
unsuccessful carriers neither had nor developed defensible competitive postures 
within the airline industry. They did not have credible transitional strategies 
coupled with the necessary resources to implement them. Companies in this 
position, 'stuck in the middle', tend to oscillate back and forth, from one strategy 
to the other, without developing a solid defensible position (Meyer, 1983). Several 
of them ignored the fact that deregulation meant exposure on prime routes 
(Byrnes, 1985). Some declared US deregulation successful from the consumers' 
point of view: 
"Of course, by the only criterion that really matters - customer satisfaction - airline 
deregulation in the US has been a staggering success. Passenger numbers have risen 
by more than 70 percent since 1978. Why? Full fares are a third lower in real 
terms, and more than 90 percent of tickets are sold at discounts averaging two-thirds 
of the full price. People have 37 percent more flights to choose from: smaller cities 
in particular have far more flights to far more places than ever before. The fight for 
customers has brought innovations such as frequent flier programmes and ultra- 
cheap, no frills flights. The safety record is first class. " (Financial Times, 8 April, 
1994) 
The success or failure of the US deregulation is still the subject of much debate: 
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"Not everybody considers the perpetual revolution that America's domestic market 
has lived with since deregulation in 1978 to have been a success. Price wars may 
have cut fares (the price of a round trip from New York to Chicago has fallen from 
US$ 800 to US$ 230 since deregulation), but America's carriers have lost over US$ 
12 billion since 1990 - more than they made in profits since they got airborne. 
Despite the cheaper fares, passengers whinge about service and the elaborate 'hub' 
systems that the big carriers run. " (Economist, 6 May 1995) 
What is clear is that deregulation in the US airline industry has given airline 
managers control over their airlines' strategy. In the face of the new intensified 
competitive environment, they were forced to enter an extraordinary learning curve 
- that of airline management. Gradually, airlines leamt how to observe markets 
and the behaviour of consumers in order to make best use of their resources to 
conquer them. 
"One of the most significant lessons to be learned from the US airline deregulation 
is that marketing has become supreme in the management structure of the airline. If 
the chief executive officer is not already a marketing man, certainly the marketing 
voice in that company is among the strongest" (Davis, 1988, p. 169). 
The increased responsibility of managers'in the fate of their companies, brought 
upon them by deregulation, was a largely positive pressure and it is behind the 
great development of strategic and tactical expertise in the airline industry. Today, 
the US airline industry is the most intensely competitive arena for airlines, where 
the most sophisticated strategic and tactical tools and manoeuvres are applied. 
This competition intensity, which constitutes a forum for the development of airline 
management, is diffused to the rest of the world through liberalisation. of air 
transport, which is spreading progressively. Degrees of air transport liberalisation 
have already taken root in New Zealand (1983), Canada (1987), Western Europe, 
ýAustrafia (1990), Sweden (1992), and India (1992) (Verch6re, 1994; Button, 
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1991). The most significant liberalisation for the structure of international air 
transport is that presently progressing in Europe, wWch is also stimulating 
fiberalisation between Europe and the US. 
3.4 Regulation in Europe 
There is a commonly held view that the liberalisation. of European air transport has 
borrowed much from the experience of US deregulation. VA&t it is a truism that 
policy makers benefit from the American experience, basic structural differences 
between the two industries may impose limitations on what can be learnt by the 
American experience that may apply to the European Community. It is therefore 
useful to bear these differences in mind when analysing the liberalisation of 
European air transport, and indeed when implementing economic policy. The most 
obvious difference is that Europe consists of numerous autonomous states with 
different languages, cultures and administrations, while the US comprises a single 
nation and therefore had a much easier task of implementing regulatory reforms. 
-A-Iso, 
Europe's geographical characteristics mean that countries have small 
domestic markets and that 80 per cent of all airline journeys inside the continent 
are international. The average distance travefled is 60 per cent of that in the US, 
with most flights being under two hours, which makes ground transport a stronger 
competitor. The total European air transport market is only some 52 per cent of 
the size of its American equivalent. Non-scheduled services account for more than 
half the demand for air travel in. 'Westem Europe, and within the US this sector has 
never accounted for more than 5 per cent of demand for air travel (Williams, 1993, 
p. 67). 
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Finally, when US deregulation occurred in 1978, the US had numerous private and 
profitable carriers. According to the Financial Times (8 April, 1994), US carriers 
were better prepared than their European counterparts are today. The US 
government could more easily watch weaker carriers be eliminated by competition 
without intervening than individual European govermnents can today. Carriers had 
no choice but to adapt quickly to the new market conditions and respond to 
competition from new entrants, instead of hoping for state subsidies to finance 
restructuring or for the defence of their individual interests by their governments. 
However, the Financial Times also warns that: 
"Deregulation should do for Europeans what it has already done for the US. That 
is why it is such a great idea. But the US experience leaves little room for doubt 
about what it will do to Europe's airline industry. In short, it looks like being a 
bloodbath. " (Financial Times, 8 April, 1994) 
3.4.1 Before European Liberalisation 
Until the mid 1980s, European scheduled airlines were strictly regulated by highly 
protectionist bilateral agreements. Capacity was restricted and often equaUy 
divided between national carriers operating on a single designation reghe (only 
one airfine designated by each country's goverment may fly the route); revenue 
pooling, whereby both national carriers on a route were guaranteed revenues 
proportional to the capacity they offered, was normal; fares were kept high 
through coRusion with the International Air Transport Association (IATA) and the 
prevention of new entrants through national licensing policies; and all major 
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European airlines were state owned and frequently subsidised. Therefore, it is a 
reasonable conclusion that competition was virtually non-existent, and that the 
industry closely resembled a cartel. European liberalisation of air transport can be 
considered: 
" ... an overdue and entirely welcome antidote to years of publicly sponsored 
collusion between sleepy airlines which preferred to enjoy the fruits of cartel life in 
the form of high costs rather than high profits, and for whose management the word 
'competition' had connotations more of the golf course than of the marketplace". 
(Financial Times, 30 May 1990) 
3.4.2 The Impetus for Liberalisation 
Deregulation in the US created new economic and market dynamics. Economies 
of scale, whose applicability to the airlines was largely ignored, were now visible. 
The dominance of incumbent airlines over the new entrants after a very turbulent 
time immediately after deregulation (where new entrants inflicted considerable 
damage), the proliferation of hub-and-spoke network systems, and the marketing 
and scale advantages of computer reservation systems were the major re- 
structuring agents of the US airline industry. The implications of the above factors 
for the European airline industry were profound and irreversible. First, the 
Americans demanded more liberal Air Service Agreements (ASAs) to give their 
carriers the opportunities of global economies of scale and an international hub- 
and-spoke systern. As American airlines operated from an enormous domestic 
market, they could produce very strong inducements for more liberal agreements, 
such as cabotage rights. Thus, they had strong bargaining power advantages over 
foreign airlines. The questions then arose as to what implications such agreements 
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might have for the EC and whether it would be advantageous for the European 
Commission to negotiate with the US on behalf of its members. 
There was also the issue of how European airlines could respond to the 
implications of the globalisation process in the US. They were increasingly 
disadvantaged in the transatlantic market because of the huge pool of passengers in 
the USA located away from international gateways. VVhile their American 
competitors could draw these passengers into their hubs for onward flights across 
the Atlantic, European airlines were legally restricted from doing so. This resulted 
in the vast rmjority of passengers who started their journeys behind international 
gateways in the USA flying across the Atlantic on American carriers. Another 
factor was that the US experience provided an example of benefits that could be 
achieved by deregulation. This further undermined support for the existing regime 
in Europe, but it also revealed some of the problems arising from the sort of full- 
blown deregulation that the US had implemented. This provided food for thought 
about how far and how fast Europe should liberalise its market. 
3.4.3 The Birth of European Liberalisation 
Faint signs of liberalisation appeared in the 1970s. Two judgements by the European 
court in 1974 and 1978 (E. C. R. 359 and E. C. R 1881) clarified the convenient confusion 
over the applicability of the European Community's competition laws to the air 
transportation industry. These laws were based on the Treaty of Rome of 1957 which 
I 'formed the basis for the European Community and its gradual move towards a single 
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market. Following these rulings, consensus was reached that articles 85 and 86, which 
prohibited the collusion that would distort the market and the abuse of dominant 
positions, did in fact apply to the air transport industry. This was to be only the 
beginning; implementing and enforcing these competition laws on airlines proved to be 
difficult. 
In 1979, the Commission published the first memorandum on air transport (European 
Commission, 1979). The memorandum expressed the EC's objective that air transport 
should comply with the broad aims of the Treaty of Rome. The report gave no firm 
proposals and was intended to act only as a stimulus for further discussion. The position 
for the enforcement of the competition rules was unsatisfactory as the Commission was 
dependent upon the co-operation of member states to restrain anti-competitive practices 
and had no real independent power to take any action (Adkins, 1994). Hence, a decade- 
long string of attempts by the Commission to develop airline policy was largely 
unsuccessful and very little progress was made. 
In 1984, the second memorandum on airline policy (European Commission, 1984) was 
published. The proposed creation of a competitive common air transport market was 
generally considered somewhat radical and far reaching, despite the emphatic rejection 
by the Commission of the American-style deregulation for Europe. This rejection was 
justified by the structural differences between the European and the US market. The US 
was a unified domestic market reserved for US carriers; US government policy was 
liberal and accepted the social and econon-dc effects of such a policy; and all US carriers 
operated on a commercial basis and in sufficient numbers so that it was not imperative 
t 'that they all be kept viable (Adkins, 1994). The memorandum proposed that pooling 
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agreements, capacity sharing, price fixing and subsidies should gradually be phased out. 
The sensitive area of market entry was dealt with cautiously (Weatcroft and Lipman, 
1986). In general, the reactions to these proposals varied in accordance with inherent 
vested interests, but encountered strong opposition from trade unions and most carriers. 
After a series of European Summits calling for completion of the Single Market, in 1986 
the Conununity passed the Single European Act (SEA) wlýdch amended the Treaty of 
Rome, and set 1993 as the deadline for the creation of the Single Market. Article 8a had 
a direct impact on airlines: "The internal market shaU comprise an area without internal 
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured 
according to the provisions of this treaty" (EC BuUetin, 1986). The passage of the SEA 
had a strong symbolic importance in revitalising the European movement and helped to 
carry forward not only European integration in general, but airline reform in particular. 
In 1986, the judgement by the European Court of Justice in the case known as the 
'Nouvelles Frontiers' (Slot and Dagtoglou, 1989) reaffirmed the principle that EC 
competition rules must apply to air transportation and represented a turning point in the 
Commission's attempts to liberalise air transport. As most of the EC member states 
were reluctant to apply the competition rules to air transport, little action followed that 
ruling. Consequently, the Commission, eager to develop greater competition in air 
transport, accused ten major European airlines and another 3 carriers of infringing 
Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome. This proved to be an effective tactic and led, after 
much discussion, to the Council agreeing that a series of measures to liberalise European 
air transport should be introduced. Subsequently, the Comn-dssion dropped the 
proceedings against the 13 airlines (Sherman, 1992). The EC , in fact, moved on two 
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fronts so that the member states would either accept the package, or have it legally 
forced upon them (Dobson, 1995). 
3.4.4 The First Package 
In December 1987, the European Council opted for the adoption of a liberalisation 
package. It was fairly modest in ambition and achievements. It sought to reduce 
capacity restrictions marginaUy over a three-year period and tried to open up the market 
by allowing multiple designation of airlines, more regional routes and more fifth freedom 
rights. It also created zones of fare flexibility where price-cutting could take place (see 
Vincent and Stasinopoulos, 1990). As a result of the first package, a number of smaller 
airlines were enabled to enter some of the most important intra-Community scheduled 
routes, or given substantiaUy increased freedom to provide the capacity and charge the 
fares they wished. These included both existing airlines which had previously 
concentrated on domestic or regional markets, such as British Midland and Hamburg 
Airlines, and new entrants such as Air Europe and Ryanair. A few fifth freedom services 
were established, notably by Aer Lingus on routes from Dublin to Manchester and onto 
other points, such as Amsterdan-4 Paris and Copenhagen (CAA, 1993). 
After 20 months, the results of the first package were modest (Weatcroft and Lipman, 
1990). The effects on capacity regulation and fares were disappointing. The zonal fare 
schemes were not much used and old cartel habits died hard. It was only where new 
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independent operators entered the field through multiple designation that the provisions 
for discounts of 15 per cent on economy fares were used (Dobson 1995, p. 193). 
3.4.5 The Second Package 
The second liberalisation package was accepted by the European Councfl in November 
1990. The second package took the process of liberalisation further, but did not add any 
significantly new dimension (CAA, 1993). The scope of zonal fare discounting was 
expanded, and market access was enhanced by allowing third, fourth and fifth freedom 
rights (restricted) between all airports, including major hubs, which had previously been 
exempt. Multiple designation was also made easier by lowering the passenger threshold 
at which another service could enter the market. However, there were still several 
protectionist measures. Capacity liberalisation could be delayed on routes for two years 
to allow a carrier to re-structure and there were provisions for protecting non-profitable 
routes serving community needs (See Weatcroft and Lipman, 1990, pp. 43-51 for a 
more comprehensive analysis). The second package was a significant move towards a 
more liberal and competitive internal airline market. The remaining restrictions, apart 
from cabotage and government financial support for state-owned airlines, were largely 
concerned with how the new rules would be applied in practice (Dobson, 1995). 
However, both the second and the first packages failed to drive down fares more than 
marginaRy (Betts and Gardner, 1992). 
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3.4.6 The Third Package 
The existing commercial framework for international civil aviation, based on national 
policies and bilateralism, found it increasingly difficult to cope with the emergence of 
regional groupings, such as the EC and the Andean Pact. The system's inadequacy was 
also exposed by problems arising from international difficulties in air traffic control and 
CRS (computer reservation systems), from transnational airline alliances, and generafly, 
from the emerging global airline market. Governments and airlines began re-examining 
their plans, and it was soon clear that the airline industry was on the verge of a dramatic 
process of change (Betts and Gardner, 1993). Both in the US and the EC, committees 
were set up to look at the future of the airline industry. 
In 1993, the third liberalisation package was accepted in Europe. The Commission was 
determined that a completely deregulated market should be avoided because it would 
lead to abuse and anti-competitive behaviour. Given the concerns expressed by a 
number of countries, the proposals were as far reaching as one could reasonably have 
expected. The proposals covered route and airline licensing, ownership regulations and 
ýhe- fare regime (Dobson, 1995). The third package was the most far reaching in the 
gradual process of European liberalisation, designed to encourage greater competition 
and bring down European air fares. On average, these were still at least a third higher 
than in the US (Betts and Gardner, 1992). Full European cabotage was delayed for four 
years, and regulations for public service routes and to address the problem of scarce 
slots at major airports, were postponed. Unrestricted fifth freedom rights were created, 
but consecutive cabotage (for example, Air France flying the London-Manchester leg of 
the Paris-London-Manchester route) was restricted to 50 per cent of the intemational 
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leg of the route (the London-Manchester segment could sell no more than 50 per cent of 
the total capacity offered on that route). Pricing was to be on a single disapproval 
regime (one country could veto a fare) to avoid predatory or excessively high fares. The 
most radical move was to introduce a common licensing policy, which facilitated the 
entry of new airlines, now defined in terms of Community rather than national rules of 
ownership. 
3.4.7 Friction over State Aid 
For some, such as the British and the Dutch govermnents, the third package proposals 
did not go far enough. The British in particular felt that the Commission was still far too 
willing to allow goverment financial assistance and bailouts for the airlines. This failure 
to stop state aid was mainly the result of the Commission wanting to avoid political 
fights with member governments at inconvenient times (Economist, 16 ApriL 1994). 
Spain, for example, insisted that "it would bail. out its state airline with Ptas130 billion 
(dollars 1.1 billion), whether agreement to the cash injection was reached or not" 
(Economist, 9 Dec. 1995). Between 1990 and 1993, BA estiniated that Sabena, Air 
France and Iberia together received aid of about $3 billion. "While these payments have 
been justified by governments in terms of the need to finance restructuring programs, it 
is unclear that the sums involved would have been made available on the same terms to 
non state-owned airlines" (CAA, 1993, p. 5). 
The Commission established the 'Comite des Sages' in June 1993 to examine the 
economic problems confronting the airlines of the EC. The spirit of the Comit6 
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des Sages' report (Comit6 des Sages, 1994) was for maintaining the momentum 
towards liberalisation, although future progress was in doubt. The 
recommendations of the Comitd des Sages in the commercial domain were 
controversial. Despite recognising that capital injections and state aid had severely 
contributed to over-capacity and uneconomic pricing, the Comit6 still 
acknowledged the need for a 'last chance' financial aid package for some airlines. 
During the hearings run by the Cornit6 des Sages, the polarisation of the EC 
member states became obvious (Financial Times, 28 Sept. 1993). A protectionist 
lobby, led by Air France and Sabena, called for a freezing of capacity and fares 
until 1996, which would effectively mean the suspension of competition for two 
years. This had the potential of seriously jeopardising any expansion hopes of 
successful European airlines such as KLM, BA, Air UK and Virgin. Secondly, 
there were calls for an EC fund to help with restructuring. Thirdly, there was an 
attack on Britain, alleging that it acted hypocriticaRy in calling for liberalisation in 
Europe while at the same time retaining the most restrictive of bilateral agreements 
With the US (Financial Times, 28 Sept. 1993). 
In March 1994, a rescue package was produced involving government funding Of 
$3.42 biUion over three years in return for some rationalisation of the work force. 
/V1 krught, 23 February, 1994, p. 25; Flight, 16 March 1994, p. 5). In July 1994, the 
Commission approved state aid totalhg $ 7.1 billion to three airlines, including Air 
France, Olympic Airways of Greece, and TAP of Portugal. Since August 1991, 
the industry calculates that the Commission has approved state aid to European 
airlines totallirig US$ 10.35 billion. Privatised airlines, such as British Airways, 
and- other carriers in the process of being privatised, such as Lufthansa, have 
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attacked the latest subsidies as threatening to distort competition in the new 
fiberaUsed market (Financial Times, 27 Sept. 1994). 
The problem was not just financial aid to airlines. Providing state aid to the airlines 
for restructuring was an investment that had to be safeguarded. Hence the airlines 
would also have to be shielded by their governments from any seriously damaging 
competition. The approved state aid also demonstrated that the Commission once 
again had coUapsed under pressure from protectionist governments. Even the US 
administration made clear its dismay at the Brussels decision: "In the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, when Pan Am and Eastern Airlines went under, the US 
government resisted enormous pressure to intervene. In the long run, US carriers 
and consumers are better for it. The European Commission should have stood up 
to these subsidies in the same way" (Financial Times, 29 July 1994). US carriers, 
of course, stand to gain much from the bankruptcy of European airfines, especiaUy 
in the transatlantic markets. 
"The EU's skies have been free of cross-border restrictions on schedules and prices 
for three years. Yet prices are still high. Barely a dozen new (and small) carriers 
have taken off successfully; most of the rest have found their way blocked by state- 
owned airlines, themselves kept alive only by Brussels-approved state aid". 
(Economist, 6 April 1996) 
3.4.8 The Importance of Airport Slots 
As liberalisation progressed in Europe, independent carriers, wl-dch have often been 
catalysts in the introduction of competitive fares and higher standards of service, 
have increasingly complained about the obstacle to entry to new routes posed by 
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the scarcity of prime time, take-off and landing slots at major airports. 
Recognising this, the Commission brought forward proposals for a gradual re- 
distribution of slots. It already had in place rules governing the distribution of new 
or abandoned slots. The reaction from member states was fundamentally hostile. 
In fact, there were many vested interests against the proposals. For example, while 
BA favoured EC liberalisation and the creation of a single European airline market, 
it developed a convenient perception of slot redistribution as a form of re- 
regulation rather than deregulation. In other words, it stood to lose valuable slots 
to such competitors as Virgin Atlantic and British Midland, which would threaten 
its Heathrow fortress. 
The Conunission persisted and the Council adopted a set of rules in January 1993. 
States were to be responsible for placing a congested airport in the hands of a co- 
ordinator to allocate new or unused slots. Any slot not utilised over 80 per cent of 
, I- - the time could be confiscated and put in a pool, 50 per cent of which would be 
allocated to new entrants. These were modest measures as the slots remained 
largely 'grandfathered' - airlines which have been operating slots have first option 
to keep them. The issue of slot allocation is of paramount importance in the 
intensification of competition. 
"There is little chance of two airlines competing if one operator's aircraft can take 
off and land and its rival's can do neither. In many of the world's airports, at least 
during the busy times, demand for take-off and landing slots far outstrips supply. In 
most airports these slots are allocated in ways that stifle competition. Until recently, 
this hardly mattered. Airport congestion was rare, and air travel so heavily 
regulated, that airport slots were the least of the worr ies of a would-be competitor to 
established airlines. ... The system is usually administrative: slots are distributed by bureaucratic fiat, not according to how much they are worth to different airlines. 
Worse, this decision is based on 'grandfather' rights. ... This insures the continued dominance of airports by flag carriers. " (Economist, 19 Oct. 1991). 
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Many propose the auctioning of slots. In 1990, the European Commission 
proposed that incumbents should sacrifice slots for auction. Lobbyists made it 
think again (Economist, 19 Oct. 1991). The Commission now opposes the idea of 
trading airport landing slots - it favours a much more interventionist approach, its 
reason being "to prevent large airlines from don-dnating airport landing slote' 
(Financial Times, 28 Jan. 1992). However, with the present system of allocation 
of slots, incumbent airlines consider they practically own the slots indefinitely. 
Legally, it is not clear who owns slots, but some legal specialists say it is definitely 
not the airlines (Skapinker, 1996). The system is restricting the freedom in 
European skies (Economist, 6 May 1995). 
3.4.9 Recent Progress 
Perhaps the most important development in recent years, after the liberalisation 
programme, has been the increasing competence of the Commission to negotiate 
on behalf of the Community in Air Service Agreements (ASAs). Political 
inhibitions have Largely been overcome to intervene within the domestic affairs of 
the EC. However, there has generally been less success in negotiations involving 
foreign states. The debate of the Council of Ministers' on 20 June 1995 on this 
matter suggests that there wiH not be a breakthrough in the short term. Ministers 
declined to sanction the draft Commission's negotiating mandate and asked the 
Commission to produce a more detailed analysis of the benefits of EC-wide 
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negotiations (Avmark Aviation Economist, June-July 95). The European Union's 
transport commissioner, Neil Kinnock, has argued that: 
"*.. in aviation, just as in trade, one collective European voice would be more 
effective than a cacophony of national voices. He has therefore opposed efforts by 
individual European countries to sign 'open skies' treaties -, and indeed begun legal 
action against some for undermining the single market with agreements that 
discriminate against fellow EU members. His threat has been ignored. Last year 
half the EU's member governments signed bilateral 'open skies' agreements with 
America. His bluff called, Mr Kinnock is now dawdling on his way to the 
courtroom; he has so far taken no action against the most recent infringer, 
Germany". (Economist, 6 April 1996) 
1 
The current threat is that the interests and the unity of the EC as a whole may be 
undermined by the attempts of individual states to safeguard their positions In 
bflateral agreements with the US. The five former 'wise men' from the Comitd des 
Sages met in mid-August 1995 for a preliminary discussion about the progress of 
liberalisation in the European Union (OdelL 1995). Their main comments and 
concerns were as foRows: 
* On a scale of zero to five, the 'wise men' assessed the Conunission's 
progress as two, which in summary means that some progress in certain 
areas was initiated, but that considerable concern still remains. 
9 The group's main purpose is to follow the results and to act in a 
monitoring role, thus attempting to avoid the eternal shelving of its 
report. 
9 They claim that the Comn-dssion is trying to solve the problem of 
allocating the slots at the wrong end. The Commission should focus on 
69 
improving the use of existing capacity and enhancing capacity for the 
future. 
e They worry about a political inclination to support rail transport and 
that subsidies to rail transport may allow unfair competition with the 
airlines; 
* On the subject of negotiation of Air Services Agreements, they advise 
that issues such as how to replace mtional desigmtion clauses and 
allocate route rights among Europe's carriers wiU make progress 
difficult. The main problems the Comniission faces are that member 
states do not actually share a conunon aviation policy, and that the 
Commission can hardly negotiate with third parties on behalf of the EU 
without a sound internal market in place. 
9 The general tone of the meeting was critical of the Commission's 
progress, but aU five members seem keen to ensure the Commission 
stays on course to lead the EU into a truly open market by 1997. 
Although progress has been painfully slow, the importance of transport to the EC 
is undeniable: it is vital for the development of the European Union (Verch&e, 
1994), generates over seven per cent of its GDP, and has broad econon-dc, social 
and pofitical benefits (Dobson 1995). 
3.4.10 Conclusions 
The aim of the EC has been to avoid the full deregulation model of the US, and to 
produce a flexible, safe and efficient market which responds to the main demands 
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of the consumer, which can meet certain Community needs, and avoids abuses of 
the free market, such as predatory pricing and exploitation by the dominant 
players. European liberalisation has been a lengthy and strenuous process largely 
because of its highly political nature and the conflict of interests shown by the EC 
member states, whose prime objective has been to safeguard the interests of their 
airlines. So often, policy is not determined by the 'objective' economics of the 
situation, but by political perceptions, accurate or otherwise, about the econornics 
involved and by a multitude of other non-economic considerations (Dobson, 1995). 
European air transport is still complex and heterogeneous. What the national 
airlines of the member states each have in common is dominance of their home 
markets and major hub airports. This dominance has often been built up over 
many years, during which national airlines enjoyed positions of near or actual 
monopoly as a matter of government policy (CAA, 1993). 
The EC increasingly bringing its competition rules to bear has reduced the rigid 
structure in the European airline market that had developed'since 1946. The 
Commission, working in conjunction with the Court of Justice and member states, 
such as Britain and Holland, has largely conquered political obstacles to refomL 
Having politically powerful states which have been willing to lead the way in 
liberalising air services has been crucial for the Connnission to pressure the other 
more protectionist states. The UK and Holland were most receptive to the idea of 
liberalisation. Both had developed their main international airports as gateways to 
and from Europe and they wanted better access to foreign passenger markets. 
They also had the best developed national reform programmes in the early 1980s. 
Britain had three reasons for wanting a liberal single airline market in the EC. The 
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first was doctrinal: the dislike by Thatcher acolytes of industrial regulation. The 
second reason was that Britain, unlike other European countries, had a good string 
of independents - BM, Dan Air, Air UK, Air Europe, etc. In a freer market it was 
expected that these airlines, along with BA, would succeed, especially considering 
the importance of London in European air travel - in 1993, ten of the fifteen largest 
international scheduled routes (including the five largest) were to or from London 
(CAA, 1993). And thirdly, there was an intemational perspective created by 
deregulation in the US. Britain has been the main advocate of reform in the airline 
industry. This is ironic, given Britain's reputation as a reluctant and increasingly 
'optional' and less co-operative partner in the EC. 
So, capacity, frequency, fare and route restrictions, and the division of whole 
markets by pooling agreements, have all been reformed. These achievements 
arnount to significant progress in aHowing the market rather than political forces to 
mould the EC airline industry. However, on the whole, the dominance of national 
flag airlines has been eroded only slightly, and few intra-European Union routes are 
yet contested by more than two carriers. "Most damningly, Europe's notoriously 
high air fares have been slow to fal On the evidence, consumers may weU wonder 
what the EU fiberalisation has reaUy achieved" (Financial Times, 20 Sept. 1995). 
The most observable changes in the European airline system have been the - 
proliferation of regional routes, the increase in fare competition on routes where a 
I 
third airline has joined the flag carriers, cross border alliances, and the foreign 
investment and ownership of airlines. However, because of congestion, potential 
new entrants have great difficulty in attaining take-off and landing slots at airports 
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(Doganis, 1992). At present the newcomers compete on a mere 7% of Europe's 
routes; in America, the figure is about 40% of aU routes (Haji-Ioannou, 1996). 
The Association of European Airlines claims that because of liberalisation, intra- 
European traffic has increased almost 30 per cent over the lastftee years (Adams, 
1996). 
Despite the achievement of important changes within the EC, there are still 
underlying problems which threaten the future progress of the Community. In 
particular, national factors can lead to the manipulation of protectionist concerns 
contained in EC regulations for the benefit of flag carriers. Amongst these worries 
are: the issue of state aid with the failure by the EC to assert a 'one last time' 
criteria; the persistence of national cabotage until 1997, when European cabotage 
is supposed to be implemented; and the apparent persistence by individual members 
of the Community to negotiate Air Service Agreements, officially justified by fears 
that the Commission is not yet qualified to do so. All these provide ample scope 
for protectionism in the short/medium term. 
There are also doubts over the effectiveness of EC rule implementation and 
enforcement. A major problem is that liberalisation needs wider and stronger 
political support to work, while at the same time it needs to show evidence that it 
is working in order to gain Political support. "Until there is clear evidence that 
competitive rces are starting to assert themselves much more vigorously, 
progress towards an open European market wiU continue to depend heavily on 
momentum generated in Brussels" (Financial Times, 20 Sept., 1995). European 
carriers have to rely more on international traffic to gain market volume than US 
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carriers. European carriers' domestic markets are too smaU to provide it. 
Furthermore, BA, for example, makes a very large proportion of its profits from its 
American routes. European liberalisation of cabotage rights would therefore mean 
not only a larger playing field, with European carriers' domestic market increasing 
to the size of the whole EC, but a more level playing field would be negotiable 
between the EC and the US. Access to European and US cabotage could be 
exchanged, enlarging the market potential for both sides. 
For the foreseeable future, the international airline industry is unlikely to become 
just a matter of commerce and business, whether it goes down the route of 
liberalisation or that of regulation and protection. It will remain highly political 
and involve complex diplomatic negotiations for some time to come, whether they 
are conducted by national or regional representatives. The success of liberalisation 
and its eventual impact on air fares will ultimately rest on the goodwill of EC 
member states (Betts and Gardner, 1992). Some (Betts, 1993) beUeve that any 
increase in competition should not be on a comparable scale to US deregulation. 
But perhaps the most important determinant of the success of liberalisation wifl be 
the airline passenger market itself If it moves out of its latest depressed state (as 
its seems to be doing in response to general improvement in the world economy), 
this might create more room for manoeuvre by airlines and give them the basis 
from which to act more adventurously in creating the new international system. 
"If the European airlines respond to regulatory changes in the same way as their US 
counterparts, we are certain to witness a transformation of the industry in at least 
two ways: increased market orientation, leading to a proliferation of new services, 
and growing price and cost pressures, making productivity improvements a key 
factor for success. " (Barton et al., 1994, p. 30) 
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However, it is unlikely that Europe will accept unlin-dted liberalisation. The 
prospects are for a continuing debate between govermnents as to how far they can 
go, and for a continuing struggle between the free marketeers and the instinctive 
interventionists (Verch6re, 1994). The European fiberalisation process wilL 
however, not be complete until open skies extend over the Atlantic as well. This is 
because airlines make most of their money on long-haul ffights, and it is hard for, 
say, a British or a Dutch airline to obtain rights to fly from Paris to New York 
while the French government regulates the route. "In a European-American free- 
aviation area, any one could fly from anywhere, subject to buying a slot at an 
airport. It is time to take the flags off aircraft's taiW' (Economist, 9 Dec. 1995). 
Whatever happens, intense political arguments and complex diplomatic discussions 
will inevitably be involved as matters cannot be resolved solely on the basis of 
economic analysis or abstract models of transportation systems. 
3.5 Liberalisation of Air Transport Between the US 
and Europe 
3.5.1 Regulatory and Commercial Significance 
The prominence of this liberalisation is substantiated not only because the 
European and North American markets together account for almost seventy per 
cent of world air traffic (ICAO, 1992), but because the liberalisation of the traffic 
between the US and Europe is already posing important regulatory questions. It is 
severely testing the unity of purpose within the European Community and testing 
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the ability of two strong economic powers on different continents to regulate 
powerful alliances, that between British Airways and American Airlines, while 
simultaneously pressing on with efforts to intensify competition. This liberalisation 
also provides a good example of the classic and delicate conflict between national 
trade goals and market efficiency goals. Achieving degrees of market efficiency 
while acting with mercantilism is arduous. 
The effects of a potential intensification of competition between the US and the 
European Union (EU) would undoubtedly spread to the rest of the world, as 
carriers of any nationality operating to and from Europe or the US would have to 
face extremely competitive airlines. Unless the countries of those carriers loosen 
protectionism over their markets, they will have extreme difficulty not only in 
gaining access to EU or US markets, but in ever out-competing EU or US carriers. 
This potential liberalisation would constitute a milestone in the development of the 
world air transportation industry. It would create an enviromnent of much 
accelerated dynamics, constituting a bighly pressurised forum for the development 
of airline management thought and hence for the evolution of the strategic use of 
information in the airline industry. 
3.5.2 Recent Progress? 
The Americans have supported Europe in principle throughout the fiberalisation process. 
PoliticaUy, the liberalisation of Europe means the increased probability that cabotage 
rights in Europe are put on a potential negotiation table of Air Service Agreements 
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between a unified Europe and the US. The US has thus far been frustrated in its great 
ambition of operating cabotage rights in Europe. Its idea of Ifficralisation is the abolition 
of all restrictions on any services an airline wants to offer. However, its policy of 
restricting the number of gateways available to foreign operators in the US was not 
completely aligned with that notion. The US has also not shown any signs of reforming 
its market place either by allowing cabotage operations for foreign operators or by 
loosening restrictions on foreign control over US airlines (Dobson, 1995). 
Because European countries have small domestic air travel markets (which means small 
cabotage bases), individuaUy they cannot offer significant cabotage bases for negotiation 
in Air Service Agreements. This gives the US, in practice, a strong incentive to 
negotiate with individual European Union members rather than with a unified Europe. 
By using this method it has much more bargaining power by virtue of the large cabotage 
base it can offer as enticement. Hence, the US is able to obtain favourable ASAS in 
exchange for fewer concessions. According to the Financial Times: 
"Suborning [competition rules] to national trade goals devalues their effectiveness. 
The US would doubtless respond that such tactics have paid off. Its carriers stand 
to gain greater operating freedom in the EU, without conceding equivalent rights in 
their home market. But if the US genuinely wants liberalisation of world markets, 
this is no way to achieve it. Its 'open skies' deals amount to using government 
muscle to win favours for US carriers. Such mercantilism does not advance real free 
trade but perpetuates the state intervention, nationalistic attitudes and bilateral 
arrangements which have prevented aviation developing into a truly global industry. 
Such an approach also risks turning relations with Brussels into a confrontational 
trial of strength. That would be counter-productive and inappropriate when the two 
sides are working together to lower transatlantic trade barriers in other sectors. The 
sensible course is to extend their co-operation to aviation. " (Financial Times, 8 July, 
1996) 
According to Neil Kinnock, Europe's transport commissioner, by dealing as a bloc with 
the US, the EU might be able to accomplish greater benefits than its members can Obtain 
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individually. However, the EU would need far greater unity of purpose than it now 
possesses. Interests are conflicting. For many of its larger members, the priority in 
transatlantic negotiations is to enhance the role of their bigger airports. For smaller 
ones, it is to expand their carriers' access to the US market (Financial Times, 7 June 
1995), -or simply to protect them from damaging competition. An example is the deal 
between the Dutch KLM and the US North West Airlines, signed in 1992, which had a 
vast effect on the German market. Although the total number of passengers travelling 
from Germany to the US had remained stable over the previous three years, the number 
of German passengers traveffing via Amsterdam increased by about 80 per cent 
(Financial Times, 7 Dec. 1995). This means great market share and monetary gains for 
Amsterdam's airport. France, Germany and Britain stand to lose much in terms of 
traffic at their major airports from open skies deals the US has signed with European 
Union members (Financial Times, 7 Dec. 1995). 
"In these circumstances, trying to forge a common front which satisfies all 
concerned looks a thankless - perhaps impossible - task. Underlying these 
divergences is EU governments' longstanding tendency to regard their flag airlines 
as projections of sovereign power, and air transport policy as a means to promote 
the interests of carriers, not of their customers. Such attitudes will persist until 
Europe has a genuinely competitive airline market, ruled by efficiency instead of 
nationalism. " (Financial Times, 7 June 1995) 
Despite efforts from the European Commission to stop individual countries from 
negotiating ASAs with the US, the Americans have signed open skies agreements with 
Germany, the Netherlands and most of the countries in northern Europe. Amongst 
other things, these agreements open international routes to new entrants, removing 
limits on flights and frequencies and allow carriers flying from America to pick up traffic 
, firom Europe to fly to other countries (and vice versa). But they do not permit 
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European carriers to compete in the protected American market (which accounts for 
around 40 per cent of the world market). The UK has so far refused to sign a similar 
agreement in order to protect BA (which is looked on by the British Government with 
"the cool detachment that a mother reserves for her only child" (Economist, 31 Aug. 
1996) and the other British carriers at Heathrow. 
Neil Kinnock has written to all EU govermnents involved, threatening court action if 
they continue to negotiate or sign deals with the US. He regards the agreements 
proposed by the US as illegal because they do not embody provisions required by the 
EU's regulations and could conflict with its competition rules. So far, the governments 
appear to have ignored his threat, and the dispute may ultimately have to be resolved in 
the courts (Financial Times, 14 March 1995). 
3.5.3 The British Airways / American Airlines Alliance 
The proposal in June 1996 of a code-sharing alliance between British Airways and 
American Airlines was hailed as unequivocaBy good news for the two carriers. 
Both airlines would effectively double their networks at minirml expense, leading 
analysts to forecast additional profits of hundreds of millions of dollars (Cohen, 
1996). Code-sharing simply means the ability of one airline to transfer its 
passengers onto the other's network. In essence, the two companies become one, 
for "code-sharing plainly requires extensive co-operation between participants on 
pricing, marketing and most other things that make an airline tick" (Independent, 
12 June 1996). The proposed alliance prompted a European Commission 
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competition investigation into transatlantic airline alliances (Financial Times, 8 
July 1996). 
For all their power, BA and American concluded their deal as a way of defending 
themselves against forces in the aviation industry they could no longer control. 
Rival airlines in both the US and Europe have been busily concluding similar 
alliances, while their govermnents have been signing liberal 'open skies' 
agreements which allow airlines from one country to fly freely to any point in the 
other (Skapinker, 1996) (e. g. KLM/Northwest, Delta with a few European airlines 
including Virgin, and Lufthansa/United). Both American Airlines and BA have 
equaUy embarrassing positions to defend. Robert Ayling (BA's chairman. ) had, 
three months earlier, strongly criticised Lufthansa's alliance with United Airlines on 
the basis that relaxing anti-trust laws would reduce the level of competition. Yet 
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Lufthansa and United together flew fewer than of 14 per cent of scheduled flights 
between the whole of Europe and the US (Independent, 12 June 1996). Robert 
CrandaU (American's chairman) had told the American Chamber of Commerce in 
1995 that code-sharing was inappropriate because it is based on misleading the 
consumers into believing they are buying one- thing while seffing another; that it 
was profoundly anti-competitive and would in the long term inevitably reduce the 
number of competing carriers. 
However, the BA/AA alliance needs immunity from America's anti-trust laws if the 
companies are to pool their services. "This would be the American equivalent of 
banning the Monopolies and Mergers Commission from investigating the activities 
of the two companies. ... This would mean that the most powerful cartel in 
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aviation history would be given carte blanche to behave as it wants in the 
marketplace" (Independent, 12 June 1996). Washington has made anti-trust 
exemption for transatlantic alliances conditional on European countries improving 
access for US carriers. The American regulators conveniently think that some sort 
of liberalisation is in order to balance the reduction in competition that would be 
caused by the virtual merger of the world's two most powerful airlines. "While 
competition is taken away with one hand, it is increased with the other. That is 
what they would like you to believe anyway" (Independent, 12 June 1996). 
Except that in terms of competition, balancing an alliance such as the BA/AA may 
be impossible. Also, US carriers would gain increased access to Europe in the 
process. This would mean damaging not only the other British carriers, but the 
business of many more European airlines, as AA could use BA to carry its traffic 
to practicaUy anywhere in Europe. 
The liberalisation that the US has in mind to compensate for the alliance relates 
mostly to the protectionism over Heathrow. It is in particular over 'beyond 
Heathrow rights' - the US would like to pick up traffic at Heathrow to fly to other 
countries. This would constitute a penetration of BA's hub/fortress, and most 
importantly, a penetration by US carriers of one of the most important European 
gateway airports. A route from the US, via Heathrow to Tokyo for example, 
would not only erode the vast profits that competing carriers such as Virgin make 
on it, but it would lure away much of the European carriers' traffic to Japan. 
The British, however, insist on the Americans granting British carriers the right either to 
operate inside the US, or to buy control of American carriers (at present they are limited 
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to a 25 per cent share). This "would be a bitter pill for Mr. Pena [the US transportation 
secretary] to swallow in an election year" (Economist, 31 Aug. 1996). The US 
considers the deal to be less than positive for an election year, not with unions opposing 
it (Feldman, 1996). 
3.5.4 Conclusions 
The liberalisation of the EU's internal market, to be completed in 1997 when 
carriers will be able to operate freely between and within all 15 member states, will 
erode the effectiveness of protection built into each country's bilateral accords with 
the US. After 1997, US airlines, through open skies deals, will, for example, be 
able to use an EU airline to carry their own passengers anywhere in the EU 
(Financial Times, 7 Dec. 1995). Hence the hportance of air transport unity of 
purpose in t EU. Europe, too, must penetrate the US market if there is to be any 
meaningful liberalisation of air transport over the Atlantic. 
"However, the chances of a decent EU wide deal [with the US] look slim. Weak 
airlines such as Air France, Iberia and Alitalia will almost certainly force their 
government owners to dilute or block any agreement. Britain is unlikely to cede to 
Brussels anything that might weaken Heathrow's dominant position in transatlantic 
traffic. " (Economist, 6 May 1995) 
According to the Financial Times, the aviation markets between the US and Europe 
should be ruled by market forces and not by political debates: 
"The EU should propose opening its single aviation market fully to US carriers once 
it comes into being next year, in return for comparable access to US domestic 
routes. That would ensure fairer and more open competition than the patchwork of 
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bilateral deals sewn up by the US in Europe. The two sides should abolish their 
anachronistic restrictions on foreign ownership of airlines, which have merely 
thwarted industry rationalisation. They should also aim to align their competition 
policies to keep markets open, rather than to promote their airlines' interests. 
Finally, they should seek the negotiation of multilateral aviation rules in the World 
Trade Organisation. Those steps would require radically changed attitudes among 
governments, long used to treating even privatised flag carriers as extensions of the 
state. But they need to recognise that such practices are to blame for the problems 
afflicting the industry today. The starting point for any solution must be to get 
governments and bureaucrats out of the airline business, not further in. " (Financial 
Times, 8 July, 1996) 
Robert Crandall (American Airlines' chairman) supports cabotage because he 
wants to use it as a trading weapon to gain access to other nations' domestic air 
travel markets. In his opinion, only the most foolhardy of foreign carriers would 
actually attempt to compete head-to-head on US domestic routes against the 
strongest US carriers. To compete profitably in the domestic US market, a foreign 
carrier would have to duplicate its US rivals' entrenched, well-financed hub-and- 
spoke networks overnight, which, because of the cost and logistics involved, 
would be impossible (Reed, 1993) 
The negotiation of Air Service Agreements between the EC and the US is difficult. 
This is because the EC is having tremendous difficulties in gaining and asserting the 
authority to negotiate on behalf of its member and stop them from negotiating 
individual bilaterals with the US; and also because reconciling the differences in 
fiberalisation phRosophies between the EC and the US is not easy. Also, 
establishing frameworks for negotiation which take into account the different 
geographical and structural characteristics of the industry in the US and EC is 
provmg compficated. 
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"The big thing to watch in the coming decade will be how these radically different 
models of aviation - free competition within the United States, rigid regulation 
outside it - come together. One way to encourage the coupling would be for 
America to remove its restrictions on foreign airlines buying American ones. That 
would inject much needed capital into the American industry and open a real 
connection between the two systems. Then the world might begin to have an 
aviation industry worthy of being called 'global'. " (Economist, 6 May 1995). 
Market efficiency is the grand official agenda of politicians involved in efforts of 
liberalisation both within the European Community and between the EC and the US. 
However, in practice the efforts are being guided by agendas of nationalism and 
mercantilism. Achieving market efficiency goals with such ulterior motivations will no 
doubt be a long and arduous process, where progress can be achieved only through 
extremely reluctant concessions from the parties involved. Any concessions on matters 
of such immense significance damage the often fragile home political support and 
popularity of the govenments ceding them, and hence their prospects of re-election. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE NATURE OF THE BUSINESS 
4. The Nature of the Business 
The airline business is a politically charged activity, target of much regulatory 
attention, and of economic theory. Its information intensity, competitive conduct 
and peculiar rationality have caused many deviations from academic and 
regulatory predictions and theories. This section is a general attempt to identify 
and describe the characteristics and influences that give the industry such 
peculiarity. More specifically, it attempts to connect the characteristics of the 
business with the importance of procuring and using information strategically, and 
to serve as foundation for the chapter addressing the strategic uses of information 
in the airline industry. 
This section will start with a compulsory overview of the political and regulatory 
restrictions involved in managing and competing in the airline industry. This 
reference is essential since the influence of politics and the hold of regulation are 
behind the most restrictive forces in airline management and competition. The 
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extent to which airlines procure and use information strategically is directly linked 
to the intensity of competition to which they are exposed in the markets. The 
section will then continue by examining the information intensity of this industry. 
It will illustrate that the airline business is extremely information intensive, not 
only operationally, but strategically. 
At this stage there will be only a general overview of the type of information that 
an airline acquires and processes in order not only to operate, but to be 
competitive. This is because in the next chapter that very information intensity 
will become much more salient in the context of exploiting the mechanisms of 
acquisition and use of information in airline management and emphasising its 
importance for airline competitiveness. 
Acquiring and using information can be seen as an organisational capability. In 
that there is a learning curve in procuring and using information, the type and 
degree of experience in competitive markets is a major determinant of the airline's 
ability to procure and use information proficiently. Procuring and using 
information strategically in such an information intensive business is therefore an 
essential organisational capability for airline strategy. 
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4.1 Flying Politics 
4.1.1 The Politics of Regulation 
For an airline to fly it needs to have aircraft, crew and its operational competence 
certified by civil authorities. It also needs to have allocated times to take off 
from the airport of origin. It needs permission to serve foreign countries and to 
compete with the respective national carriers. It needs permission to fly over the 
country or countries in order to arrive at the planned destination. It needs 
allocated times to land at foreign airports, and more often than not it needs 
permission to charge the fares it wants in the various markets. It also needs 
permission to offer the number of seats (capacity) with the frequencies it deems 
appropriate for each market. 
Given the vast and intense diplomatic and political negotiations which air 
transport needs to operate, it is hardly surprising that air transport and politics are 
extremely intimate. Lyth (1995) points out two closely connected and enduring 
characteristics which have marked the development of the air transport business 
over the last seventy-four years. First, it is critically dependent on one of the 
world's most complex and expensive of modern technologies - aircraft 
manufacture - and second, it has attracted from the outset an abnormal degree of 
governmental control, regulation and general interference. According to the 
Economist, this political interference is not always coherent, and greatly hinders 
the development of the airline industry: 
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"The world's air-transport industry has been shaped by the clumsy hands of 
governments ever since its birth 80 years ago. Today, despite the freeing of airline 
fares and routes in America and much talk of deregulation in Europe, air transport 
remains more subject to the largesse and strictures of bureaucrats than almost any 
other industry. Every aircraft maker is subsidised. Many airlines are either state- 
owned or subsidised. Routes and fares nearly everywhere outside America are 
fixed by official fiat. At one end of the industry, governments dole out cash to 
aircraft makers; at the other, they hold down demand for aircraft by restricting the 
competition among airlines that would let growth in traffic soar. Government 
meddling in every aspect of air travel has so distorted the industry that it makes 
sense for the companies which operate in it to spend much of their time begging for 
yet more government help. As a result air transport often seems to operate in an 
economic daze". (Economist, 7 March, 1992) 
Bums (1969) enquired whether airlines should be oriented, purely and simply, towards 
the needs of their growing number of customers, much advocated by the new 
independent British carriers of the 1960s, or if they should continue to place the main 
emphasis on an orderly and stable supply of air transport, with all the implications 
which that carried for national government policy and international co-operation? At 
the national level, the question of an airline's purpose drew an almost unanimous 
response in the post-war years. Even the very existence of large civil fleets was 
internationally regarded as an eminent threat to peace. These same defence concerns 
are behind the origins oflealously possessive and defensive political attitudes towards 
airlines and aircraft manufacturers. 
"Civil Aviation has been tangled up in politics from its very beginning. There has 
always been more to it than just carrying mail, freight or passengers for a profit 
from one point to another. Civil aviation, apart from commercial considerations, 
has also been deemed important from military and intelligence purposes, as a 
means of encouraging national and imperial cohesion, and as an important status- 
symbol. In all these aspects politics plays an important part. Commercial aviation 
has had to rely upon political and diplomatic sponsorship in order to obtain routes 
and landing rights; furthermore, notwithstanding the move towards deregulation 
which took place in 1978 in the United States, airlines have often been subsidised 
and fares regulated to ensure profitability. The free market has been repeatedly 
submitted to political interference". (Dobson, 1991, pp. 1-2) 
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Although the military and political dimensions remain very much intrinsic to the 
air transportation industry, liberalisation trends and pressures have gradually 
turned the airline into a conunercial enterprise, particularly in the US, where 
deregulated nwkets are now 19 years old. In Europe some nostalgic airline 
chiefs, who have for so long been used to flying under their national flag, hope 
that nationalistic interests in air transport will somehow retard the evolution. 
Nevertheless, liberalisation is taking place with intense political bargaining to 
accompany it. We are seeing an increasing number of commercially-oriented 
private European carriers. Ironically, the increasing commercial role of airlines 
in many countries has contributed only to a more commercially-oriented and no 
less intense 'national flag' attitude. What started as national sovereignty and 
pride justifying the goverrunent ownership of airlines, the denial of air transport 
freedom rights to foreign carriers, and the general restriction of competition, has 
evolved into pure nationalism and hard mercantilism. 
"Free trade has always been, and remains, an impossible dream in aviation. 
Though aviation has long fostered hopes for international peace, in diplomatic 
terms it has created nothing but jealousy and conflagration. Like bees, airlines 
pollinate the world's financial system with capital. They create, mobilize, and 
transport wealth in proportions vastly exceeding the fares paid by the passengers". 
(Petzinger, 1995, p. 341) 
According to the World Tourism Organisation (1994), protectionism over air 
transport is based on a variety of important commercial considerations beyond 
national pride and sovereignty: 
* air transport provides employment and develops high technology businesses 
(airlines, aircraft manufacture, airports, etc. ); 
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* aviation is highly instrumental in developing the tourism industry; 
* airlines are important earners of foreign exchange and avoid foreign 
exchange being spent on foreign airlines; 
* air transport services are important in regional development and in the 
promotion of foreign trade; there are essential national air transport services 
which, although uneconomic, are politically or socially useful. 
4.1.2 The Manipulation of Governments 
Airlines are not surprisingly, very proficient when it comes to politics. After all, 
the industry was created and developed by governments. Airlines are expert at 
manipulating their governments, and the competition behind the scene is just as 
intense as it is in the normal commercial market. Large airlines in particular flex 
their political muscles so mightily that their goverriments feel obliged to defend 
their specific interests internationally, and even against national competitors. 
Examples include the dropping of the 'price-fixing' charges brought by Laker 
Airways against British Airways in the US courts at the personal request of 
Margaret Thatcher to Ronald Reagan, just when BA was to be privatised 
(Gregory, 1994); the great difficulty of Virgin Atlantic and any airline other than 
BA in getting airport slots at Heathrow; the presence of a BA representative in 
negotiations on bilateral agreements between the UK and the US, and Spain's 
forcing of approval of state aid to Iberia by the EC. 
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"It's an odd thing about British Airways, but it has always regarded the 
government as a 100 per cent owned subsidiary at its beck and call. Privatisation 
and the onset of a limited amount of competition in the skies has failed to shake the 
airline in its belief that its own interests and those of British people are one and the 
same thing7 (Independent, 3 July, 1996). 
Airlines also have a tendency to play the politics game and then complain when 
decisions go against thern. Many airlines hire professional lobbyists in order to 
pursue their causes in political channels. American Airlines, for example, when 
trying to get a Chicago-Tokyo route back in 1990, hired a lobbyist (William 
Burhop, who had been hired in 1989 as vice president of federal affairs). After 
the decision to grant the route to United Airlines was made final, American 
complained. 
"[American Airlines] accused the DOT of playing politics. But that's like accusing 
the National Football League of sponsoring football games. Of course DOT played 
politics. It's in Washington. It's leader is a political appointee. And its senior 
officials, typically, are mid-career lawyers and political hacks trying either to hang 
on to their cushy jobs through ever-changing administrations or to land high- 
paying jobs as Washington lobbyists. So they do whatever they' re told by their 
political masters. And American should have known that going in. Instead, the 
airline put itself in a position to be outmanoeuvred, then cried "Foul! " when it 
happened. " (Reed, 1993, p. 260) 
Another example was a medium-sized European airline which is trying to enter an 
alliance, attempting to gain antitrust immunity from the US and European 
governments in order to intensify the role that one of the partners (a major 
American carrier). When questioned on the matter, the manager of the European 
airline replied: 
"... We need to hire Mr. [Lawyer] and Mr. [Lobbyist], and that will be very 
expensive, but they know their ways around politics. I have no doubt we will get 
it. " (Commercial Manager - Medium-sized European airline) 
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4.1.3 'Flag Carriers' -the Political Leverage of their Unions 
State owned carriers are abundant in Europe (Air France, Alitalia, Iberia, Air 
Portugal, Olympic Airways, etc. ). They have received, through the years, vast 
amounts of state aid to cover their recurring fmancial losses. They are, however, 
facing extinction in the long term, as more liberalised regulations are implemented 
internationally. The EC, for example, is strongly encouraging and permitting state 
funding for the privatisation of airlines, and many have thus begun the 
fundamental restructuring and rationalisation required. 
Airlines maintain yet another political dimension, which applies especially to state 
owned carriers, but also to many private ones - the political leverage of their 
labour unions. Indeed, many have been the airline executives fired for upsetting 
the unions. A recent example was Rigas Doganis of Olympic Airways. Despite 
turning the loss-making airline into profit (for the first time since the 1970s), he 
was dismissed "because he had incurred the wrath of Olympic's unions" 
(Financial Times, 29 April 1996) when the Greek prime n-dnister felt he could not 
politically afford to antagonise the populist wing of his party. Other examples 
include Pierre Godfroid (Sabena), and Renato Riverso (Alitalia). The 
fundamental problems of state owned airlines are: (1) their labour costs are 
artificially bloated and (2) their organisations suffer from chronic oversize and 
from a 'bureaucracy syndrome'. To become attractive for privatisation, flag 
carriers need not only extensive and dramatic restructuring, but to be managed as 
commercial concerns. This poses problems. They need not only the impetus 
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furnished by the necessity to survive without tax payers' funding, but the 
orientation and the know-how of a commercially minded management. 
Politicians, by definition, do not have the independence, the solid support, the 
motivation, nor indeed the expert know-how required to turn airlines into 
efficient, and commercially proficient organisations. Hence the inertia of many 
state owned carriers today. "If you have a combination of strong unions and weak 
government you will never reform the airlines"' (Financial Times, 29 Apr. 1996). 
The privatisation of European state owned airlines (for example) will be a long 
and arduous process, since in order to be attractive to private investors, airlines 
need to be at the very least competitive, but in order to become competitive most 
need first to be managed with the impetus and know-how of private concerns. 
4.1.3.1 Chronic Duality of Competition Standards? 
Private airlines and their governments complain about the distortion of 
competition that government owned carriers cause. It is true that state owned 
carriers are a distorting influence in the economics of the airline industry. 
However, given the ease with which large airlines, such as BA, manipulate their 
governments to promote their individual interests nationally and internationally, 
and given the worldwide political influence that countries such as Britain still 
have, it is unclear whether many flag carriers distort competition more than some 
private carriers. 
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The Americans condemn the existence of European state owned airlines while 
maintaining their own legislation to protect troubled carriers from their creditors 
(Chapter II bankruptcy), allowing them to undercut competitors' fares and gain 
market share. BA and the British government condemn them while continuing to 
defend Heathrow as BXs fortress against national and intemational airlines. 
KLM and the Dutch government condemn flag caffiers whilst signing an 
individual open skies agreement with the US (despite EC opposition), diverting 
traffic from major European airports into Amsterdam airport. These are only 
examples of the duality of competition standards that politics and the political 
influence of airlines inflict on the airline industry. It is not unreasonable to see 
competing in the airline business as precisely about distorting competition in 
one9s favour. Manipulating govermnents to gain official support and international 
influence are some of the ways of distorting competition to gain market 
advantage. Politics has fundamentally shaped the structure of today's air 
transportation industry, producing routes which are more the result of political 
considerations and diplomatic activities than commercial impetus. 
"... The intimacy of these airlines with their governments developed a long- 
standing acknowledgement that consumer and commercial considerations have 
been subordinated to national interest and political interference". (Airports 
International, 1989, p. 17) 
Despite the frequent prevalence of political forces over the market forces of the 
airline industry, there is a general increase in competition, facilitated in part by 
US deregulation and the European liberalisation now in progress. In some US and 
European markets, competition has achieved such a degree of intensity that 
airlines have been forced to re-structure, minimise costs and formulate new 
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processes of devising tactics and strategy. This encouraged some airlines to take 
an active interest in the procurement of market information and the strategic use 
of it. 
4.2 The Information Intensity of the Airline Business 
Ile airline business is one of the most inforniation intensive of businesses. 
Businesses of comparable information intensity include insurance, banking and 
finance, and the newspapers. It is essential to understand the reasons, factors and 
constructs behind the strong information intensity that the industry exhibits. This 
understanding can be gained by examining the nature of the airline product, the 
characteristics of the demand that exists for that product and the basic 
Organisation and functioning of airlines. This will expose not only the intensity 
in operational information of airlines, but more importantly for the purposes of 
this thesis, the great intensity in strategic information of the business. 
4.2.1 The Airline Product 
From a consumer point of view, an airline's product is more than a seat on a 
flight; it is has various essential variables which influence buying decisions: 
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eA route network. passengers do not fly for the sake of flying; they fly in order 
to reach some destination which an airline must serve, either with direct flights 
or with flights via intermediate points in the airline's network; 
*A schedule. As passengers normally have preferred dates of travel, many, 
especially the business passengers, also have preferred times of departure to 
their destinations. So airlines must also have an adequate operating frequency 
for each market they serve; 
9A fare for the trip. This is the main decisive factor for economy class 
passengers. The airline is a very price sensitive business. (Doganis, 1991; 
O'Connor, 1995, Wheatcroft and Lipman, 1990) 
*A reasonably accessible distribution channel. Traditional distribution channels 
are airline ticket counters (direct sales) and travel agents; 
* Quality of service, including pre-flight, on-flight and post-flight service; 
*A reasombly good safety record. 
The most dictating characteristic of managing airlines is that airline seats are a 
highly perishable product (Doganis, 199 1; O'Connor, 1995; Shaw, 1990). 
Ultimately, what an airline is selling to its customers is a seat on an aircraft. In 
order to serve a route and offer the seats in each aircraft, an airline will have 
invested and incurred considerable costs in ground facilities, acquiring the airport 
slots, ground personnel, crews, aircraft lease or purchase, maintenance, flight 
operations, marketing and sales, promotion of the route, distribution of the 
product, fuel, etc. The airline industry is characteristically a business with high 
fixed costs, high opportunity costs and proportionally low variable costs (Smith, 
1995). 
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Historically, reduced real yield has been the airlines' main lever to stimulate 
traffic growth, since people obviously travel more when it is cheaper to do so. 
This could be achieved easily without compromising profitability in the days 
when technological advances were cutting unit costs. With maturing technology, 
however, this reduction has become more difficult. Airlines are being forced to 
find ways to cut costs and improve productivity without relying on technological 
breakthroughs (OECD, 1993). The ability of airlines to control their costs is a 
fundamental factor in setting competitive fares. However, they have little 
influence on several of the major factors affecting the costs of providing seats. 
Some, such as the cost of fuel, are fixed extemally; others, such as labour costs, 
are determined largely by the history of each carrier. Little flexibility remains to 
affect airline cost structures. (OECD, 1993) 
Considering that an aircraft has been allocated to operate a specific route on a 
scheduled basis, variable costs vary marginally with the number of passengers on 
board the aircraft. This means that once each aircraft takes off for its destination, 
all the unoccupied seats represent not only irrevocably lost revenue, but costs 
which remain uncompensated. This means that opportunity costs are high, as the 
aircraft and crew, being highly mobile resources, could always have been 
deployed elsewhere. As the number of passengers on board increases, the more 
revenue the airline has to offset the high fixed costs that it incurs. Therefore, the 
airline business is highly leveraged in the sense that once the break-even point of 
the flight is covered, the profits raise exponentially. Conversely, when business is 
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poor, airlines can consume vast amounts of capital in a matter of days. It is a very 
sensitive business. As a senior manager of a large American airline commented: 
"If I had got just one or two more business travel I ers on our planes last year, we 
probably would have doubled our profits. That's how sensitive this business is. " 
In 1993, IATA (International Air Transport Association) calculated that if the 
average international ticket had sold for just US $14 more, the world's airlines 
would have broke even instead of losing a combined US$ 11.5 billion (Markillie, 
1993). 
US Airline Industry 
annual change in yield and unit cost 1981-91 
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Figure 2- Fluctuations in unit costs and yield (1981-91) 
Figure 2 illustrates the sensitivity of the airline industry. In a deregulated market 
such as the US, the fluctuations in both in unit costs and yield per passenger are 
volatile as competitive forces and environmental conditions affect airlines. In the 
five years prior to 1994 the airline industry as a whole lost more money than it has 
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ever earned since its emergence 75 years ago. This sensitivity is increasing with 
the intensification of competition in many world markets. 
"Because they are both capital and labour intensive, and because they are very 
sensitive to changes in consumer spending, airlines are inherently volatile and 
highly cyclical enter- prises. Even in the very best of times, their high costs of 
operation and ownership prevent their operating margins from rising much above 
the Standard & Poor's 500 average. And, in bad times, airlines can consume 
incredible amounts of cash in the blink of an eye". (Reed, 1993, p. 242) 
"The airlines provide vivid case studies in corporate strategy. The terrific sums of 
capital at stake and the numbing repetitiveness of their operations make airlines 
uniquely sensitive to the commands of management. Even a question of 
substituting chicken parmesan for chicken divan becomes a vital corporate matter - 
to say nothing for deciding to which continents an airline should fly, what fares it 
should charge, how many jets it should buy, or whether it should assent to the 
demands of a union or instead allow employees to go on strike. The thinness of the 
industry' s margin of error is evident in how many names have vanished from the 
roster: Eastern, Pan Am, People Express, Frontier, Braniff, and Air Florida, to 
name some whose unhappy fates we will follow in this hook. " (Petzinger, 1995, p. 
xix) 
An airline's output (a seat on a flight) cannot be as closely inventoried to match 
fluctuations in demand as most physical products. The basic unit of production for 
airlines is the number of seats that each aircraft carries. The airline product is also 
hard to differentiate; it is largely a commodity. What the passengers are buying is 
in essence a seat on an aircraft which will transport them safely to their 
destinations. One airline seat is very much Ue another, and one freight hold is no 
different from the next. Consequently, airlines go to great and costly lengths to 
differentiate, or to build the image of being different from the other competitors 
(Doganis, 1985). 
"I am selling a seat, the same seat that maybe five other carriers of the same route 
sell. I could blindfold you, walk you down a jet, seat you on a seat, and you would 
not know if it was mine, carrier X, Y or Z". (International Sales Manager - large American airline) 
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"The air travel industry is like the banana business. Airline seats are a commodity 
- despite heroic attempts at differentiation, passengers think one airline's seat is 
very much like another's - and when a plane takes off with empty seats, the 
commodity is spoiled". (Smith, 1995, p. 26) 
Airlines find great difficulty in differentiating their products. This is not because 
of lack of variety in attributes to manipulate, but because differentiation efforts are 
either easy to imitate (e. g., in-flight food), or far too expensive to produce and 
involve high levels investment and risk (e. g. high frequency of flights, last minute 
availability, etc. ). Therefore, airlines' product specifications are fairly 
homogeneous in each market segment. 
The narrow tolerance for errors in airline management caused by a perishable 
product, high fixed costs, difficulties in differentiation and price sensitivity puts a 
very heavy emphasis on the strategic management of airlines. It pressurises 
airlines into constant information osmosis with the business environment and 
creates a dependency on external information. It is therefore vital, in competitive 
markets, that airlines acquire, process and use information about the markets in 
which they compete, about the potential customers of those markets, and most 
importantly, about their competitor's tactics. All of this information is highly 
volatile and changes daily. Effective day-to-day market-specific tactics are 
essential for airlines to succeed in competitive markets. 
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4.2.2 The Airline's Markets 
Another salient characteristic of the airline business is the large number of 
markets that airlines serve. Each city or combination of cities served represents a 
distinctive market since demand for travel in each market is influence by forces 
specific to each market. The different markets are also direction-specific; each 
city-pair served by an airline represents two distinct markets. On a given route 
(e. g., London to New York) there are two distinct markets: London-New York 
and New York-London. Return tickets to London sold in New York (which are 
normally US-originating traffic) are affected by different market forces from those 
influencing passengers buying return tickets in London (which are normally sold 
to UK-originating traffic). Often there are great differences in pricing and yield 
management (capacity allocated to the different subclasses) between the two sets 
of originating traffic. 
The average international carrier serves in excess of one hundred different cities 
all over the world, many of them several times a day. Each city generates a whole 
host of information, which must be used to fill the many different tactical 
parameters that have to be adjusted daily. This generates an intensity of 
operational information with which to co-ordinate resources and logistics of the 
fleet, crew and ground personnel, to account for each individual sales transaction 
with each passenger, point of sales and distribution channel, etc. It also generates 
vast amounts of strategic information about variations in sales for each different 
subclass of service (many airlines operate over 15 subclasses of the economy class 
and 3 or 4 subclasses of the business class), which represent variations in demand 
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from each market segment. It generates information about competitors' tactics in 
each of the different cities (pricing, scheduling, frequency, promotion efforts, 
etc. ), and generates information about the different economic and political 
climates that exist in the different countries in which the airline operates. 
Another characteristic specific to each market, is the structure of the distribution 
chain. In most world markets, the distribution of airline products is largely 
(typically 70-85 per cent) in the hands of travel agents. However, very different 
types of agents constitute the travel agency community and their mix is specific of 
each market. Each type of agent has specific types of customers. Airline 
managers balance the mix of agents in which to promote and market the airlines' 
products, with the demand in each market for travel to its home country, to other 
destinations in its network and the product specifications it offers in each market. 
- Retailers - these are agents which have no specialisation, sell a wide 
mix of traffic including some business passengers, some tour operator 
products (commission-base), and leisure "seat-only" traffic; 
Chains of retailers - These are either sales outlets of one company, or 
associations of retailers. In both cases they are managed centrally; 
they have large volume of business and cover large and important 
geographic areas of demand. Therefore, they have great bargaffimig 
power with airlines for commissions; 
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- Tour Operators - These are agents which buy seat capacity from 
airlines (work with a high component of charter capacity), and package 
it with hotel rooms, car hire, excursions, activities, etc. They are often 
large in size, sometimes vertically integrated having a charter company 
and a chain of retailers (e. g. Thomas Cook). Many are also specialists 
in particular destinations, and thus very important for some airlines. 
They normally have great bargaining power with the airlines whose 
home countries are mostly tourism destinations (e. g. Portugal, Greece, 
Spain, etc. ). Tour Operators need low fares in order to produce 
packages in such an extremely competitive business, which operates 
with very low profit margins (Shaw, 1990), and can often use charter 
capacity as an alternative to scheduled capacity. 
- Consolidators - These act as sales brokers for the travel agents that 
have no IATA certification and therefore need a licensed sales outlet to 
issue airline tickets. In countries where the travel agency community 
is very fragmented, there are many agents that do not have enough 
volume of business to become IATA certified. Consolidators typically 
are the agents which get the lowest fares from airlines (10-20 per cent 
below the Tour Operator level) in some markets airlines build their 
own consolidating operations in order to retain the revenue from the 
fare level differential. 
-B ists - specialise in business travel, and often have 
contracts to act as travel managers for large corporations; 
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- Business Chains - chains of business specialists which are either sales 
outlets of a company (e. g. American Express), or associations of 
business agents. They are normally centrally managed; 
- Incentive houses - these are specialists in business conferences and 
company incentive trips; 
- Business specialists, chains and incentive houses, because they 
specialise in high yield traffic, are the agents that get the highest 
incentive levels from airlines. In order to penetrate these distribution 
charincls significantly, airlincs nccd to havc not only high quality 
products (schedule, set of destinations, frequent flyer programs, 
business lounges, etc. ), but a large presence and volume of business in 
the market in order that the incentives the airline is able to provide 
constitute significant revenue for the agents. 
Activity specialists - These are agents specialise in activities such as 
religious events, Golf, cultural excursions, etc. They too package 
airline seats with other products such as hotel, car hire and the 
respective activities and get low fares from the airlines; 
- Ethnic Agents - Specialise in selling travel to emigrant communities of 
certain countries. These are nornially loyal to the national carrier of 
the respective countries and constitute a solid source of nwket share 
for some airlines. 
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Another obvious market force is the competition provided by other airlines. The 
same airline constitutes different competition even for the same route, where 
airlines operate in both directions. British Airways, for example, as the national 
caff ier, has a stronger competitive position to sell in the UK than in the US. BA 
manages sales to passengers originating in the UK through its sales offices in the 
UK. These promote and manage the sales of their product by UK points of sales, 
while the sales offices abroad will promote and manage sales to passengers 
originating abroad which visits England, or flies via the UK. That is the norm of 
sales management in the airline industry. 
BA has much more presence amongst corporations and travel agents in the UK, 
because it doesn't just sell the US as destination, but a few hundred other 
destinations in its network. Therefore it uses different strategies in the markets at 
each end of the routes. Given that agents operate on commissions, the revenue 
potential of commissions that BA is able to give them in incentive programmes is 
more significant to the agents (in proportion to the operating revenue of each 
agent), than that of a foreign carrier. This is because a foreign carrier operates 
fewer destinations from the UK than BA, and therefore sells fewer passengers in 
the UY, constituting less operating revenue from which the travel agents earn 
their commissions. 
Some airlines use price leadership tactics to decrease the adversity of foreign 
market forces; others use aggressive incentive programmes to agents. Other 
airlines simply focus on sales in their home country, when it constitutes a large 
*, enough market in itself for demand to some destinations to fill up flights in both 
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directions. Others yet, focus on foreign markets as sources of 6t" freedom traffic. 
They compete with the national carriers of the foreign countries in a set of 
destinations they deem relevant for the demand that exists in each foreign country. 
KLM (The Dutch airline), for example, has a small home market. So, it uses 
demand in foreign markets to feed its flights departing from Amsterdam. It uses 
Amsterdam as a hub. KLM compete for example on the Lisbon - London route, 
even though they do not operate it directly. KLM uses, amongst other flights, 
their flight from Lisbon to Amsterdam to feed their flights from Amsterdam to 
London. The same applies for long haul flights. This strategy demands good 
connections in the hub airport, expert yield management and extremely responsive 
pricing because, in such a price sensitive business, it is not possible to compete 
with direct flights if the indirect flights' price is not lower (typically 15-20 per 
cent lower). A successful Oh freedom operation means that the airline operating 
in foreign markets will have a larger presence that if it was selling point-to-point 
traffic from that country to its home country. The complexity of the specific 
market forces of every market is such that airlines are forced not only to treat each 
market as an individual set of market forces, but to acquire, process and use vast 
amounts of market information in order to remain competitive. 
4.2.2.1 Airline Market Segments 
In the airline business there is a link between the difficulty of differentiation and 
the information intensity of tactics and strategy. The difficulty of differentiation 
puts yet more emphasis on acquiring information about competitors' products, 
', pricing and distribution tactics. This can be illustrated by analysing how airlines 
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in general target the different market segments. Basically there are two main 
market segments: premium traffic, and non-premium traffic. The two impose 
very different demands on the airlines. 
Non-Premium Traffic 
Virgin Atlantic provides a mild differentiation with its well promoted image, 
4premiurn economy class', more in-flight entertainment, food and service, and a 
wide variety of duty-free products - and charges substantially lower fares than its 
competition. This, however, is possible only for airlines with a low cost structure 
and when they are competing against higher cost carriers, because a low cost 'no- 
frills' airline will have yet lower prices which will appeal to a price sensitive 
segment. This 'hard to differentiate/high sensitivity to price' environment 
encourages airlines to be extremely tactical, changing prices, availability and the 
combination of sub-fares daily so that they fill their aircraft and maximise the 
average yield per passenger in balance with the amount of revenue each flight 
generates. This, in turn, means that they have to keep extremely alert for changes 
in competitors' tactics. This means an active procurement of competitor and 
market information to be utilised in constant tactical adjustments. 
Premium Tra c 
The high yield traffic is composed primarily of business travellers. To achieve the 
kind of differentiation needed to target business travellers, airlines have to invest 
heavily because the business traveller has different and more demanding needs. 
'ýBecause this type of traffic is very precious to airlines, there are some airlines 
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which are structured completely around the business traveller (e. g., American 
Airlines). The standard of product specifications is inevitably proportional to the 
importance of this type of traffic for airlines. In essence, the business passenger is 
not so sensitive to price (normally the employer pays for the trip), but demands 
product features which are expensive to provide: 
* high frequency of flights to each destination (which creates a risk of over- 
capacity). 
ea large route network (which only large carriers have the resources to 
develop). 
9a frequent flyer program with wide coverage. 
e unrestricted fares - the ability to 'no-show' without penalty, or to cancel at 
the last minute, or to travel on another carrier. This means a risk that the 
aircraft will depart with empty seats which could have been filled, and that 
the passenger will decide that he/she will fly on a rival carrier, giving it the 
revenue which the initial carrier took the risk to obtain; 
* last minute availability - business travellers normally do not book long 
before the trip. Holding available seats until the last minute increases the 
risk that they will depart empty. 
9 Much larger seats with more leg-room (which reduces the payload of the 
aircraft), increasing the opportunity costs of the space in the aircraft and 
increasing the units by which revenue increases. This exposes the airline 
much more to the revenue sensitivity of the business. 
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Although business passengers generate much higher revenue, the targeting of this 
sort of traffic for an airline means a heavy investment and incuff ing a 
substantially higher risk than the targeting of economy passengers. Any airline 
gets full fare business traffic regardless of whether it specifically targets it or not, 
but in order to get a constant feed of premium traffic, airlines must focus on the 
business segment. This combination of heavy investment and high risk 
constitutes an extra high pressure for airlines to research their markets well, to 
acquire, process and use vast amounts of strategic information in their strategic 
efforts. It increases the airline's incentive to invest in forming relationships with 
the business traveller, either individually through frequent flyer programs, or 
collectively through 'preferred carrier' negotiations with corporations. It also 
strongly encourages airlines to study the business traveller's buying behaviour and 
travel trends very closely. Airlines successfully focusing on this market segment 
(American Airlines, British Airways) accumulate and process vast amounts of 
information not only to form relationships with customers by increasing the 
loyalty of the customer base, but to make statistical predictions to incur a more 
calculated risk in the revenue managemeni of flights. 
4.2.3 Characteristics of Demand 
"'A thorough appreciation of demand must be used to develop traffic and other 
forecasts, since every activity within an airline ultimately stems from a forecase'. 
(Doganis 1985, pp. 20-1) 
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The demand for air travel is a derived demand. It is dependent on the various 
activities associated with trips. Air transport is what economists sometimes call 
an 'intermediate good' because most people use air transportation as a means to 
achieve some other purpose (O'Connor, 1995). Very few passengers fly merely 
for the sake of flying. A sales manager of a major American airline said: 
"Nobody flies because they love to fly. You buy a telephone not to have it hang on 
your wall, but to provide you with a means to talk to somebody. The airline is the 
means to get some place. " 
Consequently, when trying to estimate passenger demand, it is necessary to study 
the various components of demand for each particular destination. As a 
consequence, there has been strong pressure on the airlines to expand vertically 
into other areas of the travel industry, such as hotels, travel agencies, car hire or 
tour organisers, in order to gain greater control over the travel product (Doganis, 
1985). Demand for travel-related products is highly dependent on the consumers' 
disposable income. This, in turn, depends of the overall economy. Very few 
goods in the economy are as responsive to income as air transport (Tretheway and 
Ourn, 1992). There is general agreement among airline forecasting experts that 
the income elasticity for air travel is between 1.5 and 2.0 in different markets 
(Wheatcroft and Lipman; 1990, p. 127). This means that a growth of 10 per cent 
in the economy would typically bring a 15-20 per cent traffic increase for the 
airlines. However the consequences would be disastrous for the industry if the 
economy regressed by 10%, giving a typical decline of 15-20%. This means that 
airlines must also keep themselves informed about economic trends in the various 
markets that they serve. This sensitivity, however, has a more direct impact with 
the leisure traveller. Business travel is less sensitive to disposable income. It is 
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affected by disposable income indirectly through the effects that variations in 
consumer spending have on corporations. According to a sales manager of a 
major American airline, 
"The good thing about the business traveller is that if someone has business in a 
city, they are going to travel there no matter what the circumstances are. The 
leisure traveller is more sensitive to things like disposable income, weather, 
security threats, etc. But these guys just have to be there. The technicians have to 
go service the equipment, they need to go sell a product for a manufacturer, etc. " 
Historical analysis has shown that the industry's traffic pattern, like the economy, 
is cyclical. This creates problems in strategic planning - it is difficult to anticipate 
a downturn cycle with enough time to alter the capacity offered by airlines. On a 
number of occasions in the past, aircraft orders have been based on optimistic 
forecasts and placed in periods of uptum, but deliveries have come in periods of 
economic downturn, when the airlines need them the least. The acquisition of 
new aircraft involves long lead times. Orders for new aircraft are often placed 
years before delivery. 
"Looked at from a distance the commercial aviation industry looks comfortingly 
predictable, traffic growing in line with the world economy and boosted by lower 
real fares. ... GDP and air traffic are closely linked. They reflect the same things - the level of disposable income, the value of leisure time, the globalisation of 
corporations, for example; GDP itself increasingly depends on the level of activity 
in the tourism and travel business. ... The timing of the business cycle varies 
greatly from region to region" (Nuutinen, 1996, p. 16) 
Also, demand for airline services varies by season, month, week, day, and time of 
day. To accommodate peak demand, airlines must acquire additional assets, 
facilities, and personnel. These added investments lead in turn to higher average 
operating costs because the additional resources are under-utilised during off-peak 
periods. Airlines are often tempted to acquire more aircraft to accommodate the 
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higher demand of peak seasons and hope they can still fill the aircraft in the low 
season. More often than not, this turns to over capacity. Furthermore, because 
airlines provide a scheduled service, they cannot add or discontinue flights to 
match short-term variations in the level of demand. 
The seasonality of demand is specific to each market, and within each market it is 
specific to the segment (business travel, leisure), and it causes demand to vary by 
time of year, month, week and day. To accommodate the seasonality of each 
market and of each of its segments, many airlines are compulsive accumulators of 
historical data, so they can make statistical predictions. The market specific 
seasonality when multiplied by the number of cities served by an airline means 
yet another sea of information which airlines must acquire, process and use in 
order to keep within the narrow boundaries of the margin for error of the industry. 
Finally, another important characteristic of demand is that airlines are in 
competition with other modes of transport. However, the longer the distance of 
the trip, the stronger the inclination to opt for air transport. In Europe for 
example, trains are increasingly a strong alternative to air travel. Some also see 
electronic communications equipment such as teleconferencing, fax machines, 
video-phones, etc., as a substitute for air traveL but the magnitude and 
significance of this type of competition is still unclear. 
4.1.4 Airline Competition 
The marginal costs of adding an extra passenger to a flight are negligible. Thus 
% airlines tend to use marginal costing to maximise the revenue each flight 
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generates. This is done by offering highly discounted fares in order to fill aircraft. 
Marginal costing by airlines has been behind the frequent fare wars. This, in turn, 
pushes yields down, as consumers shop around more intensively for such 
discounted fares (Doganis, 1985, pp. 20-1). The result is: 
66 ... vicious, endless fare wars that in most businesses would quickly thin out the 
players, but that in airlines - the commodity with sex appeal - have helped produce 
a record chaos and wreckage rare in any industry and almost incredible in one so 
important to the nation's and world's economy". (Smith 1995, p. 27) 
To maximise revenues, it is in the interest of airlines to use marginal costing to 
sell only those seats which would otherwise have taken-off empty. This demands 
very accurate market segmentation and a precise prediction of how many seats 
will be sold in each flight at normal fares, as well as timely information on 
competitor's tactics. Many airlines turn to sophisticated yield management and 
market segmentation techniques to fill seats, which would have otherwise remain 
empty, with discounted fares and last minute bargains. To acquire information 
about competitors' tactics, airlines use the sales offices they have in the various 
countries. Because of this combination of high fixed costs, low variable costs and 
a perishable product with such price sensitive demand, allied to large units of 
production and the high revenue leverage, airline competition is difficult. In 
competitive markets, vicious fare wars are frequent, combined with high 
commissions to travel agents to shift market share and confidential pricing to 
complicate competitors' reactions (these will be dealt with in the next chapter). 
The nature of airline competition is such that some think fair and constructive 
competition is not possible: 
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"By contrast, the new view says that the trouble isn't bad luck; it's the very nature 
of the business - and that means the trouble is not going away. ... the argument 
goes like this: no matter how many employees or labour concessions negotiated, 
the fixed costs of aviation - planes, fuel, facilities - are destined to remain relatively 
high. The marginal costs of adding a passenger on a partly filled flight are 
negligible. So you needn't charge much to make that perishable product worth 
something. The result is that last year 92% of airline passengers bought their 
tickets at a discount, paying on average just 35% of the full fare. Inanindustry 
with high fixed costs and low marginal costs, competition may produce a market 
share that never settles down. Economists say such a market has an 'empty core"' 
(Smith 1995, pp. 28-9). 
What sort of competition is possible remains to be seen. The main conclusive 
thoughts from the general analysis of the nature of the airline business are that: 
- the airline business is a complex activity; 
it is extremely information and decision-intensive; 
- the characteristics of the industry and its product are such that airlines 
have to acquire, process and use strategically vast amounts of external 
information; 
- Airlines' strategies are frequently adjusted by day-to-day tactical 
decisions. 
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CHAPTER V 
COMPUTER RESERVATION 
SYSTEMS 
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5. Computer Reservation Systems 
The emergence of CRS marks an important stage in the use of information by 
airlines. Automating reservations was the beginning of a learning curve which 
would take the airlines to the high level of sophisticated competition which they 
enjoy today. CRS are the base of most strategic information systems and data in 
use in the industry today. Reservations data constitutes a rich source of 
competitive and market information. Also, airlines began to achieve greater levels 
of understanding about their business through gradually using the information 
generated by these systems as a resource to fine tune their tactics. In short, CRS 
represent the main force behind a learning curve that took airlines from using 
information purely for automation purposes to using information as a resource not 
only for the fine tuning of market tactics, but for the advancement of their 
-, strategic thinking. 
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This section takes an evolutionary approach to analysing the development and the 
role of CRS in the airline industry. It starts by discussing the birth of CRS in the 
US in the early 1960s and the motivations for their development. It then analyses 
the process of retail automation that took place from the early 1970s and began 
exposing the strategic potential of CRS to airlines to the point of raising 
regulatory attention. It then focuses on the international proliferation of CRS 
technology in response to the American experience. At this point regulation 
stepped in. CRS technology and the role of CRS began to mature. With the 
maturity of the role of CRS in the industry, the nature of the relationship between 
airlines and computer reservation systems was transformed into a strategic 
symbiosis of some sophistication. This is the subject of discussion that follows. 
Finally, the last part of this section conceptualises the evolution of the computer 
reservation systems in the airline industry and points to implications for airlines' 
strategic use of information, which will be the focus of the rest of the chapter. 
5.1 The Birth of Computer Reservation Systems 
American Airlines envisioned an automated reservation system as early as 1958. It set 
out to establish a real-time data processing system that would enable it to access the 
reservation eta Is of any passenger at any of the company's locations. The existing 
procedure was slow, cumbersome and wasteful of labour. Travel agents could sell 
seats only after they had confirmed availability for each individual flight. This was 
posted on the office notice board. When a reservation was made, the travel agent 
notified the airline's central reservation office and then filled in a passenger name 
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record (PNR), which was then sent to the reservation office. The central office 
monitored seat availability; when this dropped below a certain level, it would send out 
a note to all the agents to tell them to stop selling seats. This, too, was posted on the 
agent's notice board. Discrepancies between the number of seats booked and the PNRs 
were frequent, resulting in under-booking or over-booking of flights, with consequent 
loss of revenue and customer satisfaction. The company's motives for developing a way 
to automate this activity were operational. A substantial increase in the efficiency of 
the system was vital if the company's operations were to grow. 
The inadequacies of the system escalated with the growth in air travel and the 
expansion of airlines operations. In 1955, American Airlines ordered 30 Boeing 707s, 
and 25 Boeing 727s in 1961. The increased seat capacity that these aircraft brought 
heightened the importance of control over seat inventories and reservations. The most 
acute problems were in the high frequency short haul routes when jet services were 
introduced in the early 1960s, where a high volume of reservations had to be processed 
in a short period of time (Copeland, 1990). The beginnings of Sabre (American 
Airlines' reservation system project) were humble and problematic. Part of the 
problem was that senior management did not understand computers and discounted 
their importance (Reed, 1993). Therefore, there was little enthusiasm for spending the 
kind of money necessary to upgrade and modernise Sabre (Semi-Automated Research 
Environment) to keep up with the rapid developments in computer technology. Also, 
there was conflict between departments: 
"Marketing and Finance, the two driving forces that might have been expected to 
be the driving forces behind the development of computer technology, had failed to 
provide the leadership necessary to progress. The finance department was directly 
responsible for American's data processing operations. But the marketing 
department actually determined the extent to which Sabre would be developed, 
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through its control of marketing technology research and development funds. In 
fact, rather than being a focal point for co-operation, Sabre for years had been a 
pawn in the feudal war that had raged between American's marketing and finance 
departments". (Reed, 1993, p. 62) 
The result was that Finance bought 1,000 computers, but couldn't get approval to fund 
their installation, so they ended up in the basement. The solution to the problem came 
when Max Hopper (head of the Sabre project) stopped Bob Crandall (American's 
chairman) in the street for a two-minute meeting to alert him to the situation (Reed, 
1993). It took IBM and American Airlines six years to develop the first version of the 
computer reservation system - Sabre -, with the system coming on stream in 1964. 
TWA and United Airlines were quick to follow in commencing the development of 
their own systems. At this period, all these were universally regarded as labour and 
time saving systems for handling large and growing amounts of reservations data. The 
project between American Airlines and IBM would undergo a first mover learning 
curve in reservations technology development, and would serve as a reference for the 
rest of the industry and show that it was technically possible to automate reservations. 
IBK too, gained valuable experience in the Sabre project with American Airlines. 
"By 1965, the IBM Sabre projects had demonstrated that real time teleprocessing 
was a viable solution to the core problem of passenger reservations. The early 
experience spurred the principal developments of the late 1960s: (1) the desire of 
IBM to exit the custom system PNR business and earn a return on its investment by 
marketing a PNR product to other airlines; (2) the desire of Eastern, TWA and 
United to acquire PNR systems to keep pace with their rivals. The increased 
capacity of its System/360 computers encouraged IBM to include innovations from 
the Sabre projects in a standardised airline reservations product. The managers of 
all airlines sensed the importance of systems with PNR functionality". (Copeland, 
1990, p. 118) 
IBM then began to leverage its experience from the Sabre projects into the 
development of its own reservation system - PARS (Programmed Airlines 
Reservation System). This system would not only promote sales of the 
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System/360 hardware to airlines, but would also free the company from the time 
consuming, risky business of developing custom reservation systems. To 
maximise the size of its potential market, PARS was aimed at the functional 
requirements and transaction volumes of medium size carriers. By 1965, Eastern 
had decided that it too needed an automated reservation system with PNR 
functionality. So, it set out to improve and expand the IBM PARS software with 
the help of strong technical expertise recruited from Delta. In 1968 'Eastern- 
based PARS' as it became known, was installed in Eastern's new data centre in 
Miami. It became a technological standard for large-scale reservation systems. 
Both TWA and United tried to build comprehensive custom systems that went far 
beyond PNR functions, and even exceeded the original goals envisioned for 
American's Sabre. But they both failed because they lacked experience with the 
technology and its application. Both carriers were then forced to seek alternative 
solutions to their reservations problems as rapidly as possible (Copeland, 1990). In 
1970, both United and TWA arranged to purchase Eastern's software and contracted 
IBM for assistance with the accelerated implementation processes. By the end of 197 1, 
TWA had successfully installed the system (TWA continued to call it PARS). United 
called the solution to its reservation problems Apollo. 
By this time, American was already beginning to utilise data, which the reservation 
transactions generated, to fine-tune its operations and to focus its marketing strategies. 
The first benefits from the automation of reservations would be increased processing 
speed, which permitted the system to be more productive, and increased accuracy of 
seat inventories. The new accuracy of passenger inventories, which the automated 
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system delivered, allowed the airlines to begin ensuring that flights were not under- 
booked, by knowing accurately how many reservations were made to a particular flight, 
and thus how many seats remained available. The experience of a more accurate 
reservation system also showed that flights could in fact even be overbooked, in order to 
maximise load factors. It is typical of the airline industry that there is a proportion of 
passengers who make reservations but who do not turn up for flights (no-show'). So, 
it is conventional wisdom today that if flights are not overbooked then they take off 
with empty seats which can be filled by overbooking. Accurate reservation processes 
are the origins of overbooking policies and, in turn, controlled overbooking of flights 
constitutes the origin of today's extremely sophisticated revenue management systems. 
The above skills already represented something more than the most obvious use of the 
technology - the use of the information that the technology generated. 
IT'hesel capabilities were skills that took time to perfect, and the early innovators' 
accrued experience was more difficult to imitate than their technology. " (Copeland, 
1990, p. 125) 
5.2 Retail Automation 
The stimulus of retail automation had two basic components: 
(1) After having automated their internal reservation systems, airlines saw the 
potential for further increasing the efficiency of the system. The new 
bottleneck of the reservation process was that travel agents still had no idea of 
the airlines' seat inventories unless they contacted them. This would mean 
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that airlines would still need to employ armies of telephonists to answer the 
reservation calls, and that many of these calls would be for flights which 
would already be full, adding to the inefficiency in the cost of issuing a ticket; 
(2)Airlines realised the opportunity for offsetting the costs of developing the 
internal systems and maybe making some profit from them by charging the 
travel agency for the use of a retail automating reservation system. If airlines 
could install links to their internal reservation systems in the travel agencies, 
then the travel agencies too would benefit from a great increase in efficiency. 
They would no longer have to go through the OAG publications (Official 
Airline Guide) - the size of a telephone directory - in order to find out which 
airlines flew where and then call them to make the reservations if they had 
availability. Agents would simply have to fill in the transaction parameters in 
the terminals and let the system do the rest. This would mean that the number 
of reservations an agent could make in a year would increase greatly. 
5.2.1 Industry's Attempts to Automate 
In 1972, the president of ASTA (American Society of Travel Agents) approached CDC 
(Control Data Corporation -a computer vendor) to propose a joint development effort 
of an integrated travel agency system. Such a project was considered technologically 
feasible and financially desirable. The proposal called for a central reservation system, 
based on IBM computers but owned by CDC, to provide reservations and ticketing 
facilities to travel agencies on a subscription basis (Lundstrom, 1987). 
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Travel agents represented a small but growing part of the airlines' distribution chain. 
Airlines became uncomfortable at the prospect of a computer vendor owning the access 
to travel agencies. The project would have meant that airlines would be charged by 
CDC and by travel agents for using distribution systems. This was a serious threat. 
The counter action was instigated by American Airlines, which proposed a task force 
comprising airlines, hardware suppliers, and ASTA members to consider a Joint 
Industry Computerised Reservations System (JICRS). 
"In a perfect world, Crandall would never have pushed for a system jointly owned 
by all airlines. He would instead build his own system, Sabre, available to 
individual travel agents for subscription. But Sabre was still recovering from its 
years of neglect , and American's finances remained lackluster at best. Moreover, if American began hooking travel agents up to Sabre, United would undoubtedly 
begin to do the same, but with its more powerful system and financial resources 
that Crandall could only dream about. By urging the creation of an industry wide 
network, Crandall would score two victories, blocking the travel agents from 
establishing their own system, while preventing United from forging a propriety 
link with them. And for good measure, in the creation of the single system, United, 
as the largest airline in the industry by far, could be expected to shoulder the 
greatest share of the development expense. ... At United, Dick Ferris shared Crandall's view that the agents should never be permitted to establish their own 
computer reservations network, but Ferris had figured out Bob Crandall's game 
and looked warily on the idea of creating a single system owned by the airlines". 
(Petzinger, 1995, p. 69) 
To entice travel agents, American offered an additional one percent commission on the 
value of their ticket sales in return for delaying development of the CDC system and 
participating in the JICRS study (Copeland, 1990). And so the JICRS project began. 
For two years the task force studied the feasibility of such a system. In 1975, the 
JICRS technical team concluded that a joint system was technically feasible and 
economically viable. Because the development costs of the system would be allocated 
in proportion to the passenger volumes of the carriers involved, United Airlines, - being 
the largest carrier, would shoulder most of the financial investment. This led United to 
be the most conservative participant. It considered the projected economics of the 
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system excessively optimistic. American Airlines, through Max Hopper's leadership of 
the project, detected that there was a distinct possibility that United would abandon the 
joint effort and opt for marketing its Apollo system to the travel agency community. 
I So, American began planning for the marketing of its Sabre system, using the findings 
of the JICRS project as a reference. 
"Crandall had ordered his field managers to listen for 'competitive intelligence', 
demanding that they pass along anything they might hear about what United was 
telling travel agencies. Max Hopper had learned that United was warning travel 
agents away from an industry wide system, vaguely promising that it would soon 
have something better to offer them. So, while they were publicly promoting the 
industry wide alliance, Crandall and Hopper were privately developing plan B, a 
strategy for having Sabre terminals, rather than a jointly owned system, installed in 
any travel agencies willing to pay for the equipment. The development costs 
would be huge, but Crandall would come up with the money somehow. 'Ibis was 
the future. American, he believedý had no choice. " (Petzinger, 1995, p. 7 1) 
5.2.2 The Independent Marketing of CRS: Apollo vs Sabre 
During 1975, United finally concluded that investing in the marketing of its Apollo 
system to travel agents would make economic sense. In January 1976, United 
announced its withdrawal from the JICRS project and its intention to make its Apollo 
system available to travel agents and installed four terminals in different locations, 
mainly to establish whether any service enhancements to the system were required. 
The prospective JICRS development co-operation ceased in 1976 when American and 
United began marketing their systems competitively. Retail automation developed 
concurrently with airline deregulation. After 1978, the marketing potential of the 
systems complemented the market threats and opportunities accompanying the new 
'% competitive environment. Airline deregulation spurred a competitive vitality into the 
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leasing of automated reservation systems to travel agents. United's advance warning of 
its installation plans gave American some advantage. United was confident that its 
system had a3 year technical superiority over its rivals (Petzinger, 1995), which would 
prove a sustainable competitive advantage in the race for retail automation. But 
American attributed rather more strategic importance to the marketing of the 
reservation system to travel agents, hoping that significant revenues would be generated 
by the leasing of systems which increased the productivity of travel agencies. The 
company installed more than 130 terminals that year. 
The differential in the attribution of strategic importance to retail automation between 
United and American was vast. For example, whereas United assigned the 
responsibilities of marketing Apollo as an additional duty of its field sales force, 
resulting in a relatively low level of promotional leverage, American established travel 
agency automation as a separate unit and invested heavily in its marketing. Also, by 
basing a downsizing effort on seniority, United made redundant some 30 PARS 
programmers (many of these were immediately hired by American), which meant the 
loss of a significant part of the airline's expertise in data processing (Copeland, 1990). 
Another force behind the great importance attributed to retail automation was that 
American Airlines felt their reputation would suffice to be the preferred carrier of many 
travel agents if American's schedules were available to them. However, AMR 
(American Airlines) reasoned that this outcome would be unlikely if Apollo was the 
system in use. Because retail automation meant that travel agents would have to pay 
for the leasing of the equipment and subscription fees, it was unlikely that they would 
subscribe to two systems when agents could do their job with one. Additionally, 
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because at the time the systems would include only the vendor airline's flights, if the 
agent subscribed to the competition, the agent would tend to use the most efficient way 
of making the bookings rather than going through the OAG lists and calling the other 
carriers. This would mean that American's schedules were 'less available' than, say, 
United's, leading to a potential competitive disadvantage. 
So, American started targeting large and geographically strategic travel agency 
locations, which produced a halo effect on the demand for the system. The first 200 
installations were motivated by fears of loss of revenue to United. The salient intention 
was revenue retention. Experience from the initial installations demonstrated to 
American that although travel agents were leasing less hardware than expected, thus 
generating less revenue than expected from subscriber fees, retail automation was 
generating revenue rather than merely retaining it. The original estimation had been 
that the first 200 installations would contribute $3.1 million annually in incremental 
passenger revenue. The return on investment had been projected to be 6 per cent 
without incremental revenue and 67 per cent with incremental revenue included. Even 
before the first installation effort had been completed, the estimate for incremental 
passenger revenue was revised to $20.1 million, resulting in a return on investment 
exceeding 500 per cent. 
"What began as necessary competitive counter to a precipitous action on the part of 
a major competitor has now evolved into a project of significant financial 
magnitude to American Airlines. Further, it is occurring at a time when we are 
threatened with major regulatory changes which potentially could lead to a 
situation in which the marketing information provided and even a limited control 
over the distribution mechanism could prove invaluable. " (U. S. District Court 
AA080717) 
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5.3 Early Strategic Uses of CRS 
The airlines in the best position to observe and comprehend the heightened role of 
information were American and United Airlines. These carriers came to recognise that 
reservation systems were not merely operational tools, but could be used as a means for 
influencing and ultimately controlling the deregulated market. By 1978, American 
Airlines was faring none too well in its battle with United for market share. This was 
thought to be because United had a better route structure. So, American Airlines 
devised the co-host system whereby other airlines were given preferential treatment in 
the display of flights on the Sabre system, upon payment of a fee. Five airlines, which 
had route structures that complemented that of American Airlines joined the system. 
Thus, American's network of routes was, in effect, increased and United had to fight 
back with a similar system. The screens of the two systems now showed the host 
airline's flight first, then the co-host airline's flights, then those of the airlines not 
thought to be a direct competitive threat, and finally the remainder. 
Research has emphasised the crucial role played by screen position. It has been shown 
that on a busy route there can be many screens full of information. However, as many 
as 50 per cent of ticket sales are made from the first line on the first page, and 70-90 per 
cent of all sales are selected from the flights listed on the first screen (Gialloreto, 1988). 
This information display bias was to prove extremely profitable. More important still 
from a strategic and financial point of view, carriers could use the system to penetrate 
the home territory of co-hosts. Research has also detected a'halo effect', which is the 
systematic tendency [of travel agents] to book a disproportionately large share of 
revenues on the vendor airline (US DOT, 1988). If an airline has the majority of travel 
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agents in a city linked to its reservation system, then the local agents will be more 
likely to book passengers on that carrier, even if this means taking a connecting flight, 
because the host offers no direct services. There were many selective campaigns 
targeting strategic geographic locations. 
The competition for the revenue and market share benefits of the'lialo effect'was 
intense; though the ethics were debatable, the effort was often well rewarded. By 1980, 
Sabre was to return a net profit of $300.2 million on total revenues of $339.3 million 
(US District Court AA035416). American Airlines' 1982 budget for retail automation 
called for spending at an annual rate of $20 million. This expense was justified with a 
projected return on investment in excess of 500 per cent and the recognition that the 
company had been able to increase its influence over the flow of passengers through the 
air transportation network in a manner most beneficial to American (U. S. District 
Court AA072613). In 1985, American's profit from Sabre was thought to be $143m on 
revenues of $336m. Such profit levels led American's chief executive officer, Robert 
Crandall, to admit that if forced to chose between Sabre and the air transport business, 
he would have to keep the information technology business (Sabre) and sell the airline 
(Lawless 1989). The development of an automated reservation system to solve the 
efficiency problems of American Airlines assumed such powerful strategic importance 
in the industry because it generated such extraordinary demand and return on 
investment - enough to be regarded as a very viable standalone business. The 
following tables illustrate the extraordinary viability of the Sabre and Apollo 
investments: 
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Table 2: Projected cash flows generated by airline computer reservation systems (S millions): 
Apollo 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1 1981 
Cash Revenues 
Booking fees 173.4 191.2 1 205.1 1 224.3 -- -- r23 8.4 1 252.0 
Other participant revenues 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 i. 0 
Subscriber fees 95.3 98.3 101.2 104.2 107.2 110.2 
Total cash Revenues 270.6 291.4 330.5 347.6 364.2 
Cash Eipenditures 
Operating expenses 69.5 74.2 77.1 82.1 86.8 91.2 
Equipment Investment 47.3 50.5 52.5 55.9 59.1 62.1 
Development expenses 17.4 17.4 17.4 17.4 17.4 17.4 
Subsciiber Network 95.6 98.6 101.6 104.6 107.6 110.6 
Total Cash Expenditure 229.8 240.8 248.7 260.0 270.9 281.3 
Net Cash Flow 1 40.8 50.6 59.6 1 70.5 1 76.8 1 82.9 
Sabre 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Cash Revenues 
Booking fees 250.6 266.7 282.9 307.0 323.6 339.2 
Other participant revenues 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 .6 Subscriber fees 105.5 105.6 105.6 105.5 105.1 104.5 
Total cash Revenues 357.7 373.9 390.1 414.1 430.3 44-9.3 
Cash Expenditures 
Operating expenses 91.4 96.8 99.6 105.2 110.5 115.4 
Equipment Investment 58.4 61.8 63.6 67.2 70.6 73.7 
Development expenses 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 
Subscriber Ndwork 93.1 96.0 96.9 101.8 104.7 107.6 
Total Cash Expenditure 259.9 271.5 279.0 29 . . 
02.7 313.7 
Net Cash Flow 97.8 106.6 117.6 133.0 1 141.3 1 149.3 
Sourcc: US Dcpartment of Transportatiotlý Study ofAirline Computer Reservation Systems, Nby 1988, PP. 
69-70 
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Table 3- Income, costs and prorits (S millions): 
APPOLO Sabre 
1985 1986 1985 1986 
Income 
Participant Revenue 152.6 174.4 199.1 230.9 
Subscriber Revenue 78.8 97.5 93.4 107.5 
Imputed Income from Host 36.3 46.4 31.0 35.2 
Total Income 267.7 318.4 323.5 371.8 
Operating Costs 
Computer Opcrations 26.4 32.9 1 30.1 34.2 
Communications Network 27.2 35.7 4 35.4 53.0 
Subscriber Services 41.4 49.1 -- 45.2 47.4 
Total Operating Costs 95.0 117.7 110.7 134.6 
Depreciation and Amortisation. 
Depreciation of Equipmcnt 27.2 35.3 22.1 29.3 
Amortisation of other assets 21.0 28.8 20.6 29.9 
Total Depreciation and Amortisation 48.2 64.1 42.7 59.2 
Total Costs 143.2 181.9 153.4 193.7 
Net Income (loss) 124.5 136.5 170.1 179.1 
Total Invested Capital 224.7 260.4 187.7 234.1 
Net income as per cent of Investment 5-5.4 per cent 52.4 percent 90.6 per cent 76.1 per cent 
Source: US Department of Transportation, Study ofAirline Computer Reservation Systems, ýby 1988, 
pp. 69-70 
The sort of benefits airlines received from the reservation systems drove them to insist 
on exclusivity of use. For example, contracts with travel agents were explicit that 95 
per cent of reservations had to be on the airline's system, which made subscribing to 
another system impractical. By 1987,95 per cent of travel agents in the US were 
automated. This meant that gains could be achieved only by displacing rival systems. 
Some airlines went to great lengths to do just that. United Airlines, for example, 
offered one agent in Northwest's territory the following incentives to switch from Sabre 
to APPOLO: $500,000 in cash, a 10 per cent 'override' commission (on top of the 
regular commission) for sales on United, and free use of APPOLO, including telephone 
line charges, for five years (Feldman, 1987). Texas Air tried to lower the costs of 
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agents switching to its System One by defending them in lawsuits resulting from breach 
of the exclusivity clauses in contracts. The expected revenue increases from switching 
travel agencies were seen to more than compensate for even vast sums in damages 
(Feldman, 1987). Indeed, some leaps in market share were huge. For example, in the 
1983-86 period, System One (Texas Air) jumped from 16 per cent to 45 per cent in 
Miami; APPOLO (United) in Orlando went from 10 per cent to 35 per cent; and PARS 
(TWA) in St. Louis moved ftom 59 per cent to 77 per cent (US DOT, 1988). 
American and United were gaining revenue with market power gained through 
information. So successful were they in using information to their market advantage 
that the degree of deviation from perfect contestability prompted their competitors to 
seek legal protection and the government to intervene. 
5.4 The Antitrust Issues 
Numerous carriers and travel agents filed petitions with the Civil Aviation Board 
(CAB) because of problems associated with CRS dominance. These problems fell into 
several categories: access to the CRS, bias in the CRS display, monopolistic and 
discriminatory pricing of booking fees, and exclusive arrangements with travel agents 
that limited entry and competition with other vendors. The net effects of these 
practices were gains to the airlines which owned the CRS, labelled 'incremental 
revenues'. The government's extensive investigation into the allegations identified a 
number of practices that CRS vendors used to earn these incremental revenues. The 
most important of these were bias in the CRS' displays (and the underlying algorithms 
-ý which created the displays), and discriminatory access and pricing (Guerin-Calvert, 
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1989). American and United were found to have developed algorithms that ordered the 
display of information in ways which favoured them or their co-hosts. The displays 
were ordered by using carrier-specific factors to rank flights, instead of factors that 
were in the best interest of passengers, such as the shortest journey time or the most 
convenient departure time. These systems were not only generally biased, but also 
specifically predatory. For example, American Airlines was found to have 
systematically biased its displays against New York Xtr by adding 40 minutes delay to 
all New York Air flights. When Braniff Airways decided to lower its fares, CRS bias 
came into action to reduce the market impact of the lowered fares: 
"Mere were strange things happening at Braniff, Flights to Dallas would be 
booked full right to the last minute, then dozens of passenger would no-show; 
Braniff was turning away reservations, only to find its planes unexpectedly flying 
half empty. Top officials at American swore that these tales were exaggerated and 
that if anyone at American had ever used any such dirty tricks against Braniff, they 
were lower level employees acting out of overzealousness. " (Petzinger, 1995, p. 
149) 
When Continental Airlines, ran by Frank Lorenzo, discounted its fares, American 
Airlines' competitive reaction was to use CRS bias to prevent the changes in 
Continental's pricing of its inventory being communicated to the markets: 
"In Dallas Bob Crandall's people were taking 'screen science' to a new level of 
sophistication. ... Lorenzo's new airline had just posted discount fares in a number 
of cities. But the discounts on 49 particular routes were not showing up on Sabre 
terminals in travel agencies across America. An [American] internal memo cited 
'suppression of all Continental fares" at the discount levels between the 49 city 
pairs. " (Petzinger, 1995, p. 205) 
When TWA became a competitive inconvenience, American Airlines had already 
prepared programs to automate the required predatory CRS bias- 
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"Crandall wanted away to punish "IVA. All of TWA's flights as well as nearly 
every commercial flight in the United States, were visible in the Sabre terminals 
now being installed in travel agencies across the country. Crandall ordered one of 
his people to design a set of computer instructions enabling American, if it ever 
chose, to eradicate all traces of TWA from the listings in Sabre. Crandall wanted a 
single 'transaction' designed, something that could punish TWA instantly with a 
few key strokes. " (Petzinger, 1995, p. 76) 
The Department of Transportation also found that the CRS vendors had been charging 
different carriers different booking fees. Prices were not related to the costs of the 
services purchased, but to the extent of competitive threat represented by the carriers. 
This was discriminatory pricing to raise the costs of rivals, especially those of new 
entrants. Booking fees ranged from about $0.30 to well over $3 per segment, and the 
threat of CRS vendors charging $3 for bookings, when the average profit per segment 
was $2.50, seemed to have deterred a number of potential new entrants. The Civil 
Aviation Board also found that some carriers had promised United that they would not 
compete aggressively in some of United's markets. 
Other anti-competitive practices were alleged, though there was much less evidence of 
these. CRS vendors were said to delay the loading of rivals' fares and schedule data 
into the system so that the vendor could respond more rapidly to changes in market 
conditions than its rivals. It was also claimed that the CRS vendor could use the system 
to gain immediate access to information on all carriers' prices and bookings in any 
market, and so obtain anti-competitive market intelligence. Although the regulation 
that emerged from these investigations generally eliminated the more blatant forms of 
anti-competitive use of CRS, it was not totally satisfactory. Vendors were not 
prevented from making charges; they were required to charge all airlines the same, but 
the amount to charge was not regulated. Standard charges came to be between $1.75 
and $1.85 per booking. At these levels, CRS ownership continued to be a financial 
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gold mine (Shaw, 1990). Furthermore, some (AvmarkAviaflon Economist, April 1994) 
felt that, 
"... in total, the regulations are most notable for their timidity in dealing with 
alleged bias against airlines that do not have stakes in Sabre and Apollo ... An 
underlying premise of the new rules is DOT's and the Bush administration's, 
stance against regulation. The Department's fundamental opinion is that those who 
developed the CRS technology - Sabre and Covia [United's Apollo] - deserve the 
attendant economic rewards. " (AvmarkAviation Economist, April 1994) 
5.5 The International Emergence of CIRS 
In Europe and the rest of the world, CRS began emerging in reaction to the 
development and growth of the American CRS. Figure 3 shows the major international 
CRS and the airlines who invested in them. Airlines in general realised that forming 
their own CRS would be the solution to minimising the threat of an American CRS 
proliferation. Ironically, they also benefited greatly from the American CRS 
technology expertise. Some airlines also wanted to benefit from the same sort of 
competitive leverage that these systems generated for American carriers. 
"Galileo remains very important for BA, but for different reasons from the ones 
that started us off. The reasons that we invested in Galileo are not the same 
reasons why it is important now. We invested in CRS (and the other airlines), 
primarily as a defensive measure back in 87, when the European airlines woke up 
to the fact that the Americans were about to come in and take over our distribution. 
lbat's what got us into it. I suppose that at the time we also thought that we were 
going to make a lot of money out of it which is a long way into the truth" 
(Distribution Manager - Major European airline). 
CRS regulation in Canada and Europe was quick to emerge. It was derived from the 
American regulatory experience in these. However, because regulations are based on 
political will and the economic philosophy of governments, CRS regulation has not 
reached some parts of the world which are significant in terms of air transportation. 
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Examples of these include Asia, South America, Mexico, Africa and the Middle East, 
where both airlines and CRS still enjoy the benefits of strategic practices of debatable 
ethics in terms of competition. 
Figure 3- CRS Industry Structure 
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"Capitalising on the enormous advances in technology and dramatic reduction in 
the price of the computing capacity, [airlines] have created a means to control the 
way travel is packaged, priced, marketed, sold and delivered to passengers 
anywhere in the world. In some cases they have established information 
enterprises which are more profitable than their airline activity. " (Weatcroft and 
Lipman, 1990, p. 88) 
There is great secrecy about the profitability of CRS. They are very profitable 
enterprises. The last time this type of data was publicly available was in the early 
1980s when there were ongoing goverment investigations on the role of CRS in airline 
competition. When asked how profitable the business was, a manager at a major 
international CRS owned by a consortium of airlines replied: 
"Profitable enough. You knew I was never going to answer that question! We in 
this industry ensure that we make that data as difficult to get as we possibly can. " 
(Vice-President - Major CRS) 
To measure the market shares of the CRS and evaluate them in terms of their impact on 
airline competition, data on the number of booking segments and the concentration of 
those bookings are required. 
"Tbe key thing is the number and the quality of the travel agents that we have, and 
obviously the concentration of agents that we have in any one area. For example, 
in Europe we have a strong concentration of users in the UK, Germany, Italy, 
Greece, to a lesser extent in France, and we are very weak in Spain and 
Scandinavia. Our main focus is in the markets which have the main volume of 
bookings potential even though it is a lot easier for us to bring in a user from the 
US than it is, say, from Scandinavia" (Senior Manager - Major CRS). 
Because of the secrecy of the CRS industry, because widely available booking statistics 
would allow accurate estimations of profitability, and because of the unrelenting 
strategic importance of CRS for airlines and the vested interests of the dominant 
airlines, the data still elude researchers. Also, CRS are highly conscious of their image 
and Communicate with the industry through highly professional public relations 
departments. 
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"We use a lot of public relations in getting messages out to the market. It is very 
important from the standpoint of making sure that the message that we really 
would like to deliver to the marketplace is always the same message. I think 
anytime you let a bunch of people talk to the press, you never know what they are 
going to say. I think you have to be very careful because it is a very small 
business. I think part of it is that we want to make sure that the travel agencies that 
do business with us and the airlines that we do business with also get a consistent 
message. Part of it is conditioning the market signals that we send. We need to 
craft the message. We may have all the same product, but we all crack a different 
message to the marketplace" (Commercial Director - Major CRS). 
The result is that it is typical of this industry that each CRS communicates market 
statistics about its position in the CRS industry to the markets which are manipulated to 
serve vested interests. 
". .. A different yard stick, when it comes to communicating marketing their 
presence in the market. Some talk about number of terminals, some about number 
of locations, some about bookings, about concentration in certain areas, but the 
statistical indicators are all very much manipulated to serve conveniences. There 
isn't a set of reliable industry comparisons. We used to be very up front about that 
information and giving it out objectively, but we have now become very reluctant 
to giving it out publicly too" (Senior Manager - Major American CRS). 
Because of the airline ownership of CRS, the CRS industry has developed in a very 
'ethnic' manner. It is presently typical of this industry that CRS have gained dominant 
market shares in their home markets. Home markets here are defined by the markets 
where the airlines who own each CRS originate. For example: 
"If you look at Europe in particular, our main competitors Galileo and Amadeus 
have very strong allegiances with particular countries. Galileo, by definition of its 
ownership structure, has a very strong allegiance with the UK, Italy, Portugal, etc. 
Amadeus obviously has a very strong affiliation with Spain, with France, and with 
Germany" (Sales Manager - Major American CRS). 
By defending a dominant market share in certain regions, a CRS ensures that 
other airlines will subscribe as they need shelf space to sell their products in these 
` regions. But any system trying to penetrate another system's territory cannot 
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hope to be any more than a secondary player. This means that the larger and more 
global carriers have to subscribe to all existing CRS, even small carriers who fly 
internationally need to subscribe to several CRS in order to ensure that their 
products reach a satisfactory part of their markets. 
"T'he industry has developed in such a way that all of the airlines need to be in all 
of the systems. Each of the systems has a certain strength in a certain area. Clearly, 
Sabre has its main strength in North America, both in the USA and in Canada. That 
is worth a lot. For example, BA can't shut itself out of a system which covers 40 
per cent of the US market. And fortunately the US is a very important market for 
most of the European carriers. And the same thing applies for Lufthansa, Iberia, 
SAS, etc. They all need to have a good distribution in the United States. " 
(Marketing Manager - Major American CRS) 
5.6 The CRS Business of Today 
Although they are still owned by airlines, CRS today are more independent of 
airlines. There are two principal forces behind this. First, there are the regulation 
measures, which removed the screen bias, stopped discriminatory pricing and 
'de-hosted' the systems. This restricted the ability of airlines to use CRS against 
their rivals (at least in the blatant ways they were being used). Second, the very 
competition between CRS has pushed for an increased degree of independence 
from the interests of their airline owners. This section will start by explaining the 
function of the CRS in the present airline industry. It will also address the 
economics and market forces that CRS are subjected to as they attempt to serve 
two sets of customers with conflicting interests, and finally, the new strategic role 
of CRS in the air transportation industry which has evolved into a sophisticated 
symbiosis between airlines and CRS. 
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5.6.1 The need for CRS 
"We, are basically an electronic supermarket. We are a huge supermarket and we 
display on our shelves the products of the various airlines and make those available 
for sale. We provide the data and information to the travel agent in order that the 
travel agent can make the booking" (Sales Manager - Major CRS). 
The function of the CRS has evolved from creating an efficient means of 
reserving flights to a system that maintains and supports the greater scale and 
complexity of travel and tourism information. The CRS itself has contributed 
immensely to this information explosion. With the growth and evolution of air 
transport, the information available about airlines' schedules and fares has 
increased massively both in quantity and complexity. Passengers need to choose 
from seats available on many airlines, operating in thousands of city-pair markets, 
selling their inventories in a number of combinations on thousands of connecting 
flights every day for up to a year in advance. Each seat has associated with it 
several possible fares which vary depending on the rest of the customer's itinerary 
and fare restrictions designed to enforce segmentation (e. g., Saturday night stay). 
This information was once made available in a vast document listing the 
schedules and fares available to travel agents and customers. But schedules now 
change quickly and the number of possible connections has increased immensely, 
making such documents impractical to use. The fares available are so numerous 
and change so quickly that they can no longer even be listed; the flights on which 
they are available and the quantities of seats on each flight to which they apply are 
changed daily. Electronic assistance in maintaining an updated database available 
to travel agents is a necessity in this environment (Levine, 1987). 
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"It is incredibly inefficient to determine the price of goods, automobiles, VCRs, 
etc., by going to all the stores. In the airline industry, that information is readily 
available. So it is a dimension of the airline industry which is different from most 
other industries. Most other industries don't have such an efficient way to 
disseminate price" (Vice-President - Major American airline). 
The CRS also evolved from a system to reserve flights to one including other 
aspects associated with travel, such as car hire, accommodation, etc. Thus, it also 
serves as a consolidator of the information on the various components of 
travelling. This served the distribution of the airline product well since it is an 
intermediary product -a means to achieve a purpose - making it more convenient 
for people to make travel arrangements and buy travel. This not only increased 
the revenue base and the potential markets for the systems, but increased their 
value to travel agents, who saw many more of their work activities automated. 
"It was principally an airline system and then it grew to handle cars quite 
adequately, and then to handle hotels, and then leisure products, tours, and cruise 
lines, and then it was expanded to handle accounting systems so agents can do their 
own marketing analysis of their own account activity" (Sales Manager - Major 
American CRS). 
In fact, some would even suggest that from a travel agency point of view, CRS 
provide perfect market information: 
"Using a CRS you can have perfect information in the market. There are very few 
industries which have that. You can find out exactly which airlines are flying 
where, when, how many seats they have available, what kind of aircraft they use, 
all details about their fares, pricing, how that compares, etc. So you've got all the 
information in that system, and you, the travel agent, serving your customer, can 
pin point the best deal, whether that is the cheapest fare, whether that is the shortest 
flight, or whether that is the best connection and whatever else" (Commercial 
Director - Major CRS) 
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5.6.2 CRS Economics and Market Forces: a dilemma 
CRS take airlines' products to the travel agents so they can sell them to the 
passengers by making a booking on the system. The system in turn communicates 
that booking to the airline's internal reservation system and returns a message to 
the agent to confirm the booking. For a CRS to be usefiil to a travel agent, it 
needs to have on its electronic shelves the products of as many airlines as 
possible. On the other hand, for airlines to participate in the CRS, that CRS has to 
have as many travel agents as possible using its electronic shelves to sell tickets in 
the locations where the airline needs them sold. This implies that it is not just the 
number of travel agents subscribing to the system that is important, but also the 
concentration of them in key airline markets and the number of bookings those 
travel agents produce. For the CRS business the marginal cost of an extra 
booking, or an extra travel agent subscriber is negligible. 
'Ve market Sabre computerised reservations system to travel agents. In order for 
the computerised reservation system to be worthwhile for travel agents, we need to 
have as many vendors in that system as possible. We need to be able to sell every 
airline, every car rental every hotel company. The way this company makes its 
money is from booking fees. The great majority of our operation here is directed 
towards the travel agent, which is the person who uses the terminal to make the 
bookings, but the travel agency does not pay the booking fees. The person who 
pays the booking fee is the airline, the hotel or the car hire company. Basically, 
our business works by generating as many bookings as possible through the 
system. It doesn't really matter to us which airline customers book; we get the 
same fee from Iberia or British Airways" (Manager for European Markets - Major 
CRS). 
Today, the vast majority of travel agents are automated. This means that any 
shifts in market shares of the CRS can be achieved only through displacing rivals, 
or through any focused and significant change in travel agencies' demographics 
which favours any particular CRS (both unlikely occurrences and difficult to 
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orchestrate). Also, CRS are so entrenched in their territories that it would be 
difficult to demolish their local dominance. 
" ... now they are established and they are in place and have a strength 
in the 
market. And the CRS business is reaching quite a mature stage now and we have 
got pretty established CRS in most important target markets and there is not a huge 
amount of shift of share really, even though they are all going around fighting each 
other" (Marketing Manager - Major CRS). 
The technology used to operate a CRS is basically high memory capacity, to store 
and index vast amounts of information, and the communication technology and 
infrastructure to transmit that information from the airline's internal reservation 
system with the travel agents making the bookings to sell the travel. That basic 
technology is readily available today and used in many industries. The more 
specific technology applied in this industry relates to the building of searching 
toot applications for travel agent automation and productivity. The main tools 
available to travel agents from CRS today are: 
- searching tools - flights, car hire, accommodation, itinerary, etc. 
- booking tools - for reservation and confirmation of reservations in 
flights, car hire, and accommodation 
- integrating tools - for booking of travel with various elements, such as 
flights, car hire, hotels, and restaurants 
- management tools - for travel agency accounting, customer databases, 
etc. 
corporate consulting tools - to enable travel agencies to manage travel 
for corporations. 
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The CRS technological competition is in building user friendly applications and 
interfaces so that travel agents can have the highest level of automation and 
technical integration while at the same time decreasing the burden of relatively 
high training costs to the level of travel consultant turnover. 
'Travel agents want user friendly applications. A travel consultant is a high 
turnover position. Also, the training time required to learn productivity, 
commands, format, etc. is expensive. They look then for solutions to reengineer 
operations to reduce that learning curve" (Sales Manager - Major CRS). 
This technology is, however, highly exposed in the market. Most airlines 
subscribe to several CRS in order to sell their products in different parts of the 
world, and travel agents, which use CRS, are very numerous. CRS have also 
become technically very similar and have developed identical product 
specifications. Differentiation efforts are intense, but expensive and short asting. 
In short, the CRS has become a technological commodity in the travel distribution 
industry. 
"Me selling points of CRS are getting increasingly difficult to highlight 
objectively. Now, all of the systems have good functionality, they all have a very 
high level of content. And with the current code of conduct both in Europe and the 
United States, that has also created a framework where everyone has to be more or 
less the same. So, what distinguishes a CRS product from another is partly sales 
technique, service levels (how well you service the travel agents), there is still quite 
a battlefield out there for certain functionalities of the system, now that all the CRS 
come to a windows environment, that has made it a lot easier to be very flexible 
and integrated" (Technical Development Manager - Major CRS). 
Also, there is a lot of cross fertilisation of technology amongst CRS, not only 
because of the exposure and relative technical maturity of the applications, but 
through the movement of employees between companies. 
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"We've hired over the past 7 or 8 months close to between 10 and 15 people from 
Sabre. We hired them because they were doing something specific of interest to us. 
We probably have some big project coming up related to a certain area of our 
business, and these people are involved in the same areas for our competitor" 
(Manager for Easter Europe - Major CRS). 
"And the knock on effect of that is a so called 'cross fertilisation'. In other words, 
a lot of people who work here have worked in the past for Galileo or Amadeus, and 
likewise, people who have worked here now work for them, and nobody leaves a 
company without having contacts there, so that is a certain amount of information 
that gets exchanged in that way. Product information, market information, etc. 
what product is coming up, which market is very important. That information is a 
useful complement to the information that drives our strategy" (Commercial 
Director - Major CRS). 
The airline industry's technological products are displayed and promoted in the 
numerous industry conferences which take place every year (e. g., ATIS, IATA 
conferences). This provides not only a place for airlines and other travel-related 
orgamsations to shop, but allows each firm to observe what the competition has to 
offer. 
"Every three months, the airlines meet and all the CRS come to that meeting as 
well. And all the CRS come along and they do a presentation about their latest 
products and they print out newsletters, and their brochures and all this kind of 
thing. And there was a time when all this information was just given to airlines on 
request, but now it is on the table ... there 
is no point in trying to be secretive about 
that kind of information. It is in the public domain" (Sales Manager - Major CRS). 
So, innovations in this industry are matched quickly, and therefore difficult to 
appropriate in economic terms. The result is that CRS, in their intense 
competition for market share of travel agents, have been investing vast amounts of 
money in developing new applications to attract them. Those development costs 
have been passed to airlines, who pay the booking fees, and CRS have not been 
attaining any significant competitive advantage for their endeavours. 
"Me goal of the CRS for some time now has been developing products that benefit 
subscribers [travel agents], so that they have a relative competitive advantage 
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against the other competing CRS, and you will be the CRS of choice amongst the 
subscribers [travel agents]. The problem with that is that very little development 
was done for the airlines and we continue to pass on booking fee increases over 5 
per cent a year for about 5 years. And the airlines are saying, 'Hold on, we're 
under extreme cost pressure and we can't afford to pay these exorbitant booking 
fees. Our revenue growth is not coming close to the cost in distribution, we need to 
scrutinise our booking fees and all of our distribution costs, and try to correct that"' 
(Financial Director - Major CRS). 
Furthermore, the highly sophisticated tools which travel agents now have 
available to them because of this strong market share competition amongst CRS 
are in direct competition with airlines' interests. 
"We are actually paying them to develop travel agent application which push our 
yields down and even compete with our direct sales efforts. That is not fimny! " 
(Distribution Manager - Major American airline) 
Figurc 4- CRS customcrs and the diffcrence of intcrests 
AIdWes 
- Pay for bookings 
- Want maximum yields 
- Need presence in maximum 
number of markets 
- Need access to the nxrl 
significant sellers of tickets 
- Are increasingly conscious about distribution 
costs Gravel agents commissions and CRS 
booking fees) 
-Need functionality to: 
link with their internal reservation systems 
update inventories quickly 
have a flexible fan structure 
have flexible fare restrictions 
CRS 
. Are owned by airlines 
-Must serve travel agents 
- Receive revenue from airlines 
but it is generated by the 
travel agents 
Travel Agents 
- Make the bookings 
- need to provide passengers value 
formoney 
- Receive commissions per ticket flom 
airlines 
- are also incentived by airlines to up-sell 
and shift market share (overrides) 
-Need functionality to: 
have reliable bookings 
hive us" fiicndly systems (high training 
costs and consultant turnover) 
have flexible search tools (lowest fare, 
particular caff iec, wbooking. etc. 
Figure 4 illustrates the delicate position of the CRS in the airline industry. 
Whereas the CRS needed to be an extension of its airline owners' interests, the 
regulatory measures that abolished screen bias, airline hosting and discriminatory 
charges have meant that the obvious interest that airlines had in owning the CRS 
has also diminished. 
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5.6.2.1 Distribution cost consciousness 
Even though CRS are very profitable enterprises, and therefore one might think 
that, from an investment perspective, airlines had every interest in owning them, 
that interest is no longer clear. Airlines work with a high proportion of debt and 
are economically very sensitive and dependent on cash flow. 
"At the end of the day, airline managers need to balance on one hand the good 
investment that a CRS may represent, but on the other, the cash flow of the airline 
and the value that the distribution channels are providing in terms of control of 
their products. The inclination that is emerging is that we need a reasonable cash 
flow cushion to operate and more control over the distribution of our inventories. 
After all, we are the ones who take all the risk to produce those seats. " ( Senior 
Manager - Major European airline). 
When asked about the issue of airline distribution cost consciousness that 
generated the above comment from an airline manager, one CRS manager 
commented: 
'Ve think it's been a good investment, but we don't think it stands big enough for 
them to ignore the other side - it will still come into play. What our goal would be 
is to make it so important to them from an investment perspective that they forgive 
that. Now if you look at how much money an airline can arrange for -I mean 21 
per cent of their cost is distribution related - that's a lot of moneyl We're talking 
about some of the largest airlines in the world. So what we want to do is make sure 
they remember us as an investment with potential for good returns" (Vice- 
President - Major CRS). 
The CRS booking fees are not a significant part of the overall distribution costs 
when added to agents' commission and incentive costs. However, the airline 
business is very sensitive in terms of cash flow, and even a small portion of these 
costs affects this vital cash flow. 
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"And even today if one goes through the mathematics of how much it costs to 
support and maintain a reservation centre operation versus how much does it cost 
to have a relationship with the CRS and pay the associated booking fees, it is still 
more cost effective. Now, the CRS booking fees as a percentage of the total 
[airline] distribution costs is infinitely small. However, there is a concern that we 
[the CRSJ are put off that distribution chain, and how we can minimise their costs" 
(Europe West Manager - Major CRS). 
Airlines are aware that even a small change in the cost/revenue ratio may mean 
the difference between millions in losses and breaking even. The major airlines 
(even those that own CRS) have established teams to look at how they can 
increase efficiency in their distribution costs. 
"So American has been analysing the booking fees from the CRS, and there is a lot 
of costs from the booking fees area from the CRS that don't provide efficiency. 
But I think when you focus on one piece of the distribution, you might miss what 
you're looking for. You're not actually looking to target a specific cost area. 
When you look at one piece, it looks like commission costs are kind of high, but 
that really raises the flag that maybe all of the costs along the distribution channel 
need to be re-evaluated and re-assessed for efficiency. Another area is exploring 
alternative distribution mechanisms" (Distribution Manager - Major American 
Airline). 
Booking fees are a small proportion of airlines' distribution costs, so airlines are 
not merely focused on minimising booking fees, but are looking at the larger 
distribution picture. The CRS are responsible for the huge growth in the 
proportion of bookings that the travel agents make versus other distribution 
channels, such as airline reservation centres and direct selling. Therefore, the 
CRS represents a large component of the bargaining power that travel agents have 
in terms of commissions and incentive programmes. 
"7be cost of distribution through that channel has steadily increased and the 
perceived value of that distribution is beginning to be causing questions. If you 
look at the cost of distribution on an average ticket, I have seen figures quoted that 
22 per cent of the cost of that ticket is used to pay for distribution. Very few 
products that you see in the market today have such high distribution costs. For 
airlines distribution is probably the third highest cost that we pay" (Distribution 
Manager - Major European Airline). 
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The development and the establishment of CRS has created a distribution chain 
structure which is extremely expensive for airlines now that airlines can no longer 
use CRS against each other in the blatant ways they once did. So, the CRS has 
become somewhat of an economic inconvenience, not merely because of the 
booking fees that it charges, but by weakening the control that airlines had on the 
distribution of their products. The CRS is today an established means of allowing 
the travel agencies to apply market economics which are in their own interests and 
in some cases in the traveller's interest, rather than the airlines'. 
"Ibe [CRS] industry has a total of 800-900 million segments multiplied by $3 per 
segment. That will give you the total value of the industry $2.5 billion, which is 
not that big. Travel agency commissions are probably ten times higher. That is 
where the airlines want to effect the change" (Commercial Director - Major CRS). 
Airlines go to great lengths to maximise the revenue they obtain from each flight. 
Yet, travel agents, wishing to remain competitive in their business, search for the 
lowest fares available in the market on behalf of their customers. This pushes 
down airlines' yields. Airlines experience great difficulty in influencing agents to 
'up-sell'. Most offer a typical base commission of 5-10 per cent for an economy 
ticket, and 10-15 per cent for a business ticket. The problem here is that airlines 
are becoming aware that travel agents cannot normally influence people to fly 
business instead of economy class. Rather, they have a certain number of 
business customers and economy customers who can be influenced to fly certain 
carriers. Therefore, the strategy is to influence travel agents to shift market share 
by providing them with competitive incentive programs. This is expensive. 
Airlines are now not only paying vast amounts of money in base commissions, but 
also heavy override commissions to shift or merely maintain market share in their 
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most important markets. This is the main factor behind the high distribution costs 
that the airline business has come to suffer. 
5.6.2.2 The CRS and Airline differentiation 
There is another aspect of distributing through CRS which is beginning to 
inconvenience some airlines - the difficulty in supporting airline differentiation 
efforts. The displays of CRS are filled with information about all the flights 
travelling to any part of the world, but that information is limited to the fares and 
schedules of each airline. So, on a typical CRS screen there will be, for a given 
date of travel, a list of all flights from carriers who subscribe to that system, with 
all the different fares available from each one and the timetables of travel. Figure 
5 shows a typical screen. 
Figure 5- Sample of normal 'availability screen, 
02 Sep Tue Lon/Z#l NYC/ EDT-5 
Airline Fliglit Different fare codes (descending price departure and dep. Arr. aircraft 
No. order) and number of seats available in destination Time Time 
each fare 
IAA- 141 F9C9B6G4V4K4H4Q2MIWO LIIRJFK 1300 1600 763 
2AI 101 F2 A4 A D7 W7 L6 K5 Y4 V2 UO LIHUFK 1315 1545 744 
3UA 907 F9 C9 Y7 B7 M7 H4 Q4 V3 LHREWR 1355 1640 777 
4VS 3 J9 W9 Y7 B7 L7 M5 G3 S2 NO LIHUFK 1400 1640 744 
5BA 177 F9 J9 S7 B7 K5 M4 U Q2 VI LHRJFK 1400 1640 741 
6DLNS 2803 C7 D6 W4 Y7 B7 MI HI QO KO LO LIIRJFK 1400 1640 744 
Source: Interview with a travcl agent (using a Sabre terminal) 
Note: This is a sample of the I st, 'availability screen' for a request of a flight to New York. The description of fields has been added by the author for interpretation purposes. 
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The CRS was designed at a time when air transport was growing substantially and 
when the airline owners had clear dominating positions in their territories. It was 
therefore geared towards the mass distribution business - providing automation to 
travel agents so they could sell as productively as possible. So, it does not take 
into account any more qualitative aspects of airlines' products which may be 
differentiators or drivers for better yields. Some insist that the difficulty in 
differentiating originates in the nature of the airline business, and that there is not 
much a CRS can do to support differentiation tactics. 
"Ibe market in the airline business is price driven, I don't care how many graphical 
interfaces you display it in, and how pretty they look, the consumer is firstly going 
to the price page, and if the price looks pretty, then they may look at other things" 
(Senior Manager - Major American Airline). 
Also, it has become common practice for travel agents to have the functionality of 
what some call 'biasing tools'. These are the ability to pull up on a screen only 
the flights of a particular carrier to the given destination (see figure 6). This is a 
tool which has been officially justified by the travel agents' need to conform to a 
passenger's request to fly a particular carrier. However, most passengers do not 
ask to fly a particular carrier. They ask either for a list of flights which fulfil a 
particular travelling need (two week vacation, or a day return), or for the lowest 
available fare to a given destination. 
"Most customers just come in and say 'I need to go to Paris next week. Give me 
your cheapest fare. Very rarely will they say 'I want to fly BA'. As long as the 
price is right, they don't mind which carrier they travel on. Unless it is some 
airline that they've never heard of and the difference to fly a more known one is 
small. ... So in the end it is mostly up to us which airline we sell" (Travel Consultant - British Travel Agency). 
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Therefore, in practice, these tools have become effective means for travel agents 
to conform to particular incentive arrangements with airlines for the shifting of 
market share. Subsequently, they are instrumental to the travel agent's ability to 
'advise' (influence) passenger choice of carrier, and so to the bargaining power 
travel agents have over airlines' incentives. This not only totally bypasses any 
differentiation efforts that airlines may have invested in, but proves very 
expensive for airlines in terms of commissions. The choice of carrier becomes 
more of a function of how much different airlines pay travel agents in overrides 
than of the product specifications offered to passengers. 
Figure 6- Sample of 'carrier specific' display screen 
02 SEP TUE LON/Z# I NYC/EDT-5 
Airline Flight Different fare codes (descending Departure dep. Arr. aircraft 
No. price order) and number of scats and Time Time 
available in each fare destination 
BA 117 F9J9S9B7K7M6LAW2GI VI LIIRJFK 0845 1125 772 
BA I R9 LHRJFK 1030 0920 ssc 
BA 173 J9 S9 B9 K4 M4 L3 W3 G2 VI LGWJFK 1040 1335 747 
BA 175 F9 J8 S7 B7 K3 M3 L2 W2 GI VO LHRJFK 1100 1340 747 
BA 177 F9 J9 S6 B6 K5 M4 IA W4 G4 VI LIIRJFK 1400 1640 747 
BA 185 F9 J9 S7 B5 K5 M2 L2 WO GO VO LHREWR 1445 1735 747 
Source: STA travel agent (using a Sabre terminal) 
Note: Sample of 'carrier specific, screen for the request of a flight to New York. The description 
of fields has been added for interpretation purposes. 
Differentiation and market segmentation are associated. Airlines must determine 
market segments in order to target them with differentiation efforts. When a 
booking is being made, today's most sophisticated airlines are capable of 
identifying which point of sale is making the booking and its location. This is 
, helpful because they can make judgements about which points of sale can sell 
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more profitably, which points of sale are worth defending in terms of market 
share, and even which points of sale arc more viable in terms of exchange rates. 
However, carriers which have reached this level of sophistication and have gained 
experience have come to recognise the potential for going one step further in this 
segmentation game. They glimpse the potential for the ultimate segmentation 
exercise, which is reaching the passenger who is making the booking and studying 
the information this generates. CRS do not allow this, because it is the travel 
agency doing the booking and influencing passenger choice. 
"Ibat's one thing that distribution can provide, and if you think of the Internet and 
electronic distribution, you can collect information about individual travel habits, 
begin to see where they fall in terms of their profile and the type of product in 
which they are really interested. And so that may be one direction in which this 
new distribution channel might go. But that said, it takes a huge processing 
information infrastructure to handle that" (Distribution Manager - Major European 
Airline). 
This level of segmentation gives the opportunity of pin pointing groups of 
passengers with specific needs, so that the airlines can capitalise on both 
providing the product specifications passengers require, and on building 
relationships with them. It also creates a high level of complexity, which in turn 
requires more technical and organisational infrastructure to support it. 
"So the balancing act in determining the future of distribution really is: is it worth 
the investment in that infrastructure to provide that complexity in fare structure to 
provide the products that the passenger wants, or would it be that the travelling 
public would be just as satisfied with a less complex fare system that doesn't 
require as much processing support, and will travel just as much and the end result 
would be that the airline would have the same amount of profit and revenue? So 
that's the uncertainty" (Distribution Manager - Major American Airline). 
With the pressure of potential alternative distribution mechanisms, CRS are 
beginning to recognise that there are ways in which they can help in assisting with 
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the differentiation tactics of airlines, while leveraging their position in the industry 
and making additional revenue in the process. 
'Ve would like to give the airlines the opportunity to differentiate themselves in 
the CRS. Today the CRS is very sterile. It is a screen and regulated. We want to 
give the airlines the ability to advertise their product in our system, give the ability 
for airlines to leverage their partnerships to the system. For example, after a 
customer finished a booking, the system knows the destination and might come 
back with a message saying, 'have you considered staying in Hilton Germany? 
You will get triple mileage there, or something" (Technical Development 
Manager - Major CRS). 
It is ironic that, after having served as competitive weapons for the airlines, the 
CRS, which are owned and were developed by airlines, are having to find ways to 
defend a delicate position in the distribution chain of the industry. To protect 
themselves against potential distribution alternatives, such as the Internet and 
direct sales, CRS must defend travel agents while attempting not to inconvenience 
the airlines excessively. 
5.6.2.3 CRS perspective 
In their efforts to obtain travel agents' market share, CRS have traditionally 
concentrated their marketing and technical development efforts in the travel 
agency community. CRS are having to respond to the distribution cost concerns 
of airlines: 
'I'he concern here is that STIN [Sabre travel information network] has had a 
history over the last five years of raising the booking fees to its airline subscribing 
customers. The CRS business has largely been driven by the subscribers and 
where we make our money supposedly. Even though the airlines pay us, actually 
pay the bill, to get a bill for something you've got to have bookings, and to have 
bookings you have to have a presence in the subscriber community" (Commercial 
Director - Major CRS). 
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Whereas the cost of developing CRS technology back in the 1960s was 
tremendous because the technological capability had to be pioneered, nowadays 
the technology required to develop alternative reservation systems is readily 
available and at a much lower cost than in the 1960s. Also, the technical, 
programming and marketing skills are abundant in the labour market. This has 
made some CRS recognise that airlines really can have an impact in the 
distribution chain, if they choose to do so. 
"So a lot of the airlines that have the resources are developing alternative 
technologies and we're coming to a point where they can, like the Internet. Now 
technology has got inexpensive enough and there is new avenues and opportunities 
like the Internet they can develop their own distribution costs and bypass the CRS. 
I frankly think that a lot of the CRS have overlooked the airlines and the power that 
the big airlines have. And it is the big airlines that line the pockets of the CRS. 
They account for about 80 per cent of the revenue for the CRS, and certainly we 
need to beýconcerned with our smaller airline customers as well. Butit'sthebig 
airlines that have the fmancials to develop the alternative distribution channels" 
(Distribution Manager - Major American Airline). 
Those CRS that have recognised this are setting up teams to analyse airlines' 
distribution strategies in order that they, too, can be involved in any alternative 
distribution arrangements. Another CRS takes a different approach to the issue 
and one of its senior managers reasons that the process of distribution chain 
restructure will be incremental rather than revolutionary. 
"Mere will be alternative distribution systems and the CRS will want to become 
involved in them. They will be niches that could become core. It's going to be 
more of an evolution than a revolution. There are too many behaviours that need to 
be changed for a revolution to occur" (Commercial Director - Major CRS). 
Today CRS cover 85 per cent of air travel bookings. Another manager at a major 
'CRS reasons that even if alternative distribution channels captured a further 15 
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per cent market share, they would continue to have a strong core business with the 
travel agents. 
Do you realise we have 33,000 travel agencies connected to Galileo. So if that's 85 
per cent and we would still have 70 per cent, we still have to serve a huge number 
of people. So if there's a very big dichotomy, we can't ignore such a large 
proportion of our business. We need to work with them and find out how they can 
survive. At the same time, we need to be able to provide Internet solutions and 
other channel solutions that may come along in the future. Galileo is trying to send 
a message to our travel agency partners that we'll want to work with them in the 
future, where we will say some of our competitors may be going directly to the 
Internet. But while we want to go to the Internet, we want to use our partners and I 
don't think our competitors do that" (Senior Manager- Major CRS). 
Because of their airline ownership, CRS are very restricted in the functions they 
offer to other airlines. The functions offered to travel agents which are not 
completely aligned with the airline owners' interests are necessary in order for the 
CRS to gain market share amongst travel agent users. But having established 
defensible CRS territories, CRS have ensured that any airlines operating in these 
markets have to subscribe to them so their products have the necessary market 
exposure. So, fiinctions offered to other airlines are seen as a competitive threat 
by airline owners, and very much resisted. 
"Mere has been a lot of talk about developing a news flash to alert interested 
parties on fare changes, but then that is a sensitive matter, because it will create a 
conflict of interests. Airlines would not be very happy for their fare changes to be 
immediately available to their rivals. If United has just changed their fare on a 
Boston - Los Angeles flight, and as a travel agency you may have a customer 
booked on that flight and every day the price changes and the customer before he 
takes the flight, would have more opportunity to get a lower fare. We are trying to 
get a positive use for that information" (Software Development Manager - Major 
CRS). 
The search for a positive use for a specific bit of information implies the 
recognition that information is a resource and as such requires use to benefit the 
organisation. 
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The economic interests of airlines and travel agencies are not aligned. So, airlines 
are trying to fragment the distribution channels in terms of the proportion of 
bookings in an attempt to reduce their distribution costs and decrease the market 
power that travel agencies possess. They are turning to direct sales operations for 
that. However they need the travel agencies in order to maintain exposure in their 
markets. The CRS is in the middle of this strategic conflict. 
'Ve do two things. We provide the travel agencies with the tools to manage their 
business against their competition in the most efficient manner, so if they need 
lowest fare search capability, to be able to screen out airlines or connecting cities, 
the functionality is all in the system. It is up to travel agencies to configure their 
own internal systems whichever way they want, so they have a full array of tools to 
manage their business. And if they negotiate rates with the corporation, we provide 
a private fares package for the agency to actually control those rates for that 
particular corporation. On the airline side, basically what we do is we give airlines 
enough control over schedule change, and parcelling up of the seats into a number 
of different classes of service so they can play their yield game any way they want 
by allocating seats, or oversell, or however way they want to go about it. While 
they're in conflict, they really can't do without one another, so they just kind of 
find a way to live" (Commercial Director - Major CRS). 
5.6.3 Sophisticated symbiosis 
The use that airlines make of CRS has been transformed from generating 
incremental revenue and market power to reducing distribution costs and 
accumulating market information. While airlines get dividends from bookings 
made on the CRS which they own, they give rivals dividends on the bookings 
made through other CRS. Airlines are trying to reduce the cost of bookings made 
through reservation systems, because they are aware that their CRS cannot capture 
all the bookings made on their flights. Because no CRS has more than a 30 per 
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cent market share worldwide, it becomes a negative sum game for most carriers. 
The exceptions are the few carriers who operate mostly in the regions where their 
own CRS dominates. Airlines are also trying to funnel as many bookings as they 
can through their own CRS both to reduce their distribution costs and also to 
control the information that these bookings generate. 
"Economically, it makes sense to try and fimnel as much volume of bookings as 
possible on the CRS that I own because I lose dividends on any other bookings in 
any other CRS. Realistically in certain markets, because of certain relationships 
that may exist, that may not be possible. The alliance between Covia and Galileo 
has provided the coverage, the presence in the various markets, the financial 
capability for expansion and significant returns on the investment. It is profitable 
enough" (Commercial Director - Medium-sized European Airline). 
Market information is another dimension of the fight for market share in the CRS 
industry. The bookings that are transacted by travel agents through reservation 
systems generate timely and precious up-to-date information about market share 
relative to other carriers in any specific markets, and about consumers' buying 
behaviour. Not only are airlines using this market information to fine tune their 
tactics, but their CRS are now selling that information to other airlines and to 
firms which produce reports which are sold on to airlines. This is a very 
profitable business since it generates vast amounts of additional revenue but does 
not require a great deal of additional investment. The information is already being 
generated from day-to-day CRS operations. The competition for market share is, 
therefore, also a competition for control of information. The more bookings that 
are made in a carrier's own CRS,, the more information it will obtain more 
quickly, without having to buy it from other CRS, and the more interested buyers 
there will be, generating in turn yet more dividends. 
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So, despite the greater travel agent bargaining power and the higher distribution 
costs that a CRS represents today, airlines still have every incentive to want the 
CRS they own to gain market share amongst travel agencies. 'Consequently, they 
find sophisticated ways of leveraging their CRS's position in the market place, 
using their own market power. 
"It has been proven over and over again that if you have an alliance with the 
national airlines of a country, you will have the lion market share. For those same 
reasons, why we are successful in our owner markets, and where we have 
association with the national airline, we are very successful. And in markets where 
we do not have those associations, we end up with 15 - 20 per cent market share, 
and the other guy has 70 per cent - that is a fact, it's there! Lufthansa is Lufthansa. 
In Singapore, Singapore Airlines is the only one out there and there is no regulation 
in Asia at all" (Commercial Director - Major CRS). 
'Without the support of United Airlines, we would not be where we are today. 
Look at Europe; we have a number of markets where we have 80-90 per Fent 
market share, and it is all because our owner supports us. So the best way to go to 
a new market is through the national carrier. You need his effective support. If he 
doesn't support you effectively, then you may have problems. You need to make 
sure that your interests are aligned with his interests, and that can be a challenge" 
(Sales Manager - Major CRS). 
CRS which are owned by several airlines use the market presence and power of 
their owners in the markets to gain market share. The CRS owned by single 
airlines build joint ventures and franchises with local airlines to sell their CRS to 
travel agents in specific markets. 
'Ve support our existing joint ventures, which is Gulf Air, Cyprus, British 
Midland and 3 others in our region [Europe and the Middle East], as well as look 
out for potential joint ventures either within our direct sales markets, which are the 
European markets, or outside of those markets as well. So we look out for 
potential joint ventures as well inside and outside our direct sales markets" (Sales 
Manager for Europe and the Middle East - major CRS). 
The result of using airlines' market power is the demarcation of territories that 
characterises the CRS industry today. In the markets where rival CRS dominate, 
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and in which a penetrating CRS cannot have the support of the local dominant 
carrier, they are quite content with the commissioning support of secondary 
players and attempt to gain market share through promoting the technical virtues 
of their system. 
"Certainly in the UK, BA owns the NDC [the national distribution company which 
distributes the CRS products locally] there that distributes to the agencies and there 
is a perceived value for agencies to participate on the CRS that the predominant 
airline owns. Some of that is perceived, some of that is real. In countries that we 
own the NDC, such as Germany and France, the predominant airlines there are 
participating in Amadeus. Therefore, we have to sell our product as being 
technically better than their product. It's obviously much tougher. Our market 
share in those areas is much smaller. There is very little to differentiate our 
services technically. Therefore the agencies are going to go for the one owned by 
the dominant carrier there because they perceive a value there. And that won't 
stop. The airlines are probably making private fares available to companies who 
use agencies that are connected through a different CRS. They will still do that" 
(Senior Manager - Major CRS). 
To influence travel agents' choice of CRS and even move some travel agents from 
other CRS, airlines began offering incremental commissions on each ticket sold 
through their CRS (DOT, 1990). This proved effective because it contributed 
directly to the profit of a travel agent, since they incurred no extra costs by using a 
different CRS to book the passengers. 
"If you look at Galileo in the UK, which is owned by BA and have an 80 per cent 
market share in the marketplace, they're pretty happy guys. So there is a lot more 
leverage on the airline side to do those things. So they will give you as a travel 
agency an override of a dollar a ticket or something, to do the bookings on their 
system, and that's a big chunk of money" (Senior Manager - Major CRS). 
This practice of using overrides to encourage agencies to subscribe to specific 
CRS, however, has been contained by regulation in the US and Europe. So, 
airlines can no longer directly entice travel agents to subscribe to their CRS 
through offering extra commissions, or threatening to reduce existing 
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commissions in those regions. However, the same cannot be said for regions 
where this regulation is non existent. 
'Vhat airlines can no longer do is to approach travel agencies and force them to 
change CRS through overrides. That they can no longer do in the US and Europe" 
(Senior Manager - Major CRS). 
The influence of the carriers in the marketplace however remains powerful, not 
only because the offering of overrides to change CRS is hard to prove, but 
because the influence remains very much active through less formal mechanisms. 
"Tbere is all kinds of indirect influences that still exist; e. g., in the US 
marketplace, who sells Apollo? United Airlines. We have a contractual agreement 
with them that they are our sales representatives. So when United goes in, they 
have on their card 'United Airlines'. They are selling automation to the travel 
agent. Although it is never stated, there is an implied connection between me as 
United Airlines selling automation and me as United Airlines with my overrides 
and commissions, my seats and my planes that I am trying to fill. It is sort of a 
hidden market force" (Sales Manager - Major CRS). 
"If you are a fairly dominant carrier then you can have influence in the 
marketplace, and we do use United Airlines as our sales force in the US and in 
Mexico and in Japan, and in the US we also use USAir. Sabre uses its American 
Airlines people. With us, the USAir territory and the United Airlines territory in 
the US don't overlap. It is definitely worth using the strength of the carriers 
because they have a lot of influence in the marketplace" (Sales Manager - Major 
CRS). 
Another indirect but powerful influence over travel agents' choice of CRS is the 
use of negotiated deals with corporations. Direct sales by airlines to corporations 
is increasing. Airlines try, wherever possible, to bypass the travel agency in 
corporate travel and so save the commissions paid to the middleman. However, 
some corporations still prefer to deal with travel agents. They may perceive them 
as more impartial than dealing directly with airlines; after all, they are travel 
brokers. In those cases airlines offer discounted fares to the corporations, 
conditional on the bookings for their travel being made on their CRS. 
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"roday there is no regulation that prevents an airline from going to a corporation 
and saying 'Mr Corporation, we have a strong relationship together. I want to 
strengthen it. As such, I will provide you with a negotiated city-pair pricing. 
However, for that you must tell your travel agency that your bookings must be on 
Galileo or Apollo'. And the corporation can then influence the travel agency and 
say 'Look, I am an important customer of yours. I do $20 million of travel volume 
ayearwithyou. As such I want you to put my bookings on Apollo'. Andthe 
travel agent will say 'Well, whyT And he says 'Well, that's none of your business. 
I have relationships, and I want that volume to go through Apollo". Similarly in 
Hong Kong, Galileo will ask BA, 'Who are your key customers? Let's go knock on 
the doors together'. Why not? It is utilising the tools that are available to leverage 
your position. Our salesmen are airlines and our own sales personnel" (Sales 
Manager - Major CRS). 
In regulated countries, joint ventures and franchisees (who are normallY airlines) 
which sell CRS are recompensed. through ftinctions which are outside the current 
legislative powers of regulations. These functions are mainly related to assisting 
airlines to provide a differentiated service and promote passenger loyalty. One is 
to provide services to the travel agents which are congruent with the services an 
airline provides its frequent flyers: 
"Here this is difficult, but if you are an NDC owner, you can get other levels of 
fimctionality, and you can get your server requirements which fall outside the DOT 
that may benefit you. It is small things, for example, like seat selection, seat maps, 
all kinds of things that are not at top level, but sort of second tier importance. 
Frequent flyer databases, for instance; Lufffiansa and Air France can make sure 
their frequent flyers are best served through Amadeus, and they can prevent that in 
Galileo or Apollo. There is a strategic benefit in pushing Arnadeus and they can 
manipulate and serve the agencies better. through their CRS" (Sales Manager - 
Major CRS). 
There are, however, many countries where CRS regulation is non-existent, or not 
enforced. In those regions, the benefits of owning or selling a CRS for a third 
party are still extremely interesting and very powerful. 
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"Apart from the airlines that own us, we have support from associates. Many of 
them want to run an NDC [national distribution company], because an NDC can be 
interesting business. Many airlines see strategic advantage in owning an NDC, 
from a money point of view and there may be still some advantages in displays. 
You know, beneficial treatment in the CRS of certain airlines. In the US 
especially, the CRS are strictly regulated. If you look at the displays, it is all what 
the DOT [Department of Transportation] tells you to do. That's not the case in the 
Far East, for example, and that will probably take a long time to happen" (Sales 
Manager - Major CRS). 
"Mexico and Japan are diametrically different to the rest of the world. There is no 
bias in Mexico, there is no rules in Mexico. It's open trade for everyone to do what 
they want and Japan is the same way. There are no rules in those market places" 
(Commercial Director - Major CRS). 
In Japan, for example, it is the CRS purchasing department that decides on which 
airline to book passengers: 
6'... as a matter of fact, in Japan you don't sell from the CRT [computer reservations 
terminal]. You sell from the Apollo purchasing department. Literally in many 
cases they say, 'OK, I have an Hawaii passenger. Who do I put them onT And the 
purýhasing department says, 'We have volume on this guy, so put him on this guy. 
The customer doesn't seem to care. Very seldom do they debate or voice an 
objection. It is usually a group, and then they go enter the data in the CRT, just as 
a data entry thing. They hardly use the screen display. Most of them have very 
few sets. They pop real high volumes through them, but it's mostly data entries" 
(Sales Manager - Major CRS). 
Internationally, the current situation is a multitude of different regulation 
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arrangements and a heterogeneous variety of approaches to economic trade. This 
provides ample scope for some airlines to continue using CRS as market 
distorting weapons in many regions. So, strategic leveraging practices are hybrid. 
It is not merely a case of the airlines using CRS, or indeed, CRS using airlines, 
but a sophisticated combination of both - sophisticated symbiosis. 
'Ve've got more marketing clout and the ability to penetrate more markets 
because we're owned by a number of different airlines. I don't know if we use the 
airlines to penetrate the market more than they use us to penetrate the market, so 
it's tough to know who's really ahead of the show here. I am sure the airlines feel 
161 
that we're there to service them. We'd like to believe that. We're pushing the 
airlines in the direction that we want to go" (Commercial Director - Major CRS). 
"If American goes into some place, or United goes into some place, the first thing 
they do is they send their Sabre or their Apollo workforce into that area and they 
convert as many agencies as they can to Apollo or Sabre. So they've got the 
agencies now with them, so they do a market ploy where they start flying out of 
that big place. The more upload (getting people in the seat), the bigger booking 
concentration is on their CRS systems. They build first the CRS presence and they 
try to get a Lunn Poly or a big multinational on their side. They would do some 
overrides. They would do some stuff to start getting their product sold. Spain's 
national carrier is in Amadeus, right? Lufthansa is in Amadeus, Air France is in 
Amadeus, BA is in Galileo, so they are not there. You have the same thing going 
on where you have the lift and the sales force that backs up the lift" (Sales Manager 
- Major CRS). 
These entrenched symbioses pose not only complex regulation formulation 
questions, but regulation enforcement questions. Forcing airlines to divest from 
CRS is an option. However, given the long historical 'quasi dependence' that 
exists between the two, and given the crucial importance and integration of the 
airline distribution chain into the tourism and travel industry as a whole, this may 
prove economically and politically costly. 
"Is there a model though under public governance which would have the same 
degree of implied support and interest on behalf of the owner airlines on the market 
place? I don't know. If you diversify ownership, then it's a totally different ball 
game" (Commercial Director - major CRS). 
5.7 Conclusions 
The development of CRS can be conceptualised as a clear evolutionary process. 
Airlines were seeking automation in order to respond to the pressures imposed in their 
operations by the growth in air travel. Efficiency was the justification for the initial 
R&D investment. When the system became operational, it continued to be seen as 
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automation and justified in terms of the increased efficiency and productivity it would 
bring to travel agencies, and hence to the airlines too. 
"Interest in travel agent computerization initially centred on reducing the cost of 
issuing a ticket by automating the booking and ticket-writing functions. At first this 
was seen as an information production and processing problem similar to the initial 
creation of in-house CRS and the initial provision of computer services between 
airlines. In this role, CRS were production tools, rather than systems of demand 
enhancement. " (Levine, 1997, p. 459) 
American Airlines and United began marketing their systems competitively. United's 
Apollo system was technically superior to American Airlines' Sabre simply because it 
was developed at a later stage in the learning curve of CRS technology, actually 
benefiting from the experience that American Airlines had with IBM in developing 
Sabre. United however made a classic business mistake in thinking that the technical 
superiority of its system would be sufficient to protect the company from the ambitions 
of American Airlines. So. despite its more powerful position in terms of size and 
financial resources, United did not take the marketing of the technology as seriously. 
American, responding to the threat of its schedules becoming less accessible in travel 
agents than United's, were United to beat American in the retail automation race, 
invested very heavily in the marketing of its Sabre product, even though Sabre was 
considered technically inferior at the time. The result was that American took the lead 
in the retail automation race and, most importantly, in the learning curve of the use of 
CRS technology and data. This is an illustration of the power of marketing and using 
the technology versus merely having the technology. What was an obvious use of 
information and technology - automation - had less obvious potential, which was in the 
grasp of only the first movers. Those who had developed and implemented computer 
reservation systems were able to learn that these could generate incremental revenue. 
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One of the first lessons was that the way information was presented to travel agents 
could influence their choice of carrier. 
The airlines would profit ftom leasing the necessary hardware and software to travel 
agents. In fact, the airlines' investment Yielded substantial and totally unexpected 
benefits. Only after these benefits started to emerge did the airlines begin to realise the 
strategic potential of what they had developed with information. Only then did they 
start to consider more strategic uses for CRS and to justify further investment in terms 
of not only increased rents, but also the strengthening of market power. Increased 
efficiency was no longer the universal justification for investment. 
"After eight years of investment in the business, and you have fairly good lease fee 
structure out there, so agencies were kind of paying their way, and then all of the 
sudden you turned out this big deal of cash from bookings. So it was like woe! The 
systems originally were all biased just because they were home grown for 
individual carriers' internal offices. I don't think anybody tried to leverage the bias 
probably until the early 80s" (Commercial Director - major CRS). 
With the experience in CRS technology and retail automation, the perception of 
information evolved from simply a contribution to efficiency through automation. The 
new perception of information saw beyond automation and glimpsed the strategic 
potential of using information as a resource for market advantage in other less obvious 
ways. Given the uncertainty faced by all airlines after 1978, it was not at all obvious 
that adopting a strategy of retail automation was the key to industry dominance. Only 
the first movers were positioned to understand the power of a retail system, making 
rapid imitation unlikely. 
"Intelligent persistence leads to invaluable experience not easily imitated by rivals. 
Firms that begin to fide an experience curve ahead of their competitors realize a 
head start that will endure as long as new opportunities continue to be revealed. 
Technology can always be purchased, but the same can rarely be said for 
knowledge. " (Copeland and McKenney, 1988, p. 368) 
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More than the technology itself, it was the experience in developing CRS in retail 
automation and in using the information that CRS generated which provided the first 
movers with a superior understanding of the airline business. It also exposed to them 
the strategic value and potential of reservations information. This experience generated 
superior knowledge of how to use information as a strategic resource rather than merely 
a means for efficiency. Expert uses of this information can be seen in the extremely 
sophisticated revenue management systems in use today, in frequent flyer programs, 
and in the complex and flexible incentives provided to travel agencies through real time 
monitoring of variations in their sales activities. These are tactical activities of 
paramount importance in competitive airline markets, and which take expert knowledge 
and organisational capabilities to be used. The vast disparity in the level of use and 
sophistication of these tactical tools in the airline industry is a prime example of the 
difference between possessing merely the information and the technology, and, 
possessing the knowledge to use both effectively. By the time regulators and other 
airlines appreciated the competitive significance of retail automation, it was too late to 
challenge the dominance of the first movers. American and United were so successful 
in devising ways to use their systems to exploit the new environment that their rivals 
were often forced to seek legislative protection. 
'Vhen they decided that distribution was in fact a marketing tool and in fact we 
can do quite well, then the government stepped in and they neutralised it to the 
extent they can, although they left enough flexibility in the systems for the agencies 
to get around some of the neutrality that was put into the systems. But what 
happened was that you had all of a sudden a large influx of cash into the companies 
because you could now charge and your investment was minimal" (Commercial 
Manager - Major CRS). 
CRS began to emerge internationally in response to a potential American 
dominance of distribution and with the intention of making the same kind of 
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additional revenue. However, airlines in Europe had to share the development 
costs, because even though the technology involved was no longer pioneering, 
setting up such technical infrastructure was still a vast investment, and no 
European carrier had the spare resources required to do it individually. 
Two systems emerged in Europe: Galileo and Amadeus, each of which had 
powerful airlines in its ownership structure. The same race for retail automation 
then developed. However, because CRS were owned by various carriers, the 
market power of the owner carriers was used to reach travel agents. The result 
was the consistent and defensible regional market dominance of each CRS. 
Galileo merged with Covia (which owned United's Apollo) and became Sabre's 
main competitor internationally. Amadeus tried to merge with Sabre, but without 
success (AwnarkAvialion Economist, 1992). Other reservation systems emerged 
world-wide and also established the same entrenched regional roots. 
Today, the overwhelming majority of travel agents is automated and using some 
CRS or another, depending mostly on their regional locations. The CRS has 
greatly contributed to the strengthening of travel agents' position in distribution. 
They can exert strong influence over passengers" choice of carrier, and 
consequently they can greatly influence airlines' market shares of the bookings 
they transact. This costs airlines immensely in terrns of commissions and other 
travel agent incentive programmes. Furthermore, CRS market share shifts are 
marginal. The CRS technology is mature and its applications are diffused 
innovations. CRS competition is intense for the conquest of market share through 
'technical innovation, but to no significant avail. The result is increased booking 
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fees for airlines without any obvious material benefit. American Airlines' 
experience in using the CRS technology revealed that accurate and timely 
information from the booking transactions could be used to fine tune tactics and 
was also very valuable as a tactical resource which provided much information 
about the competition and the passengers. Other carriers soon followed the 
practice. 
CRS charge high booking fees and have very defensible market positions. This 
means that any airline that has a reasonably extensive and international route 
network, even if it owns a CRS, will have a large booking bill to pay. There may 
be many bookings going through its own CRS, but there will be equally many 
going through rival CRS. Also, most CRS are owned by several airlines, so the 
dividends that they get from booking fees have to be shared in proportion to their 
share in the investment. On the other hand, there is an increasingly heightened 
interest in the information which booking transactions through CRS provide. The 
most obvious interest is in the booking information generated by reservations on 
routes served by the CRS owner carriers. But that information also has a high 
market value amongst competitors serving other routes, and CRS booking 
information is therefore being sold today. 
The high market value of this information emerged, not only because the benefits 
of using it were promoted by the very success of the first movers, but also because 
many caff iers are actually reaching the level of sophistication in the strategic use 
of information that the first movers reached some years ago. The result is that 
% airlines are creating market pressures to lower booking fees and are even more 
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interested in reducing the market power that they inadvertently gave travel agents 
in the process of retail automation. At the same time, airlines have found more 
sophisticated ways of responding to the difficulties in displacing rival CRS. Their 
aim is increasingly to control the precious information from booking transactions. 
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CHAPTER VI 
TRAVEL AGENTS AND AIRLINE 
COMPETITION 
6. Travel Agents and Airline Competition 
The previous section argued that the development of CRS and the advent of travel 
agent automation have affected the position of the travel agents in the airline C) 
distribution chain. This section will elaborate on the factors which contributed to 
the transformed role of the travel agent. It will then add to the discussion, also 
initiated in the previous section, about the conflicting interests between airlines 
a. nd travel agents. Finally it will discuss the factors which are already pressuring 
travel agents, and provide a glimpse of the potential new paradigm travel agents 
face. The role of travel agents in the distribution chain is an important dimension 
of airlines' current strategic uses of information. The role that travel agents are 
playing in the airline industry today has stimulated particularly sophisticated 
information uses, which will be discussed in the following sections. In order to 
enforce their market strategy, sophisticated airlines not only monitor the sales of 
I travel agents very effectively, but use them as sources of competitive information. 
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6.1 The Bargaining Power of Travel Agencies 
Before US deregulation, the role of the travel agency was simply an extension of 
the airlines' reservation off ices. The market place was simple, there was little 
competition on routes, and carriers applied simple fare structures, which were set 
by the Civil Aviation Board (CAB). The same happened in Europe and the rest of 
the world. 
"Me travel agent market place that the combination of airline and agency 
regulation created was a very orderly one. Regulated fares were simple and easy 
for agents to deal with, so no travel agent could attract business through superior 
assistance with fare search since only one or two airlines served most routes and 
there was little likelihood of fiuffier entry" (Levine, 1987, p. 455). 
In the 1970s, the travel agent's role was that of representing airlines, and so 
airlines thought they had every interest in automating travel agents in order to 
increase the efficiency of their internal reservation systems, while earning some 
revenue in the process. Airlines were increasing the productivity of agents, whose 
economic role at the time was that of faithfully representing the commercial 
interests of airlines. 
"Back in the 70s the primary objective of the travel agent was fairly clear, they 
were representatives of the airline they sold - like sales offices - and they got 
commissions. The commission structure, of course, is designed to incentive up- 
selling, meaning that if you are a full fare passenger, you could be convinced that 
flying first class would be better, or moving to an airline that has more expensive 
fees. And at that time there wasn't this myriad of different fares that are almost 
incomprehensible. Back then you knew that if you moved up to the next class you 
would get better service and you wouldn't have to worry about this vast disparity 
between bargain basement fares versus first class fares. It was fairly clear back 
then. So, at that time the value of the agency was very clear to the airline, meaning 
that if we pay you commission, then they are going to be incited to up-sell" 
(Distribution Manager - Major American Airline). 
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With the development of air transportation, the number of cities served by airlines 
increased, and so did the number of travel agents that served those cities. In the 
US, for example, the number of travel agents more than doubled in the decade 
between 1978 and 1988 (DOT, 1990). Another contributing factor to the growth 
in importance of travel agents was the inclusion of other travel-related products in 
the CRS, such as hotels, car hire, trains, cruises, etc. This gave the travel agents a 
larger role, not only in terms of number and variety of products available for sale, 
but also as consolidators of travel arrangements - providing holiday and travel 
packages. They achieved equally dominant positions in the distribution chain of 
these other products (DOT, 1990). 
"Currently, in the current distribution world, airlines distribute over 80 per cent of 
their inventory through travel agents. That probably means that it is the highest 
volume that the agents distribute since they first started. It is interesting to look 
back into how the this whole distribution system developed to the place that it is 
today, because 20 years ago travel agents distributed a very small proportion of the 
airlines' product. Airlines distributed most of it themselves. Passengers wouldn't 
really think about a travel agent unless they had a lot of money and were interested 
in a pretty complex trip. The travel agent's function really has been a new 
development, and I think that we can attribute that development to the 
improvement of the information being distributed by airlines. The development of 
Sabre was really instrumental, I think. When it started being implemented in travel 
agents in the late 60s, even at that point the amount of distribution to an airline by 
travel agents was about 20 per cent, and it has really gone up since then. " 
(Distribution Manager - Major European Airline) 
The expansion in terms of number of passengers carried by air transportation over 
the last 30 years was accompanied, with the various deregulation movements, by 
an intensification of domestic and international competition. This means that on a 
busy route it is not uncommon to find seven or eight carriers competing for 
passengers. 
"An orderly marketplace with few airlines and regulated fares blossomed (or 
exploded, depending on one's point of view) into a confused bazaar of new entrant 
airlines and the complex fare structure. " (Levine, 1987 p. 455) 
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Deregulation took place concurrently with the race for retail automation between 
the major airlines. The beginnings of retail automation were marked by the use of 
computer reservation systems to achieve market advantage through bi4sing 
efforts. The vast revenues that airlines were accruing from booking fees and the 
CRS bias contributed to fierce CRS market share battles, which gave most travel 
agents powerful CRS functionality. At that time, the travel agent was perceived 
not only as an extension of the airlines' reservation centres, but also as a source of 
much revenue and an outlet point of the market power which CRS were designed 
to orchestrate. 
With the regulation of the CRS, and the inclusion of other carriers' inventories in 
reasonably unbiased displays, the travel agents' role was gradually transformed to 
that of a travel broker. Other flights were included on the display, and air travel 
being a difficult product to differentiate - almost a commodity, with the new 
distribution technology and a more assertive role in the distribution chain - it is 
not surprising that customers turned increasingly to travel agents for the booking 
of travel. 
"Deregulation has greatly favoured the agent in the US. Competition in air fares 
and frequent service changes have meant that more passengers have turned to the 
agent as a source of the latest market information. " (Shaw, 1990, p. 208) 
The intensification of competition also brought a much greater complexity in the 
fares charged by the airlines as they employed sophisticated techniques to 
maximise the revenue of each flight. Today, it is not uncommon for carriers to 
have ten different fares in economy class and two or three different fares in 
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business and first class. These complex fare systems are largely unintelligible to 
the public. Hence, people turn to the travel agent not only to decipher this 
complexity, but also to achieve better value for money from the existence of more 
discount fares. 
"Me domestic US market is always going to function on the schedule and price, 
and the fare wars that we have constantly. The agency community is constantly 
monitoring the fare wars and react relatively quickly and re-booking people and 
changing their reservations and doing baby-sitting on their records. In the 
international market, the whole structure of it from most people's perspective is 
that it is confusing, it's complicated pricing. People tend to run to the agencies to 
handle them more as an assurance than anything else" (Senior Manager - Major American CRS). 
With increased competition and the subsequent complexity of market information, 
the travel agents underwent a crucial transformation. From being merely 
extensions of airlines' reservation centres, they began to sell information to 
customers. 
"Unlike the past, where travel agencies in an orderly marketplace served 
principally as ticket vendors, the confused marketplace of deregulation allowed 
agents to sell information to customers. Deregulation increased the value to 
consumers of having an expert search for them, since it was more likely that a good 
agent would find a new airline service or a fare that the consumer couldn't find 
herself. It also created new profit opportunities to travel agents because it was very 
costly for customers to monitor the search process. ... 'Ibe system rewarded airlines that were particularly adept at paying high incentive commissions. " (Levine, 1987, 
p. 456) 
The disproportional increase in airlines' distribution costs can also be attributable 
to the ease with which travel agents can now influence the customers' choice of 
travel. 
"But the travel agency today, with all the systems that are available to them can 
really control an awful lot of travel, and can direct traffic pretty much" 
(Commercial Manager - Major European Airline). 
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A recent survey in the US indicated that 24 per cent of travel agents usually 
choose a specific carrier in order to qualify for an overriding commission and an 
additional 27 per cent sometimes make such choice (US DOT, 1990). A study by 
the US Department of Transportation observed that "some industry participants 
believe that agencies can choose the carrier for half of their leisure customers and 
one-fourth of their business travellers" (US DOT, 1990, p. 8). The influence of 
travel agents over passengers' choice of carrier was strengthened and facilitated 
with the automation and biasing functionalities provided by the CRS. Travel 
agencies can also build in their own biases. 
'7ravel agents can do it easily. If you can sit there and you can take, say, you want 
all your BA flights, then you can build a robotic application to go into our end 
system and enquire through the normal availability messages and screen-scrape out 
all of the BA stuff, put it into your robotic and present your agent only BA trips. 
There is nothing to it" (Market Development Manager - Major CRS). 
Furthermore, while CRS are today subject to strict display regulations in many 
countries, the travel agents are not regulated in this way. Agencies developed 
new ways of using CRS with the help of programs created by airlines, CRS, some 
agencies, and independent software firms. Some programs, for example, modify 0 
CRS displays to instruct agents which airlines are 'preferred' by the agency or its 
clients (DOT, 1990). 
I have to do a neutral display, OK? And it has to go through all the miles and 
miles of regulation criteria stuff, right? For this thing, it doesn't make any 
difference what the agency builds; they can build a bias anywhere they want. So if 
BA gives them overrides for that, then yes, no problem"(Vice President - Major American CRS). 
"One of the important things to recognise under the regulated environment is that 
all the CRS companies were regulated and cannot provide a biased display. The 
travel agency community is not regulated. So we have put biasing tools in Apollo 
that the travel agency can exercise at their option. They have a function in there 
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where they can enlist an airline or a hotel company, or a car company and that will 
influence the display. So, if they want to influence it for American or Continental 
Airlines, they put that parameter in and then when their travel counsellor sells a 
seat for a commercial account that has an ongoing discount on an airline, then they 
only see the screen display for those airlines" (Technical Manager - Major CRS). 
"A lot of the travel agents have their own interface information systems with the 
CRS, mainly as a way of inventory management, so that if you book a holiday in 
the Algarve for example, they can bring all the different component bookings on 
the screen. I am not quite sure how their system works, but I should think also that 
commissions and the different overrides different airlines offer them should also 
play a part in those systems" (Commercial Manager - Major CRS). 
Airlines are today forced to compete not only to appeal to passengers, but most 
importantly, for travel agents' favourable market influence. This has given travel 
agents increased bargaining power in negotiations for the distribution of each 
airline's products. The result has been a substantial and sustained increase in the 
commissions airlines pay travel agents to distribute their products. This increase is 
disproportionately higher than increases in their other costs. , 
"Commission payments have risen sharply in recent years. They have done so both 
in absolute terms, and as a proportion of airlines' operating expenses. Today, 
commission payments constitute the third most important input cost for airlines 
after those of labour and fuel. ... there 
is every possible reason to believe that the 
situation in the US is typical of many other markets. " (Shaw, 1990, p. 209) 
"Mree of the eight US majors spent more than 10 per cent of total revenues on 
commissions in 1994, and Northwest paid more than 17 per cent of its revenue 
because of its heavy dependence on Pacific routes where overrides push 
commissions up to 30 per cent. Commission expenses per ASM [available seat 
mile] have almost tripled between 1980 and 1993, while unit labour costs have 
risen by less than 20 per cent over this period. " (AvinarkAviation Economist, 
March 1995) 
Airlines in Europe pay a base commission to travel agents to distribute their 
products (9 percent is a normal level). However, they also use more complex 
incentive programs with certain agencies, according to the strategic importance 
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and tactical focus they attribute to them. The main pricing and incentive 
mechanisms used by airlines in competitive markets are as follows: 
- Oveffiding Commissions - these are commissions given to agents on 
top of the basic commissions. They are normally used to stimulate 
market share for specific destinations. Typical override values are 10- 
20 per cent for economy traffic and up to 50 per cent on business 
traffic. These commissions are given on an ad hoc basis to different 
agents at different points in time, and vary in value and in the 
destinations as well as the subclasses to which they apply. They are 
private agreements between airlines and agents. 
- "Rappel" Mechanisms - these are incentives used to stimulate the 
loyalty of the agents independently of the destinations. They are 
composed normally by indicators of, volume, market share and growth 
in sales from the previous year. As an example, an airline may pay the 
agent I per cent if it grows by 5 per cent in volume of sales of 0 
$500,000, and if it maintains a market share of 40 per cent. "Rappels" 
are used by airlines mainly in their home markets, or in markets where 
they have a significant presence. This is because agents normally can 
only adhere to one or two "Rappel" incentive programs, if they are to 
achieve their targets and hence receive the revenue at the end of each 
year. Rappel mechanisms are also private arrangements between 
airlines and travel agencies. 
"TOCs"- are confidential fares given by airlines to travel agencies. 
Traditionally, these were offered mainly to tour operators and 
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consolidators in order to maintain the prices confidential and not to 
upset other agents. However, they are increasingly being used with 
other types of agents in order to hide pricing tactics from rival airlines. 
TOCs are not direct incentives, they do not provide the agent with 
additional revenue. Indeed, often it reduces the revenue the agent 
receives, because the lower the fares, the less revenue will 9 per cent 
represent. However they enable agents to be more competitive. Some 
CRSs, such as Amadeus,, are already accommodating that industry 
practice by providing electronic means of distributing private fares. 
They supply and maintain software for distributing different private 
fares to different groups of travel agencies (e. g. Amadeus Nego Fares). 
The intention behind the development of systems such as Nego Fares 
was to automate the logistics involved in the distribution of different 
fares to different agents, and the activities of updating those fares. 
However, the system also enabled airlines to increase the number of 
fares and the frequency of altering these fares to varying numbers of 
travel agents. So, some airlines today focus much of the distribution of 
their pricing on private fares. The system enabled airlines to hide a 
much greater part of their pricing tactics from competitors eager to 
react to it. 
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6.2 Conflicting Interests 
Travel agents provide information so passengers may manage their travel, and they 
earn commissions from airlines for distributing their product. Typical base 
commissions are 5-10 per cent. Overriding commissions carrier (which may vary from 
5 per cent up to over 35 per cent of the ticket value) are given as incentives for travel 
agents to bias the information they provide passengers so as to influence their choice of 
carrier. This situation creates a principal agent problem between the travel agent (the 
agent) and the passenger (the principal). Airline marketing programs are designed to 
reward the agent for directing business to the airline at the expense of the principal 
paying for the tickets. Passengers expect unbiased information on what carrier service 
is most suitable for their travelling needs. On the other hand, travel agents have strong 
incentives to provide biased information which favours certain carriers. The airlines 
are paying travel agents vast amounts in overriding commissions so that they serve 
their interests. Travel agents, because they work on very tight profit margins (DOT, 
1990), are very susceptible to overriding commissions. However, they are also 
vulnerable to competition from rival travel agencies, which are particularly numerous 
in large cities. Hence, agencies still have to provide their clients with reasonable value 
for money. 
"As deregulation came into play and the fares began to go all over the place, and as 
consumers became more aware of what was happening in terms of pricing and 
fares, the change of the regulatory environment and the additional information and 
education that the consumers were receiving, resulted in the change of mentality of 
the wide public, to say, 'Oh, there's really two or three classes of service, and in 
the coach cabin there seems to be all sorts of fares, and if I shop around I will find 
the best deal'. So, as that developed the travel agent became more and more 
chartered by the consumer to look out for their interests versus those of the airlines, 
meaning that airlines are looking for higher fares and the consumers for lower fares. Twenty years ago, if you asked the travel agents where they got their money 
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from, clearly they would say that it was from selling airline seats and being 
representatives of the airlines. Today, I think if you ask the travel agents the same 
question their first response would be that 'I service my clients'. There is still a lot 
of airlines' desire to influence what goes on in a travel agent and that does happen. 
But the individual agent, whilst having targets placed on them, their first desire is 
to provide service to their clients. And part of that service is to actually down-sell, 
versus up-sell. At that point it starts to look that there is a conflict of interests that 
arises in the agents" (Distribution Manager - Major American Airline). 
"For every would-be price fixer [airline] hoping to sell high, there are 10,000 
vacationers who want to buy low, and the [CRS] terrninals glow on both sides of 
the counter [airline/travel agency]. The contest isn't close to even. " (Forbes, 15 
March 1993) 
To find a way of responding to both sets of conflicting market interests, travel 
agencies have adopted a common practice of selling to their clients the low fares, 
thereby pushing airlines' yields down, while shifting market share towards 
airlines with which they maintain overriding commission relationships. 
'Vhat that means for the airlines is that the airlines are basically fimding these 
consultants to perform activities that may not be in the best interests of the airlines. 
I think that is not the full direction that it goes, because like I said there is always 
opportunities to try to influence the agents. Airlines are paying more and more 
money in commissions and overrides to try to influence the travel agents, and they 
do something which is not in the airlines interest, which is pushing yields down. 
Now, we want to keep business, and that's really what we are doing now in the 
travel agency community. Initially our interest was to create an environment 
where people were encouraged to sell value of the travel and up-sell. Now, with 
the overrides and the other incentives that are given to agencies by airlines, we aim 
to just keep business and not necessarily create higher revenue traffic" 
(Commercial Manager - Medium Sized European Airline). 
This works particularly against airlines who shift market share at great expense, 
but who see the vast majority of passengers boarding their aircraft on some kind 
of discount fare or another, and that includes even many business passengers. In 
1994,92 per cent of airline passengers bought their tickets at a discount, paying 
on average just 35 per cent of the full fare (Smith, 1995). 
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"So at that point there is that complicated drift and that is definitely causing the 
question that if we are funding this 100 per cent, why don't they look out for our 
interests more? And so I think that at that point you wonder, 'Well, if there is two 
parties being served, who should pay for that? ' Ultimately, the consumer pays 
either way, because they pay for it in the airline ticket and it goes back to the travel 
agent" (Distribution Manager - Major European Airline). 
Shaw (1990, p. 210) claims that airlines should be properly rewarded for their vast 
investment in the business of air transportation. 
"It is still absolutely essential that airlines should be in control of the distribution of 
their product. Airlines commit enormous sums to the future development of 
aviation through the capital costs of the aircraft they purchase. Intermediaries, of 
whatever type, do not make an investment which is remotely comparable. They 
should not control the distribution channel. " 
However, the entrenched position of the travel agents in the distribution chain is 
difficult to challenge. This is because: 
(1) bargain fare hunting, which is one of features of the broker function of 
travel agencies, is increasingly popular amongst passengers; 
travel agents perform relatively complex travel planning and 
consolidating functions, which airlines have no interest in doing; and 
(3) travel agency's market shares are typically quite fragmented (DOT, 
1990), and many small agencies have highly defensible positions in the 
market. 
"Me extent to which airlines are able to bypass travel agents is very limited. They 
cannot and do not want to handle complex multileg interline trips with car and 
hotel bookings, etc. They are only interested in their own flights" (Area Manager - 
Major American Airline). 
"Small travel agents are also in considerably defensible positions. Many focus on a 
network of people to which they consistently sell, which are loyal and accustomed 
to deal with them. So the fragmentation of the travel agency market into the 
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existence of many small travel agencies is a characteristic of the business" 
(International Sales Manager - Major American Airline). 
"Ibe role of the travel agency is to provide information to, and to broker on behalf 
of, the passenger. Demand for this service, especially from inexperienced leisure 
travellers or passengers with complex itineraries remains strong" (Avmark Aviation 
Economist, March 1995). 
6.3 Commission Capping? 
A recent effort from the major US airlines to reduce their distribution costs was 
the capping of travel agents' base commissions. Delta Airlines initiated the 
practice of commission capping in April 1995 (AvmarkAviation Economist, 
March 1995). This applied to domestic return fares, limiting them to just $50, 
irrespective of the monetary value of the fares. All major carriers soon followed 
suit. 
"Delta capped travel agents' commissions because paying travel agencies 
commission is expensive and if you could minimise what You pay to travel agents, 
then the money goes to your own pocket. And other carriers matched that" 
(Marketing Manager - Major American Airline). 
"'That doesn't affect travel agents' propensity to sell us, because say every carrier 
did the same, which they did, there is the same value in selling any one. But that 
was relying on everybody doing it" (Sales Manager - Major American Airline). 
This led ASTA (American Society of Travel Agencies) to initiate a court action 
against the airlines on allegations of breaching US antitrust laws by collusion to 
f ix travel agent incentives. However, the major airlines have arranged out of court 
settlements, not only to avoid the negative publicity, but to keep the commission 
capping in place. 
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"Me other unexpected development was the reaching of a tentative settlement on 
the class-action litigation brought against six majors over their travel agency 
commission capping. Individual carriers' shares of the $97m total settlement 
ranged between $9.8m (USAir) and $20-$21m (United, American and Delta). 
However those payments are insignificant compared with the long terms cost 
savings derived from the lower commissions. The settlement allowed the majors to 
retain their commission caps. " (Avmark Aviation Economist, November 1996) 
Airlines maintain that the practice of commission capping will not affect travel 
agents' propensity to sell their seats because the main factor behind travel agents' 
choice of carrier has always been overriding commissions and not base 
commissions. 
"Ibe major incentive for travel agents to sell particular carriers continues to be the 
incentive commissions (overrides), because before everyone gave the same base 
commission anyway. So, it is just a matter of reducing the base commission, but 
continuing to incentive them as you wish" (Commercial Director - Major European 
Airline). 
However, by reducing the base commissions, airlines are reducing the revenue 
which goes to the travel agents. The real economic effects of this practice will not 
be apparent for quite some time, but it encourages the travel agents with sufficient 
bargaining power to demand yet higher overriding commissions to compensate for 
loss of base commission revenue. 
6.4 Competing for Corporate Travel 
Another area where travel agents are in direct competition with airlines is 
corporate travel business. Corporate travellers (passengers travelling for business 
purposes), who are also normally frequent travellers, are airlines' highest yield 
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passengers. The problem is that they are also the travel agents' premium clients 
in terms of commissions. So, while airlines attempt to by-pass travel agents 
wherever possible through direct sales products, negotiated discounts with 
corporations and their frequent traveller programmes, the travel agents target the 
corporate market. Agencies are doing this not only to avoid being by-passed, but 
to earn revenues additional to the commissions they get from airlines by providing 
travel management services to corporations. This also differentiates them from 
their travel agency rivals in terms of expertise and the services they can provide. 
"But the travel agency today, with all the systems that are available to them can 
really control an awful lot of travel, and can direct traffic pretty much. The airline 
business is now driven by all these other things, and it is in direct competition with 
the travel agencies as far as corporate travel is concerned. If travel agencies go to 
corporations and guarantee them the lowest fare, they are already in conflict with 
the airlines. "Ihey're trying to raise yield, and agencies are trying to reduce the 
yield. 1, as an airline, decide that maybe I can't survive on volume and then go to 
the corporation now and I'll cut a corporate deal with them. So, if he gives me 85 
per cent of all his travel, I'll discount it. And then the travel agency is forced to 
deal with negotiated rates, where they may or may not earn full commission 
structure, and half the time the corporations will re-direct their business to a travel 
agency who uses a system which is owned by the airline who is giving the deal. 
Some of that is not quite on the open because it's kind of bugging" (International 
Sales Manager - Major American Airline). 
There is, however, a large disparity amongst travel agents in terms of their ability 
to serve corporations directly. Many travel agencies have under-trained, under- 
paid staff, and therefore lack sophisticated travel management skills. With the 
competition amongst CRS for market share, travel agencies are filled with 
technology and sophisticated functions which most cannot utilise. 
"I'lien you're kind of driven to this kind of technology game, totally under-utilised for the most part. I would say there is not 5 per cent of the agencies who can use 
the sophistication they have. They all want it though! They use it strictly as a 
Point of sale terminal for the most part. They don't do a lot of sophisticated 
analysis. Most are not really running this full integrated business. '17hey are really 
running a typical travel agency; they sell limited products, travel, hotels, cars, etc. 
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So now they have got this brand new machine, but they still use it the same way 
that they have for the last 6-7 years. And they had no business drivers to force 
them into using this new technology, and they've sought the path of least resistance 
and that's to what they have leamt 10 years ago. '17hey got into PCs, but they just 
use it as an emulation device to get into the old functionality. But all the owners 
and the managers are caught up with 'If I am going to compete in the marketplace, 
I need a PC'. They really don't understand why they need it, but 'It is nice for me 
to have it', because then they can tell everybody 'I am definitely a sophisticated 
business"' (Vice President - Major CRS). 
There is both the opportunity and the technology for many travel agencies to 
progress to a more value-adding role in the distribution chain. This, however, will 
take considerable cultural and economic restructuring. This is an illustration of 
the barrier that the use of the technology (not its development or acquisition) can 
constitute. The technology is readily available for all travel agents who subscribe 
to CRS, but very few are making use of it to add substantial value to their 
business. Those who are utilising that technology by investing in the skills and 
organisational infrastructure to use it are developing skills and gaining experience 
which has a very healthy market value, and they are proving to be fierce rivals to 
the airlines' by-passing efforts. 
"Me more sophisticated users of technology, they will go to a company, and they 
will say 'Give me six months of your travel and expense reports', and they'll take 
those expense reports and they will run it through their systems and they will say 
'If you were working with me I would reduce your total T&E [Travel and 
Expenses] budget by $400,000 and I'll guarantee you lowest fare and I will manage 
your whole travel platform for you'. They will do that kind of work for a 
corporation and they'll use their systems that they've created to deal with their 
negotiated rates and their guarantees, and their commission tracking and follow up 
thing. They do whatever analysis work needs to be done by the client, and they'll 
police the travel policy for their client. Their biggest problem is that corporations 
have a hard time setting travel policy, and an even harder time enforcing travel 
policy. So it's kind of a give and take until they settle in" (Commercial Director - 
Major CRS). 
"roday they're saying, 'My God they're going to go direct. I need to get out of the 
commission business. So the smart ones will share their commissions back with 
corporations and say that if you want me to do these things, this is what it will cost 
per transaction. It's here and now, and it's becoming a real pain in the butt to us" 
(Commercial Accounts Manager - major European Airline). 
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6.5 Changing Paradigm? 
The current dominant economic paradigm of most travel agents is such that the 
revenue they earn is not directly related to the costs they incur in the operation of 
their business. This is a difficult aspect of the business to manage, which involves 
a high degree of uncertainty. Relatively few agencies or corporate clients have 
adopted a fee system. Most locations do not charge any service fees, and of those 
which do (only 25 per cent of the total) the great majority (86 per cent) obtain less 
than one per cent of their net income from such fees. Those who charge fees tend 
to be more profitable than those who do not (DOT, 1990). 
'I'lie commission system is also flawed because the agency's payment depends 
solely on the amount of the fare, not on the amount of work needed to meet the 
customer's needs. As a result, the payments made to an agency for a transaction 
under the commission system may bear no relation to its costs. " (DOT, 1990, p. 15) 
It is in the interest of the airlines that travel agents begin working with 
transaction-based rather than commission-based charging. This way they would 
greatly reduce their distribution costs in terms of base commissions. Airlines are 
trying to influence the travel agents to change their sources of revenue from 
airline commissions to client fees. Much of this influence is being applied 
through the computer reservation system companies who 'advise' the travel 
agencies. 
"Travel agents should change their economic paradigm. In the past, someone 
could walk in, talk one hour to the travel agent and then walk out, never come back 
and never buy a ticket. And if he bought a ticket, the travel agent would get 5-10 
per cent of the revenue of that ticket which could be as much as $500 dollars. The 
guy that buys the ticket says, ' Well why if I only need 20 minutes of your time, 
why are you getting $500 for that? That doesn't make sense'. They need to 
change their role" (Marketing Director - Major CRS). 
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Certainly, in corporate travel it is economically desirable for the travel agencies to 
abandon the practice of being influenced by the airlines through overriding 
commissions. This would promote their image of travel brokers with the 
corporations, who want exclusive interest relationships with the agent who 
manages their travel. Knowing that the agent is exclusively serving their interests 
is important since the costs of monitoring the travel agents' searches for products 
which serve their best interests would be expensive and defeat the purpose of 
contracting out these activities. 
'Ve see the role of the travel agent changing. You see it already in the US, with 
the commission capping, and whatever, and consulting fees. A travel agent 
focusing on business, they get a fee for handling the business, so it is not like you 
get a 10 per cent plus a5 per cent override for a ticket. You get the base price of 
the corporation. Corporations give them say 5 per cent fees for handling tickets. 
That is a different approach. Within that paradigm I think that a travel agent can 
play a good role also in the future" (Commercial Director - Major CRS). 
"Consequently, some agencies and corporate clients have shifted to a fee system, 
where the client, not the air carrier, compensates the agency by paying it a fee. The 
agency then turns its airline commissions to the client. The fee system would help 
ensure that the agency's incentives are consistent with the client's expectation that 
the agency's goal is to provide it with the best possible service and would reduce 
the uncertainty facing an agency over the adequacy of its compensation" 
(Marketing Director - Major CRS). 
The problem with this system is that while it would save costs on base 
commissions paid by airlines to travel agencies, it would not reduce the emphasis 
on overriding commissions, since the system is based on the travel agents' sharing 
these with their corporate clients. The sharing of overrides is hard to monitor by 
corporations because overrides are private agreements between agencies and 
airlines and agencies are not legally required to disclose their existence. Hence, 
many agents do not share their commissions with corporations, and the ones that 
do, do not share commissions with all their corporate clients, and where they 
share them, it is a very small proportion of their commissions (DOT, 1990). This 
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does not reduce the agency's bargain power, because despite overriding 
commissions, a travel agent is still an option with less bias than that of having 
discount arrangements with one particular airline. 
Most firms do not have a consistent travel policy and the ones that do have 
problems in enforcing it (DOT, 1990). The travel agent does not require policy 
enforcement; rather it still acts as a travel broker who may be somewhat biased in 
recommending which carrier to choose, but not significantly biased in terms of the 
monetary value of the fares. It is still possible for agencies to serve the cost 
efficiency interests of their clients while still receiving overriding commissions to 
shift market share for airlines. The fee-based system affords travel agents the 
opportunity of strengthening the relationships with their premium customers, 
whilst strategically using the commission sharing arrangements with other clients 
to cross subsidise that. A rational course for travel agents to follow could be to 
focus on the areas where their particular expertise can add the most value. As 
seen previously, not all travel agents are capable of competing in the corporate 
travel business because it takes a higher level of technical sophistication 
accompanied by the expert use of it. 
"It is not walking in and getting one hour of free time and say bye bye. They 
should focus on areas where they can add value, focus on the passengers where 
they actually make money. They can focus on certain market areas via their 
expertise, in the areas where their expertise and knowledge is. Multinational travel 
agents will probably focus on serving big corporations. With leisure, you need to 
know a lot about a certain market, destination, or whatever. But the booking itself is fairly easy, if you have that expertise then you will attract those passengers. If 
you sold a ticket to a business traveller, that could bring you $500 in the past. But if you sold that ticket to him, that wouldn't happen anymore. Instead of making $500 on one out of every five customers, you will probably make money out of 
each customer that you deal with, irrespective of the fact of whether he buys a 
ticket from you or not" (Vice President - Major CRS). 
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Focusing on a fee-based system could prove a manoeuvre more acceptable to 
corporations than to individual passengers in the leisure segment. Corporations 
can more easily appreciate that system's added value than can the average leisure 
traveller. It would therefore be more difficult for travel agencies to justify the 
merits of a fee-based system to the public. 
"That is already happening in the US - more in the business segments - because 
they can form institutionalised relationships and sign agreements, but leisure 
cannot do the same. It will take time, and margins for the travel agents in the 
leisure business can still be interesting. If you are a passenger and you like it then 
you will come back. "Me Internet, for example, cannot answer all the questions 
that a leisure passenger has" (Corporate Accounts Manager - Major CRS). 
6.6 Conclusions 
Travel agencies enjoy a substantially entrenched and powerful position in the air 
transportation distribution chain. Airlines consider the benefits that the travel 
agents are enjoying unfair since the airlines incur all the risk in the production of 
available seat miles (capacity offered to the passengers) and suffer 
disproportionately high distribution costs. Ironically, the airlines have 
inadvertently contributed to this situation with their retail automation efforts and 
most importantly with their market distortion efforts. These market distortion 
efforts also constitute additional information for airlines to acquire in order to 
respond to each other's travel agent incentive tactics. 
The ability of airlines to by-pass the travel agencies is limited and it involves 
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substantial investment either in the building of customer relationships (direct 
sales, frequent flyer programmes, promotion), or in the development of alternative 
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distribution media such as the Internet and interactive sales television. Both 
initiatives are being explored by airlines, but it will take time and vast investment 
to achieve significant effects in the reduction of the travel agency's bargaining 
power. Also, travel agencies are themselves establishing presence in alternative 
distribution channels. Because of the economics that characterise airlines, the 
political persistence of hampering bankrupt airlines to compete on equal footing 
with others (through allowing state aid in Europe and Chapter II bankruptcy 
arrangements in the US), the existence of highly subsidised loss-making flag 
carriers, and the very nature of competition in the airline industry, market forces 
will not permit the natural disappearance of overrides. Also, airlines are legally 
obliged to refrain from any collusive arrangements by international anti-trust 
laws, and so cannot orchestrate the abolition or reduction of overrides. Anyway, 
there is no consensus among airlines to do this. 
On the travel agency side, overriding commissions are very important sources of 
revenue, and while some are moving towards fee-based arrangements with 
corporations, they have no incentive to refuse, or indeed, stop demanding 
overrides from airlines proportional to the bargain power they have. 
Corporations, too, have no incentive., or indeed, means of making travel agents 
refuse overrides and would lose their rebates if they did. Finally, the practise of 
shifting market share in exchange for overriding commissions by travel agents is 
expensive for clients to monitor. However, it is very closely monitored by many 
airlines. The economic, social and political desirability of this situation is at least 
debatable, and poses many important regulation questions: Should the airlines be 
allowed to continue offering travel agencies overrides? Should the travel agencies 
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be obliged to divulge the commissions and overrides they receive? Should the 
travel agencies be allowed to shift market share on behalf of the airlines at the 
expense of impartiality to the passengers? 
Any significant regulatory measures on this matter will be subject to fierce battles 
of interests. The major airlines have powerful political influence and the travel 
agents are well organised (ABTA - Association of British Travel Agencies, ASTA 
- American Society of Travel Agencies, for example). They, too, enjoy 
significant political influence. While it is in the financial interest of travel 
agencies to keep receiving overrides, not all airlines may be interested in 
distributing their products through completely impartial travel agents. Besides, 
the abolition of override commissions would only work if the regulations were 
equally. implemented, and enforced worldwide. Therefore, controlling overrides 
and their effects with regulation could be a complicated and strenuous process. 
It must be conceded that more detailed research is required on this matter. 
However, there is strong indication that the market share shifting, induced by 
overrides, is at the root of the travel agents' disproportionately high bargaining 
power and subsequently the artificially high distribution costs of airlines. 
Passengers are the ultimate payers of these costs. Therefore, a strong argument 
could be built that this situation is causing significant economic inefficiencies in 
the airline business and, in consequence, in all the industries it serves. 
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CHAPTER VII 
USES OF CRS INFORMATION 
7. Uses of CRS Information 
7.1 MIDT Technology 
Retail automation was a great milestone in the generation of competitive 
information which would greatly affect the future of airlines' strategy. The 
experience in an automated retail environment proved invaluable for airlines. 
However, another no less important, but less explored, use of this information was 
to monitor the booking activities of travel agencies. This use of information 
emerged because American Airlines, as first movers in CRS retail automation, 
were well positioned to observe the great increase in importance of the travel 
agent in the airline distribution chain. With retail automation, the proportion of 
bookings made through travel agencies increased dramatically. American 
Airlines was also well positioned to realise that the combination of the CRS 
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display regulation and increased travel agency experience in using the CRS would 
contribute to an increase in the bargaining power of travel agencies. Travel 
agents, after all, were brokers of airline products, so when they began exercising 
their bargaining power, normal and override commission expenses began to rise. 
This Prompted American Airlines to develop an information system (SMARTS - 
sales management and response tracking system) to monitor the bookings that 
travel agencies made on American in relation to the bookings they made on other 
carriers for each particular route. This way, American Airlines could invest travel 
agency incentives more selectively and achieve greater returns for these 
investments. 
The SMARTS system initially worked by extracting booking information per 
point of sale from the Sabre reservation system and processing it to give market 
share per route per point of sale, per operating carrier. This meant that it was 
possible not only to examine market share against that of specific rivals on 
specific routes, but also to study variations at frequent and specific points in time. 
Because this information related to bookings, it referred to the future rather than 
'sold' and 'flown' revenue. This characteristic meant that the airline could react to 
this information before its relevance perished. However, information extracted 
from Sabre would only cover those travel agencies using the Sabre reservation 
system to make their bookings. It then became important to obtain the same type 
of information from other reservation systems, which had significant market 
shares in important markets. The first step for achieving this was the marketing of 
that information to other carriers by American Airlines, which promoted its 
virtues for airline strategic management. This constitutes the birth of MIDTs 
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(management information data tapes). The CRS regulation, in place in the US 
and Europe, which is still proliferating internationally, mandates that all products 
and services offered by CRS companies have to be made available to all airlines at 
non-discriminatory prices. So, today, all major CRS produce and market IýMTs, 
which are becoming widely used by airlines. Systems like SMARTS are also 
being marketed by the many airline-specialist IT firms and used by many of the 
major airlines. Some smaller carriers are also attempting to implement the 
technology. The systems now consolidate booking information from the various 
relevant reservation systems and process the information per route, per flight, per 
specific carrier, per point of sale. 
7.1.1 The Contents of MIDTs, 
Traditionally, airlines accumulate information on sold and flown revenue. This is 
the revenue sold by each agent, which is reported monthly through the BSP (bank 
settlement plan), which is an organisation which accounts for the transactions of 
travel agents and their payments to airlines of the fares from the tickets which 
they sell. This information consists of data on payments made each agent to one 
airline compared to the payment of the agent for the total of his sales to all 
airlines. Flown revenue is the proportion of the sales of each agent which actually 
were flown by the airline. It does not, however, specify how much the agent has 
sold on which airlines and therefore gives no idea of the market share that the 
airline has in each agent for sales to each destination. This was the major 
breakthrough that MIDT technology brought. 
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There are two main formats by which MIDT information is received by airlines. 
The major carriers, those which can afford to set up their own MIDT information 
processing teams, buy the tapes directly from the CRS companies, and process the 
tapes. Many airlines, however, do not have the scale of operations to dilute such 
investments, or regard the in-house processing of that information to constitute no 
added value. So they buy what is known in the industry as 'captured MIDT 
information'. This consists of largely standard reports, which use the most 
popular industry measures. Figure 7 shows a sample of the main fields of data 
included in the unprocessed CRS magnetic tape. 
Figure 7- Data Fields of Unprocessed MIDTs 
Meld Name 
Transaction Date 
Sequence Number 
Agency Identification Code 
Agency IATA Number 
Flight Number 
Airline Code 
Departure Airport 
Arrival Airport 
No. of Passengers 
Class of Service 
Local Departure Time 
Departure Date 
Local Arrival Time 
Type of Link Indicator 
Bookcd/Canccl indicator 
Definition (Where required) 
Date at which the booking was made 
The sequence in which bookings were made 
Code to identify the travel agency making the booking 
Travel agency's IATA number 
Number of the flight on which the booking was made 
Airline code on which the booking was made 
Departure airport of the booking 
Airport of arrival for the booking 
Number of passenger in the booking 
Class of service the passenger has booked 
Type of link between the CRS and the airline internal reservation system 
Indicator of the validity of the booking or its cancellation 
Source: Galileo International's technical manual of MIDT products 
The above fields can easily relate to tens of millions of entries per month, 
considering that major carriers have thousands of daily flights each one carrying 
on average in excess of 150 seats, and each seat will have several bookings and 
cancellations attached. Also, there are many entries which are incomplete or 
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contain codification errors which require correction or 'cleaning' in order to 
produce coherent reports. The number of records that each field can contain and 
the number of possible combination of fields which produce different analysis, 
make not only the processing, but the use of this information a difficult task. 
There are some airlines which produce myriads of different reports on this 
information to achieve greater detail. 
"... then you have to write your own programs and analyse the stuff. The one I 
thought was probably the craziest so far was the discussion we had last week 
regarding SAS. SAS wanted the entire itinerary at time of booking. They want all 
you have while you're doing the sell transaction. They wanted to look at all your 
O&Ds [origins and destinations] even though they may be only a piece of it. They 
wanted to look at it when you're initially selling the system. Every time you 
modify the sale or add segments to it they want to see the whole thing, they wanted 
to see it when you file the record away, the final record and they wanted to see 
what it looked like again when you ticket it. So they get a ton of data, I mean 
they're not that big, but they're going to get a lot of data and now they look at it 
and they're going to analyse it. Some people just want to know bookings per 
agency, per location that type of information. Other people want journals, they 
want an entire journey itinerary given to them. So various people use it for various 
analytical purposes. " (Commercial Manager - Major CRS). 
Because of the processing capability required to filter and process the 'raw' MIDT 
information, 'captured MIDT information' products, marketed by several airline 
IT firms and some CRS companies, are increasingly popular. These are normally 
limited in the number of measures used and variables compared. This reduces the 
potential extrapolations which airlines may make of the data, but facilitates the 
task of using the data in their strategic efforts. Infonnation can be excessive if the 
organisation is not capable of using it. Table 4 is contained in a sample report 
provided by Sabre Decision Technologies to a medium sized European Airline: 
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Table 4- Sample MIDT Report .I 
Top 9 Outlcts/N4arket Share by Agency/On Line/Non-Directional 
Market Analysis by Airlines by Agency 
Market: EWR - LIS 
October 1996 
Agency Agency Airline 
IATA Code Airline booldngs Share 
Agency Name 
1069161 Landings TVL TP 257 100 
Total 257 
2256980 Saga M Holidays TVL TP 104 86 
BA 13 10.7 
DL 4 3.3 
Total 121 
4160138 Collette TVL SVC TP 61 81.3 
BA 14 18.7 
Total 75 
3157989 Adams TVL TP 62 100 
Total 62 
0950199 Academic TVL Abroad INC TP 62 100 
Total 62 
3155619 Elmora TVL CTR TP 59 96.7 
DL 2 3.3 
Total 61 
0667966 Ovi TP 49 94.2 
BA 3 5.8 
Total 52 
2267700 Grand Circle TVL INC TP 49 100 
Total 49 
Source: Sabre Decision Technologies MIDT - Sample report 
7.1.2 The Use of MIDTs in Airline Competition 
The advent of CRS and the use of information captured from the CRS by airlines 
has transformed the way airlines monitor the effectiveness of their strategy in 
different markets. Access to more detailed and up-to-date sales and market share 
information has stimulated some airlines to develop extremely focused and 
responsive sales forces. 
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"I think travel agencies are very influenced by commissions, overrides, prizes, etc., 
but the airlines are getting a lot smarter in targeting them, devising ways to make 
sure they get something back for them. We are becoming a lot smarter in targeting 
where we need to pay overrides and where we don't. A good example is 
Concorde, we provide a service which no other airline has got, so why are we 
going to pay overrides for travel agencies to sell it? It's &ft I It makes no sense at 
all! But we have been doing it for years! We've onlyjust figured it out that we 
oughtn't to do it, but we are not doing it now" (Commercial Director - Major 
European Airline). 
The use of this technology is directed at the sales force employed in the various 
sales offices around the world, who can use this information to monitor agents 
sales activities, discovering which agents are supporting which airlines for which 
destinations. It has become part of the strategic processes of airlines' sales offices 
by indicating which agents to visit and incentive programs to provide. 
'4 ... what we do, in the States with the tapes [MIDTJ is we download them immediately all the way down to the sales rep who's responsible for that area. 
[He's] equipped with a laptop, then he can go into the agency or the corporation 
and say 'Well I gave you 1000 bookings last week', and they use that. We have 
red flag reports that come up and say 'This doesn't work', so we customise it to the 
account [sales point]. 'Mey can be intelligent enough to say 'Before the quarter is 
over you won't get your incentive (if there was one) if we don't get enough 
business. Here's the problem areas'" (Sales Promotor - European sales office of 
major American airline). 
This improved monitoring capability has greatly assisted airlines not only in 
focussing on agents, but in building information exchange relationships with them 
and customising the incentive programs they offer to the characteristics of each 
agent. 
"If we're getting all the information through the computer about what your agency 
does, you can't sit there anymore and say, 'But I sell Chicago all the time'. But I 
can say 'Well yeah, look at the screen for last month. You were six points below 
the other guys, and so don't tell me you sell Chicago. Here it is! ". You as the 
agent may think you're selling Chicago, but it's the people on the telephone and 
the counter that are selling the seats, but in fact you don't. So, are you willing to 
have a training session with your people and tell them that my God you need to sell 
more American. Are you willing to let our sales rep come in and push American, 
to help you with things that you need? In many cases we know more about the 
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travel agents' businesses than they do themselves. There is a lot of travel agents 
that don't even know what their gross sales is through the year" (Sales promotor - 
major American airline). 
Because airlines receive and accumulate MIDT historical information, they are 
able to observe variations in market share in each agent for each destination. This 
is used as triggering device for many visits in order to find out why market share 
is decreasing, and what the airline may offer in terms of product specification 
changes, or incentives in order to improve the situation. MfDT has proven a very 
effective tool for sales promoters and sales managers more because the 
information it generates raises focussed and targeted questions than by the mere 
observation of the results. The most profitable uses of NMT technology are 
those that apply it as a tool to guide both the infonnal acquisition of qualitative 
market information to explain the variations in the airline's competitive position 
and also the informal acquisition of information to improve that position. 
7.2 Frequent Flyer Programs 
Frequent flyer programs (FFP) are a use of information derived from the use of 
CRS technology pioneered in the 1960s. The advent of CRS enabled the storage 
and indexing of vast amounts of information. An incremental step was to begin 
accumulating information about business travellers, the premium customers of 
airlines. Upon analysis of the reservations data, American Airlines noticed that a 
small number of passengers was responsible for a large number of trips and 
% revenue. It was therefore logical to develop strategic tools to attract their loyalty. 
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With the CRS technology, the technical ability to set and track millions of 
individual customers' travel accounts and offer them incentives to travel and 
spend yet more money with the same airline was available. The development of 
frequent flyer programs is a fine example of an effective marketing strategy aimed 
at differentiating the airline product, targeting the high yield frequent business 
traveller, to achieve a degree of customer loyalty. American Airlines used its 
CRS to identify the most important group of customers - the business travellers. 
To appeal to this group, American introduced the'AAdvantage! frequent flyer 
programme in 198 1. In May of that year, the group of people who devised the 
frequent flyer program was expecting some 50,000 members in the first year of its 
operation, , 
"Ibey weren't even close. More than a million people joined AAdvantage before 
the end of that year. And nearly a million more people joined the frequent flyer 
programs that quickly sprouted up in 1981 at most of the nation's other carriers in 
response to AAdvantage. ... AAdvantage membership totals flew past the 
19.1 
million mark in 1992 and are growing now at a rate of nearly 2 million new 
members a year" (Reed, 1993, p. 177) 
Observers estimate that the cost of starting such programs as AAdvantage were 
between $2 and $12 million and that they resulted in an increase in an individual 
carrier's business of between 20 and 35 per cent (Business Week, 27 Aug. 1984). 
Frequent flyer programs have also become very important direct mail lists, which are 
very effective in cutting advertising costs. 
"Of course, no one associated with the creation of the AAdvantage program back 
in 1981 ever considered that they might be working on perhaps the most effective 
marketing program ever created - in any industry. All they knew they were doing 
was looking for a solution to what had been a long-standing unsolvable problem 
within the airline industry. How does an airline build customer loyalty? " (Reed, 
1993, p. 178) 
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Because of fears by the people who developed the program at American, that 
corporations would begin to use the free mileage points gained by their employees, 
which would mean corporate discounting, American had prepared Corporate 
AAdvantage. However in the early 80s corporations were less concerned with cutting 
travel costs, rather they saw the mileage prizes as benefits they could give their 
employees without paying extra for them, consequently, American never felt compelled 
to introduce the corporate program (Reed, 1993). By not introducing the corporate 
program and rewarding business passengers individually, American would take 
advantage of a principal agent problem between business travellers and their 
employers. The relevance of frequent flyer programs to this thesis is that they are a 
means of differentiating the airline product and of studying the habits of business 
travellers. They also constitute in some markets barriers to entry. Accumulating 
information about their most important customers and using it to stimulate customer 
loyalty, while achieving disproportionate amounts of revenue and creating barriers to 
entry, is an effective strategic use of information. 
7.2.1 The Principles of Frequent Flyer Programs 
The idea behind the frequent flyer programme is to promote brand loyalty by rewarding 
passengers for continuing to fly American, thus eroding the commodity nature of the 
service. The rewards were attached to the number of miles flown by passengers and 
took the form of upgrades or even free flights. The FFP's effect on the demand/revenue 
ratio is that it creates a principal agent problem. It frequently rewards a business 
traveller (the agent) on behalf of the employer (the principal). The agent normally 
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benefits from these rewards. The FFP can function as a genuine discount when the 
entity receiving the benefits is the one who pays for the flights. However, this is not 
normally the case. Frequent travellers generally use bonus miles for their leisure trips. 
Hence, they have strong incentives to pay higher specification fares, to travel more than 
is strictly necessary, and to take longer routes or more trip segments to reach their 
destinations (Civil Aviation Authority, 1993). This costs their employers vast sums of 
money, but gives the airlines disproportionately large amounts of revenue. 
In 1990,3 per cent of US passengers accounted for 27 per cent of all trips and 40 per 
cent of airline revenues (Humphreys, 1991). Layer and Reid (1988) estimate that ticket 
prices are 10-15 per cent higher than they would be without frequent flier programs. 
Layer and Reid (1988) consider that frequent flyer programs may be costing American 
business as much as $7 billion a year in added travel costs. Frequent flyer programs 
have become widespread and an essential feature of business travel. In 1991, 
membership of the main American programs was reported to be: American 14.2m; 
United 13.3m; Delta 10.1m; Continental 9.1m; Northwest 8.6m; USAir 7.8m 
(Humphreys, 1991). The degree of consolidation of programs has been high, since the 
wider the range of routes on which bonuses can be gained and used, the greater the 
appeal to frequent flyers. Another market advantage of frequent flyer programs for a 
carrier is the opportunity they afford to compile information on customers. Frequent 
flyer programs give carriers such information as the customers' name, address, 
employer, number of flights flown and destinations, preferences for meals, seating, and 
a host of other details. In the past, airlines had infonnation on the total travel of their 
passengers, but little, if any, about the individual customer. As this membership 
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database accumulates, the airlines are able to utilise it for market research, specialised 
promotions, and differentiation. 
In the US, Morrison and Winston (1995) found that abolishing frequent flyer 
programs would cause larger airlines' fares to fall relative to those of smaller 
airlines, because the larger airlines carry a greater share of passengers redeeming 
frequent flyer miles, which helps curb losses of market share. The largest carriers 
would often lose market share from such a policy and the smaller ones would 
gain. Travellers obviously differ in the frequency of their trips, their reasons for 
travel and the frequency with which someone else pays for their ticket. By 
offering free trips instead of reduced fares and by using their networks to take 
advantage of these differences among travellers, large carriers have increased their 
market share. But smaller carriers can and have offset the competitive advantages 
of frequent flyer programs by charging lower fares and developing strong 
customer loyalty. Frequent flyer programs are important to competition, but are 
only one dimension of it. 
Levine (1987) claims that frequent flyer programs have assumed an unexpected 
importance in deregulated airline competition. When first introduced by 
American Airlines in 1980, the frequent flyer program seemed to many observers 
in and outside the airline industry, and perhaps to American, itself to be a 
marketing 'gimmick' of only peripheral importance. It is now apparent that 
frequent flyer programs are very important loyalty building tools. Airlines are 
however increasingly interested in the information accumulated by frequent flyer 
, program databases. The information contained in these databases is used not only 
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for the building of substantial mailing lists, but even to predict the demand of the 
business segment in particular markets. 
" If you're going to start a new city we could literally pull one of the largest mail 
lists in the world which is our Advantage List. We could literally pull who's in the 
zip code, who's in the area, where do they fly. We could run an analysis on it and 
tell you right away that Luis is doing 100 segments a year, he usually goes to 
Denver and he does that 12 times a year, so he's worth this much" (Corporate Sales 
Director - Major European Airline). 
What started as a simple marketing exercise of offering discounts to frequent 
travellers evolved into sophisticated information systems to support the 
accounting of frequent flyers' miles, and at a latter stage, into an exercise of 
information acquisition. 
7.3 Revenue Management Systems 
Revenue management systems, also known as yield management systems, are 
today an important part of the competitive airline industry. They are responsible 
for the great complexity of fares in the airline markets. This section will begin by 
exploring the origins of such systems, and the strategic motivations for their 
development. It will then explain the strategic principles behind such systems and 
the main functions they perform in airline competition (without delving into 
technical analysis). It then continues with a breakdown of the main levels of 
sophistication of the systems. This examines the different roles they perform in 
different airlines, but most importantly, the difficulties which higher levels of 
revenue management sophistication impose on airlines as organisations. 
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The relevance of this section to the thesis lies not in exploring exhaustively the 
technicalities of the system, but in providing an illustration that even in the airline 
industry, which has a high content of quantitative information, the benefits of a 
sophisticated decision support tool, such as revenue management, are in how the 
technology is used and not simply in its acquisition or implementation. This 
requires a vast investment in terms of the organisation's ability to understand and 
use the information contained in the system. In order to make full use of a 
decision support system such as the revenue management, it is important to 
recognise the limitations of its models and predictions. Only then can the airline 
complement the statistical recommendations generated by the system, and cope 
with constantly being interrogated by the system for strategic decisions. Using a 
revenue management system well is the difference between having the airline 
work for the system, or having the system work for the airline. 
7.3.1 Origins of Revenue Management Systems 
The beginnings of revenue management systems can be traced to the development 
of automated reservations systems by airlines in the 1960s. More accurate control 
of inventory allowed American Airlines to notice that some passengers were 
booking flights but not boarding. In order to predict the proportion of passengers 
that would 'no-show', American Airlines began to accumulate reservations data 
for each flight to serve as historical data for the statistical predictions which 
would serve as recommendations for the degree of overbooking of flights. 
Without overbooking of flights seats would take off empty and revenue was lost 
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forever. The airline would have little chance to fill them because they were 
reserved until take-off. Overbooking the flights minimised the risk of under- 
utilising the capacity which aircraft offered. 
When the number of passengers who had reserved their seats and who would 'no- 
show' could be fairly accurately predicted, an incremental step was to predict the 
proportion of seats which would not be reserved and flew empty - for which no 
demand had been expressed. The data required for this prediction was in the 
reservations. By accumulating historical reservations information, it became 
possible to predict not only the number of 'no-shows', but also the number of 
seats for which there would be no demand. When this was related to the time 
reservations were made., the rate at which the reservations would be made could 
be predicted. So, American began to gain a sense of the probabilities of seats on 
each flight being sold at each particular period of time before departure. With the 
deregulation of the US air transportation industry in 1978, carriers were given the 
freedom to set their own fares in the markets. So, by associating the data to the 
different fares each passenger paid, and experimenting by varying the fares, it also 
became possible to study passengers' sensitivity to price - the extent to which 
demand could be stimulated by lowering some fares, and the extent to which 
higher fares would affect demand. This enabled American to calculate the 
probability of seats being sold at specific points before departure, at particular fare 
levels, and to realise that on some flights demand was particularly strong. By 
holding prices at certain levels there would still be enough demand to fill flights, 
even at a much higher average fare. By using the information contained in the 
' AAdvantage frequent flyer database (Reed, 1993), American Airlines found that 
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business passengers were not particularly sensitive to price, but normally made 
their reservations shortly before the departure of flights, and would not remain at 
their destinations for long. So, they were more sensitive to schedule, time of 
booking before departure, and flexibility of travel arrangements, than to price. 
The strategic problem was now twofold. First, how many discount seats should 
be sold at which fares? and how long before departure? If too many seats were 
sold at discount prices, then there was a risk of not having enough seats for 
business passengers arriving at the last minute. If too few seats were sold, then 
there was a risk of the aircraft taking off with empty seats. Second, how could the 
airline ensure that the higher yield passengers would not begin buying deeply 
discounted fares instead of the premium fares they normally paid? The answer to 
the second problem was simple. American would attach restrictions to the fares. 
So, even today, discount fares are normally bought 21 days in advance of the 
flight, and require a weekend stay. The answer to the first question took many 
years of historical reservations data and required data processing power on an 
almost unimaginable scale. To begin accumulating meaningful data, American 
had to experiment with varying the proportion of discount fares in relation to the 
number of seats held back for business passengers. In addition, the demand for 
business travel varies by time of the day, by day of the week, and by destination. 
"Mere were some obvious guidelines: on week days in the early morning and late 
afternoon it made sense to hold back a greater number of seats for potential 
business passengers. But even this was pure guess work; the mix of passengers 
was unique for every flight. The patterns were shaped by trade shows and industry 
conventions, by Super Bowls and weather aberrations. " (Petzinger, 1995, p. 75) 
206 
The only way for the airline to notice variations in the number of business 
passengers was by being intentionally optimistic in its predictions. If a business 
passenger could not get a seat at the last minute, that meant that he could not 
make a reservation either. So, for revenue management purposes, the airline 
would never have known that it had sold too many discount fares on that , 
occasion, because the only information processed by revenue management 
systems was that from confirmed reservations. 
"At the beginning, around 1977-78, when we were trying out stuff to get a feel for 
the thing, there was a lot of seats going empty, and a lot of money lost, but we got 
the show on the road, and it paid back good! " (Member of the Board of Directors - 
Major American Airline). 
The error margin was therefore intentionally favourable to the business passengers 
because the only way to acquire information about them, to perfect the statistical 
models, was always to aim for an excess of seats held back for business 
passengers. Thus, they always had seats to reserve in American Airlines' 
reservation system, and could contribute not just with revenue, but with 
information for the mathematical models. This was a trade off between revenue 
and information as an investment to develop the market sensitivity of the revenue 
management models. An early version of American's revenue management 
system is considered to have been responsible for the liquidation of charter 
services in the US. Donald Buff the founder of People Express, the low cost, low 
fare airline he built into the fifth largest carrier in the United States, attributed its 
demise to the revenue management capability of his rivals. (New York Times, 
1988). 
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"rhe name given by Crandall to the advance purchase discount was 'super savers'. 
Suddenly it was possible to fly on a regularly scheduled American flight from coast 
to coast for $277 instead of $412. ... Crandall's super saves were spreading , throughout the airline industry and accomplishing the intended purpose. Within 
months the charters were dead. Bob Crandall had killed them off. " (Petzinger 
1995, p. 75) 
The success of its yield management system allowed American Airlines to 
compete for passengers even with the low-cost airlines. The secret was that the 
yield management system was designed in such a way as to stimulate demand in 
order to increase the revenue of the flight. This was achieved by discounting 
deeply only on the seats which otherwise would have flown empty. 
'Vhen, by 1984, Crandall and Amster had nearly perfected the process, it seemed 
like alchemy. If People Express were offering a $99 fare to the West Coast for 
instance, American, in theory, could advertise the identical fare, but sell only as 
many seats as the gigabytes of historical data in the Sabre system suggested it 
would sell at that price. The remaining seats on that particular flight - the number 
varying by the day or perhaps by the hour - would be held in reserve for full fare 
passengers making their arrangements closer to the day of departure. So, 'while 
both People Express and American might advertise $99 to Los Angeles, the 
average fare on the American Plane might be $250, say, while, the average on 
People Express, where every seat has the same value, could never be more than 
$99. 
... American had out-People Expressed People Express. Because he had no 
computer systems and no yield management, Don Buff [People Express's 
chairman] would have to offer every seat on any given flight at the price Bob 
Crandall was offering on a fraction of his. Crandall was only too happy to let Burr 
sell a cheap seat to anyone that American had turned away for the sake of a 
passenger paying the full fare" (Petzinger, 1995, p. 27 1). 
In the US deregulation era, revenue management systems were used by incumbent 
airlines to counter the lower fares offered by new low-cost entrants. The idea was 
to offer a sufficient number of discount fares on each flight so that the low fare 
entrant can be beaten by the higher frequency of the incumbent's flights. Revenue 
management capabilities enable an incumbent to respond quickly and 
. 
inexpensively to a low fare entrant, depriving passengers of a price incentive to 
fly the new entrant. By meeting or beating the entrant's lowest fares, the 
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incumbent can attract price sensitive discretionary passengers. This way, not only 
does the incumbent achieve higher revenues, since the marginal cost of carrying 
an extra passenger is negligible, but it also inflicts considerable, sometimes fatal, 
damage on the new entrant. 
7.3.2 The Principles of Revenue Management Systems 
The objective of a revenue management system is to maximise revenues on each 
individual flight by setting a fare structure which divides the aircraft into many 
different units and sells them to different segments of the market. Robert 
Crandall, chief executive off icer of American Airlines, joked about the system 
enabling airlines to offer "the adjustable rate air fare - tell us what you can afford 
and we'll sell you a ticket. " (Fortune, 29 October 1984, p. 24). The principles of 
yield management are based on the economic concept of utility, as expressed 
through the demand curve. There is a maximum price which each customer is 
willing to pay for a good or service. That price is equivalent to the utility or 
benefit which he/she gets from the consumption of the good or service. Figure 8 
illustrates this concept for an imaginary route. Cases A and B both use a simplistic 
demand curve which illustrates that the lower the price of a particular air fare, the 
higher the number of seats sold. 
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Figure 8- Minimising the consumer surplus 
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Case A shows that if an airline used only fare Y ($50), then there would be a 
relatively large number of unsold tickets, as many customers are not prepared to 
pay that much for the trip. In addition there would also be a large number of 
customers who bought tickets at this price, but who would have been willing to 
pay more for them. Case B illustrates that if that same airline on that same route 
used five different fares (C, Y, A, E, S), the proportion of seats sold would be 
greater, and the consumer surplus would have been minirmsed by transforming 
most of it into revenue for the airline. This is because the airline identified five 
different groups of customers and charged thern the highest price they were 
prepared to pay. In practice, the exercise does not achieve completely optimal 
results, and the fares have to be accompanied by special restrictions (advance 
booking, Saturday night stay, under 26 years old, etc. ) so that the customers who 
would pay higher prices do not buy cheaper tickets. 
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"For a long time it was thought that the 'fences' or booking conditions attached to 
different fares were a sufficient safeguard to ensure that yields or revenues were 
not diluted by high-fare passengers switching to low fares. However, they failed to 
ensure that revenues on each flight were being maximized. In many cases the 
opposite happened. ... [yield management] involves the manipulation of an 
airline's reservation control system in order to maximize passenger revenue. This 
is done by trying to sell each seat on each flight at the highest possible price so as 
to get the maximum income from that flight. " (Doganis, 199 1, p. 3 02) 
Basically an RMS works like this: the computer makes frequent checks, 
sometimes several times a day, on how forthcoming flights are filling up. Each 
flight may have more than a dozen fares allocated to it, and the computer 
constantly juggles their availability. If bookings are coming in quickly, it will 
recommend restricting the number of low fares on offer. If, on the other hand, it 
predicts there will be some empty seats, it will recommend the creation of more 
bargain fares. The computer uses historical databases for every flight to check on 
past flight patterns (Economist, 12 June 1993). In order to cater for the premium 
fare paying passengers, the system uses historical information to calculate the 
number of premium fares sold, and the rate and the timing at which they are sold 
for each flight for each destination. Aggregate statistical calculations for all 
flights to each destination are not useful because the proportion of premium fare 
demand to low fare demand varies by day of the week and by time of the day. So, 
each specific flight has its own typical mix of passenger fares. Figure 7 illustrates 
the disparity between leisure and business passenger booking profiles. 
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Figure 9- Typical booking profiles 
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To accommodate the business passengers' demand, which constitutes the vast 
majority of premium fare purchases, the revenue management system sets a limit 
on the number of seats sold at discount prices so that there can be a calculated 
number of free seats available for reservation by business passengers who book at 
short notice (Figure 9). If there were no limits to the number of seats allocated to 
discount fares on each flight, the flight would simply fill up with discount fare 
passengers, since they can make their travel arrangements much longer before 
departure than can business passengers. The airline would therefore be 'spilling' 
premium fare traffic to other flights, which would most likely be those of rivals 
who ensure availability for these late passengers. 
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Figure 10 - Monitoring the booking curve by a revenue management system 
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The basic value of a revenue management system is in comparing the evolution of 
a booking curve of a flight to the typical evolution of the booking curves for that 
flight through time. The system can then statistically form positive and negative 
tolerance margins, and recommend whether particular deviations from what it 
regards as typical are significant and hence worthy of fare structure correction to 
stimulate or slow down demand for particular fare levels. 
Figure 10 illustrates the basic monitoring of the booking curve for a particular 
flight. The above example is simplistic - it differentiates only between discount 
and premium fares. In practice, revenue management normally comprises several 
discount fare levels, which would be horizontal dotted lines placed strategically at 
different points below that of the limit for discount fares, whose booking curves 
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would be individually monitored. It is now common for airlines on competitive 
routes to have as many a great many fares on a single flight. 
The recommended number of seats allocated to each fare will be adjusted by the 
system according to the statistical trends which it can detect. Here the system 
requires additional information from its users. The system can easily be 
programmed with seasonality doefficients and even with data on general 
demographic changes and traffic growth predictions for each market. However, 
the system has no way of detecting reasons for some wide deviations from the 
typical booking curve. The manoeuvres of competitors may be among these 
reasons. Also, determining the number of fares and monetary value of each fare 
in a particular flight is a key activity in revenue management and very much an 
exercise in which the airline utilises its market sensitivity and experience. It often 
becomes an experimental exercise where the user needs to rely on market 
I 
information which is not contained within the historical databases. 
7.3.3 The role of qualitative market information 
For given destinations, some airlines have vast historical databases which will be 
used to determine the typical business component of the traffic on that route, and 
the specific flight numbers for which there is particularly strong business demand 
(the morning and late afternoon flight, etc. ). But an important addition to that 
information is the competitive information of the market. The route manager 
needs to know about such things as specific offers by the competition, how much 
they pay key travel agencies in overrides, and specific events (such as conferences 
214 
at the destination, etc). Market specific events and competitive tactics affect 
demand for a particular airline's flights and can alter the revenue management 
variables dramaticallY. 
"They are allowed to override [the system]. Typically they override on those 
flights that are flagged as exceptions. There are also situations where we know in 
advance that the system isn't going to handle a seasonal change as we would like 
so analysts - tactical analysts as opposed to flight analysts - they will plan how we 
should make a global adjustment or a broader adjustment to the flights that will 
need adjustment. And they try to adjust the input to the model so that the model 
will adequately represent the demand at the time" (Route Manager - Major 
American Airline). 
66 *- accurate forecasting of demand by booking class is the key to success, but demand is influenced by many external variables. Abe yield controller must 
control not only current sales, but also external developments which may affect 
future sales. ... In markets where fares are not strictly regulated, yield managers 
must constantly monitor the fares being offered by competitors. While they must 
maximize revenues, they must also have an eye to market share. Losing market 
share may mean even higher unit costs" (Doganis, 1991, p. 306). 
"The user can then accept [the revenue management system's] recommendations, 
or adjust them. In order to adjust them, the user needs to know something that the 
system doesn't. This means more qualitative information is needed about the 
market" (Pricing and Yield Management Manager - Major American Airline). 
A new entrant airline on a particular route, for example, can cause wide deviations 
from the typical booking curve. This diminishes the value of the historical data 
and puts emphasis on more qualitative information. It then becomes more 
important to know what the strategy of the new entrant is than what the typical 
demand for that particular flight was before the existence of the new entrant. The 
same applies for other tactical manoeuvres by competitors. 
"These people [yield managers] also rely very much on sales office information for 
specific events which will stimulate travel. This information is provided in an ad 
hoc basis - event driven rather than process or system driven" (Vice president - Major American Airline). 
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This kind of information is not neatly stored in the historical databases, which - 
guide the revenue management system. Extensive searching is required for 
external information. Revenue management systems are simply statistical models 
which take into account the quantitative information. They perform statistical 
calculations of what is typical for specific flights in terms of demand - bookings 
for each particular fare level at each particular point in time before departure. The 
more sophisticated systems make recommendations on the typical price elasticity 
of the different market segments which compose the typical passenger mix on 
each flight. These are also based on the historical information contained in the 
database. Having vast historical databases is especially valuable in mature 
markets (such as the US market ), since the number of new entrants is relatively 
small, and the number of new domestic routes is increasing slowly. 
In Europe, the regulatory liberalisation is allowing a greater number of new 
entrants in the markets and allowing the incumbent airlines increasingly to make 
use of fifth and sixth freedom rights. Here, in terms of revenue management, the 
exception is the norm and the emphasis is not on the vast historical databases, but 
on the airline's ability to capture and use external information from local markets 
to guide its strategy, not only in revenue management, but in the general 
management of the markets. The revenue management information on each 
particular flight is added to the historical database after departure of the flight to 
contribute to data which feed the models. In short, the system learns from the use 
that is made of it, and from the results that the use has produced in terms of 
revenue for the flight. This means that the quality of the system's 
I recommendations is also dependent on the level and quality of the 
216 
experimentation which the user carries out in order to know what stimulates good 
or bad results. The better the use made of the system, the more useful it becomes. 
It is common for revenue management systems' heuristics to be constantly re- 
calibrated in response to changes in market conditions. In order to calibrate the 
systems' heuristics, airlines must be familiar with the extent to which the 
historical data and the heuristics of the system capture the characteristics and the 
events of the marketplace. This implies that they must know the limitations of the 
systems in the stimulation of demand. For that they need to be proficient users of 
the other, less quantitative, tools of airline management. 
"Another classic one is, let's say you want to start up a new route from some small 
airport and Dallas. There is no data to support that there is any traffic flow, but 
what if by starting the route you will stimulate traffic? Some decisions clearly will 
always remain intuitive. Clearly that cannot disappear; that's what running a 
business is all about. You can't put it on auto-pilot. I think the airlines that will 
succeed will be the ones that will make the best use of decision support tools. 
There is absolutely no question in my mind. That will play a huge role" 
(Consultant - Major RMS Vendor). 
"The [yield management] systems are only good up until a certain point, to the 
extent that the model can really capture what is going on in the market. ... 
The goal 
was for the computer to make as many of the decisions as possible. However, the 
system now has models who isolate flights with abnormal characteristics and flag 
them, so they let the system manage the norm and the analysts manage the 
exceptions. ... It would 
be nice to have a totally automated environment. Any time 
you can take people out of a complex decision process, any time you can do it with 
a high level of accuracy, you want to do it! But I think there are too many 
exceptions and variables in this industry to do thaf' (Revenue Manager - Major 
American Airline) 
"Yield management cannot eliminate the human component. For example, this 
year's Olympics; there is no historical data, so demand cannot be modelled. " 
(Commercial Manager - Major American Airline) 
"** To stimulate demand, the human factor has to kick in, and you can't run it all 
by a damn machine! " (Commercial Director - Major American Airline). 
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Amongst these crucial tools of airline management are the sales force's ability to 
capture competitive information, using the influence of key travel agencies in the 
shifting of market share, the sales force's ability to strike direct deals with 
corporations, and realising the adequacy of the capacity and schedules offered to 
the characteristics markets. To use a revenue management system well is to know 
not just what it can do and affect, but also what it can not do or affect, and how 
other management tools should be used to complement it. 
7.3.4 Levels of sophistication 
The above section described the basic principles of revenue management systems. 
In practice, however, the most sophisticated airlines have adapted the revenue 
management system to their specific requirements and the characteristics of their 
operations. Different airlines use different types of revenue management systems 
according to their size, level of revenue management investment, financial 
muscle, network characteristics and organisational capabilities. This section will 
examine the great disparity in the sophistication of the revenue management 
systems used today in the airline industry. 
"You get yield management systems from the most simplistic which will say 'last 
year on this date we had 100 passengers, so this year we eiqpect 100'. All the way 
to an O&D [true origin and destination] system, depending on different airlines, 
different levels of investment, etc. that led to different approaches also through 
Years" (Senior Manager - American Airline IT vendor). 
"Yield management manifests itself in many different ways of control. Some of the 
simpler ones are overbooking. You have 100 seats, you overbook by a certain 
percentage because so many passengers won't show. Another simple one is in the 
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subclasses of the coach cabin, which are segmentations of the inventory according 
to the different segments of the market. Another manifestation of yield 
management may be in a network. Let's say you have a flight from Boston to 
Dallas to London. On the flight to London, do you take more passengers coming 
from Austin, or do you take more passengers coming from Dallas? That depends 
on the total profitability of each customer to the airline. So it is deciding on an 
itinerary level how many passengers to take at each given point - that's the O&D 
manifestation. It can take into account, if you wanted to, which specific travel 
agent you were booking from, and therefore the commission that is being paid to 
that travel agent. It will basically lead to a dynamic market, where you make 
instant decisions on variable pricing specifically to you as the consumer, one on 
one marketing. That's the direction everything is headed in" (Technical consultant 
- American Airline IT vendor). 
There are three basic manifestations of revenue management: 
(1) overbooking of seats; 
(2) segment-based revenue management; 
(3) true origin and destination-based (O&D) revenue management. 
Overbooking is the first step on the learning curve to the more sophisticated forms 
of yield management. There are some major airlines, however, who still use 
revenue management only for overbookings. Overbooking flights is based only 
on numerical statistics; it does not require vast historical information and, most 
importantly, it requires no external market information. Therefore it is easy for 
airlines to become experts in overbooking techniques. However, the evolution 
from overbooking techniques to mastering sophisticated yield management 
requires a much higher investment not only in the development of technical 
capabilities, but in the development of organisational. capabilities to gain a much 
higher level of understanding of the markets. Some airlines have not made this 
breakthrough. 
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"A lot of airlines don't practice yield management. They may call it yield 
management by name, but [they] basically sell the seats until the aeroplane is full, 
or maybe control overbookings - many airlines do that today! " (Senior Consultant - 
Major American RMS Vendor) 
Segment-based revenue management techniques are common in today's airline 
industry, especially among small and medium sized international carriers who 
have point-to-point route networks as opposed to hub-and-spoke operations. 
Segment-based revenue management basically consists of using the principles of 
yield management to maximise revenues on each individual flight irrespective of 
the true origin and destination of the passengers. Here another level of 
sophistication in tenns of functionality was inadvertently created by the CRS. In 
order to differentiate their product, the major CRS devised various levels of 
participation as a way to increase their product portfolio. These basically relate to 
the frequency with which the airline's inventory is updated with the airline's own 
internal reservation system's data in the CRS which travel agents use. The most 
sophisticated level of participation is an online connection between an airline's 
internal reservation systems and the reservation systems which the airline uses to 
deliver that information to travel agents. This way, travel agents have up-to-date 
information on latest availability. That is how the CRS initially promoted the 
virtues of the higher participation level to the airlines. 
"If we take the [following example: ] I want to go to Lisbon tomorrow morning on 
TAP. So I look in Sabre to find out what's available. Then that information I'm 
looking at in the mainframe..., TAP may have provided that 2 days ago. So, it 
might show on the screen there are 4 seats available in business class, where in fact 
they have all been sold, or it might show, which is more likely in fact, it might 
show there are no seats available, but if I phone TAP up there are some" (Senior 
Manager - European CRS). 
"So what I see on my screen is absolutely the latest data. If there's one carrier out 
of that list that doesn't have direct connect availability (in other words the 
information might be two or three days old) I've got less incentive to go book it, 
because I know I can get a seat on all these other carriers, so why do I want to 
bother with one when there's doubt T' (Senior Manager - American CRS). 
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However, when airlines began subscribing at on-line level so that the travel agents 
would have more accurate inventory displays, some realised the potential for what 
is known today as interactive selling. Airlines using interactive selling techniques 
are able to recognise which agent is making the booking, and take into 
consideration factors such as the currency used, the commission the agent is 
receiving, the importance of that agent in terms of annual number of tickets and 
average fare level at which it sells, their coefficient of cancellations, etc. The 
airline will consider information which provides a basis for comparison of the 
revenue generated by different points of sales for the same ticket, and for 
assessing to what extent the agent is worth defending in terms of market share 
versus revenue maximisation. It then decides to which agents it wishes to sell 
which seats and at what fares (when there is a surplus of demand in relation to the 
capacity offered by the airline). The airline will reply to booking requests 
depending on the economic characteristics of the travel agency attempting to 
book. It may return a message of zero availability, or availability only at specific 
fares, etc. Some airlines create specific fares which are open only to specific 
travel agencies. interactive selling is difficult for airlines as organisations because 
it means they are constantly being interrogated for complex tactical decisions 
which demand great tactical flexibility and responsiveness from them. These 
types of organisational capabilities are difficult to develop, particularly in large 
airlines. 
"For an airline to have a very sophisticated yield management system and 
subscribe at the highest level to the CRS, they would have to have a very 
sophisticated internal system. If not, they would have to go through a long process 
of gradual change. They have to have a decision system which can cope with 
being constantly interrogated by the information systems. It is selling in a very 
interactive way and that is difficult" (Vice president - American CRS). 
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Interactive selling requires investment by the airline in the higher level of services 
it receives from the CRS. It must subscribe at a higher level of participation. This 
is typically 25-30 per cent more expensive than the normal subscription charges. 
But the greater investment creates organisational capabilities to cope with making 
strategic decisions in an interactive way. Making decisions on the effects 
exchange rates have on the revenue generated is a complex task, but relatively 
easy to process by an airline, since most are comfortable with quantitative 
analysis and well equipped in terms of software and hardware to do this. The net 
differentials relating to currency for any fare class may be as much as 40 per cent 
(AwnarkAviation Economist, June 1988). 
49 *** the cheapest Kuala Lumpur to London return fare in 1989 was only $845 if 
sold in Johor Bahru in Malaysia, and $1,060 if sold across the causeway in 
Singapore. If the same seat was sold in London it would have generated about 
$1,400 revenue. If sold in Australia as part of a Sydney-London trip, the revenue 
would have been greater still" (Doganis, 199 1, p. 3 06). 
However, difficulties arise when local market information and qualitative 
variables have to be considered. For example, it is common practice for some 
airlines to offer availability to specific agents in peak traff ic seasons at the 
expense of obtaining optimal yield, in order that the agent involved will sell them 
in the lower traffic seasons. Also, an airline needs to have an idea of how much its 
rivals pay the travel agent in overriding commissions, what fare structures its 
rivals are applying in specific markets, who are the travel agent's major clients, 
etc. This information is not readily available. It is within the reach only of sales 
offices, difficult to acquire and even more difficult to use by headquarters. 
Nevertheless, the investment may be worthwhile if the airline can capitalise on it. 
Controlling seat inventories by point of sale can bring a5 per cent improvement in 
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overall revenues (AmarkAviatiott Ecommist, June 1988). Given the sensitivity 
of this industry to fluctuations in revenue, a variance of 5 per cent on overall 
revenues may mean the difference between millions in losses and making some 
profit. The more recent marketing techniques used by the CRS companies to sell 
the higher participation levels promote the virtues of the system as a tactical 
management tools, instead of the higher precision tool which assists in retaining 
travel agents' goodwill by having more up-to-date inventory information. 
"A high level of participation in the CRS is valuable because it is a good marketing 
tool for the airline, and if [it is] associated with a sophisticated yield management 
system, that is even better for the airline. But it is only really worth having a 
sophisticated yield management system if you have CRS connectivity to make full 
use of it" (Senior Manager - American CRS). 
O&D Yield Manaizement 
Currently, the highest level of revenue management sophistication is what is 
known as O&D (true origin and destination) yield management. This is used by 
the major airlines, which have large networks and who are experienced in revenue 
management. Basically, O&D revenue management involves the integration of 
inventories in order to manipulate fares to optimise the revenue generated by the 
airline's entire route network This is achieved by recognising, when the travel 
agent is making the booking, the true destination of each passenger. 
"And if you get into interactive O&D selling, where when you [are] requesting 
something you have to give your true O&D, than I can decide what I want to offer 
you back as available seat. Then you're getting into fairly sophisticated yield 
management techniques by the airline. Delta is one example where every time you 
book Delta in Apollo, you send a record to them and they give their specific 
availability at that moment in time of that O&D" (Commercial Director - Major American CRS). 
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Airlines can then take into account whether passengers are connecting with other 
flights to reach their destinations, and can offer them competitive fares in order to 
attract their custom for their entire journey instead ofjust one leg of that journey. 
There is a clear trade-off between optimising yields or optimising the revenue that 
each passenger generates. Indeed, sacrificing the optimality of fares for one of the 
legs of a journey may well mean that the passenger flies both legs on the same 
airline, and thus generates more total revenue. By using an O&D revenue 
management system well, an airline can gain considerable competitive advantage 
over another which is using a segment-based system. For example, assuming that 
there were no direct flights from Brussels to Rio de Janeiro, a passenger wanting 
to fly from Brussels to Rio could be offered a fare of flOO on a flight to Lisbon, 
and a fare of 1800 on the connecting flight from Lisbon to Rio (maybe with two 
different carriers) using segment based revenue management. An airline using 
O&D revenue management would be able to recognise when the passenger is 
booking the flight that he doesn't want to go to Lisbon at all. In fact, he wants to 
go from Brussels to Rio. Segment-based revenue management systems cannot do 
that. So, the airline might discount the first leg flight to L50 (through marginal 
costing -selling a seat which would otherwise have flown empty, or by denying a 
seat to another passenger who would generate less total revenue) in order to 'feed' 
the passenger to its own L850 flight from Lisbon to Rio. Even if it had no seats 
left on its Brussels to Lisbon flight, it might even offer an alternative route which 
would make the connection to Rio at another hubbing point. This way the airline 
would ensure that the passenger would fly both legs on its aircraft, generating a 
total of L900. Also, by using the same principles, the airline can more easily 
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compete in destinations to which it has no direct connections, even though its 
rivals may. 
In practice, a sophisticated O&D yield management system would apply the basic 
principles of revenue management, but integrate the inventories of each flight on 
an airline's network by recognising the typical patterns of traffic flow through the 
network, selecting the most significant combinations of flights, and accumulating 
historical data to compute the probability of connecting passengers turning up for 
flights. The airline would then create fares (subclasses of C or Y) for those 
specific purposes, and would constantly monitor the development of the booking 
curves for those fares relative to their own typical patterns. However, applying 
the principles of O&D yield management in vast networks at an interactive level, 
while taking into account exchange rates, agency commissions and market share 
importance, while building and processing historical databases to predict the large 
number of variables that influence the demand for each subclass of each flight and 
using local market information to complement computer predictions, is at the very 
least a tremendously complex task. Some think that may be going too far: 
"Ibose who think that O&D yield management is really important are generally the 
international worldwide guys, global guys. But when your route network is very 
complex and you're hubbing in a lot of locations, and you're doing a lot of cross 
traffic feeds, and you're trying to feed international both ways, then they try to get 
pretty sophisticated. They may even be too sophisticated" (Vice Present - Major 
CRS). 
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7.3.5 The Trading of Revenue Management Systems 
There is today in the airline industry a growing business of selling information 
systems and technological solutions. Several major international airlines have set 
up their own small IT companies and are now competing fiercely with specialised 
hardware and software vendors. With the international proliferation of airline 
liberalisation, an increasing number of airlines are suffering from the effects of 
greater competition. Some of these airlines believe that buying a revenue 
management system can be the solution to their deficiency in terms of strategic 
flexibility and responsiveness. After all, the success of experienced airlines in 
revenue management systems is admired across the airline industry. This was 
seen by some airlines as a good opportunity to generate incremental revenue from 
the investments which they had already made when they developed their own 
systems. Revenue management systems are now being commercialised by IT 
firms belonging to the very airlines that developed them. Those airlines have 
experience not only in developing the systems, but in adapting their organisations 
to make use of them. So, they are well aware that the investment in acquiring 
these systems is by far outweighed by the organisational investment required to 
make use them. 
'Vith yield management systems, for example, you don't turn on a button and it 
sets everything automatically. There is a fair amount of input that is required both 
in terms of calibration, data that you've collected and the quality of that data, but 
also you have to actually take the results. Any system is only as good as how you 
interpret the results. You have to interpret the results and factor in real world 
situations. I mean fundamentally sciences such as yield management are very 
dependent on your ability to forecast. Forecasting is generally very strongly driven 
by history. But history is history. At the end of the day you still have the macro 
economic factors, market conditions, maybe something strange is happening... 
Decision support systems don't make decisions for you; all they do is present you 
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with support to make decisions. At the end of the day, you still have to rely on 
your experience, your market knowledge, etc. ... That knowledge of 
how to use it 
consists of knowing the markets, the competition, the organisation setup, the 
procedures in practice, and also to set up the right data collection not only your 
internal data, but also data outside, it may be formalised data ( it may be informal 
data)" (Commercial Director - Airline IT Vendor). 
Some airlines are selling the very systems which they regard as important 
strategic weapons and a strong component of their strategic advantage. They do 
this in the knowledge that their rivals will be hard pressed to make use of them in 
ways which would pose any threat to their competitive positions. These airlines 
realise this because they are confident that the use they are making of the systems 
cannot be easily imitated. They also realise that there is still ample scope for them 
to improve the use of their system and maintain the advantage even when the 
buyer is learning how to use it. 
'Ve're selling all these technologies to everybody else because we can make 
money out of it and because by the time they get it we're already up to stage 5 by 
the time they've incorporated it, you know. We're not going to give up something 
that's going to hurt us" (International Sales Manager - Major American Airline). 
"And we have to keep ahead of everybody else. If we don't continue advancing, we 
get lost in the shuffle. If we're good, we've got to continue to be good and the only 
way to do that is to keep getting better" (Area Manager - Major American Airline) - 
The most obvious difficulty that buyers of these systems have is that the systems 
need historical data in order to make reasonably accurate predictions. Airlines 
who have not been operating a revenue management system will also not have 
been accumulating historical information about each specific flight. Even when 
they have some sort of historical information, it is not codified in the way the 
revenue management system requires. Other less obvious, but no less important, 
difficulties are in adapting the organisation to using a revenue management 
system. The system needs to be constantly fed with strategic and tactical thoughts 
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by the organisation. Revenue management systems require that the organisation 
delegates a great deal of strategic responsibility to those who are using the system 
to monitor the market responses to the airline's product, in order to cope with 
being constantly interrogated for strategic decisions. 
Another major difficulty of using revenue management systems is that the data 
which the system's models use to forecast demand are historical. Real time 
market events, such as competitors' tactical manoeuvres and destination-specific 
events, often reduce the relevance of the historical data. To devise a strategic 
response to a variation in sales, the airline needs to know not just the extent of the 
variation (which is what the revenue management system provides), but most 
importantly, the origins and reasons for the variation. To respond to unusual 
market signals, airlines need to acquire local market information which lies 
outside their immediate organisational boundaries. This market information is not 
neatly codified to fit the system; it is event driven and highly perishable. This 
requires great investment in flexibility and responsiveness in procuring, acquiring, 
interpreting and using local market information on the part of airlines. 
The practice of selling revenue management systems by airlines is a clear 
capitalisation on the difficulties that buyers will have using the systems. 
American Airline's subsidiary - Sabre Decision Technologies (SDT) - is the 
dominant player in the airline information technology and solution 
. 
business. It 
belongs to the Sabre Group, which owns the CRS business and which in turn is 
owned by AMR Corporation, which owns American Airlines. The Sabre Group 
, generated Us$ 1.5 billion in revenues in 1995 and is the most profitable unit of 
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AMR, generating margins far in excess of those achieved at the far-larger airline 
unit (Flint, 1996). SDT accounted for 34 per cent of those 1995 revenues. Its 
ninety-page brochure offers products and services for administration, airport and 
ground transportation, cargo, catering, crew scheduling, distribution planning, 
financial services, flight operations, frequent flyer programs, hotel, in-flight 
services, maintenance and engineering, pricing, rail, reservations, sales 
automation, and yield management. The business of the AMR Corporation is 
increasingly about far more than operating one of the largest airlines in the world. 
It is believed that SDT is dominant in its business because of a combination of an 
extensive product portfolio, a strong brand name provided by American Airlines' 
success in this field, and most importantly, because it markets most of its products 
as part of consulting projects. 
"Decision support systems aren't 'off the shelf systems. They require a great 
degree of calibration. They require a great degree of knowledge transfer. So, if it's 
really not treated as a consultative project, you don't get the benefit out of it. ---- We don't really compete in that kind of thing. ... 1 can think of at least two major 
airlines in Europe that I know who have made investments in purchasing yield 
management systems, but made the classic mistake of thinking that if they just pay 
a million or half a million bucks for the system and plugged it in, it would all be 
OK. People have to understand the technology, people have to understand the 
product and the organisation, they have to understand the data, all of those things 
areimportant. ... It 
is a huge change, and you don't get the benefit without the 
change"' (Vice President of Sales - Major Airline IT Vendor). 
This provides strong indication that American Airlines' experience in developing 
and using technologies is reflected through SDT's dominant position in the airline 
technology solutions business. American Airlines' presence in the airline 
technology solutions business will also assist the airline in keeping informed 
about the technological developments in the field, and about which competitors 
'buy and sell which syste ms through the inevitable diff-usion of technological and 
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competitive information in the business. SDT"s consulting activities will also no 
doubt enrich the airline's experience in using technologies. It also provides 
indication that American Airlines not only recognises the organisational 
difficulties in using revenue management systems, but capitalises on them to 
generate incremental revenue without eroding its competitive advantage. For 
example, the first client for the latest version of an O&D revenue management 
system developed by SDT was not American Airlines, but Air France. Air France 
is owned by the French government and is one of the major European airlines. It 
is using state aid to undergo an extensive re-structuring program in order to 
reverse its astronomical financial losses. 
'Ve don't really have that many restrictions because American itself doesn't own 
the systems. We do. See, we're free to go sell it. ... American's relative [potential] 
gain from O&D yield management is smaller, right. Air France's relative 
[potential] gain from O&D yield management is much greater, but will they get to 
exactly the same point as American? I doubt it! ... Any system is only as good, 
in 
my opinion, as several other things. It is only as good as the organisation, the 
organisation structure, as the process and procedures to use that, and the data that 
goes into it. The large databases of history - Air France may not have them, they 
may not be as clean and [Air France may] not really understand how best to use it. 
So plugging in a system is only part of the solution. So if you don't have these 
other three things working harmoniously, you don't get the benefit out of things. 
So that's where I think American has got a reasonable advantage over most people, 
because they can certainly understand the business. Like many other things, you 
know... you don't take a super computer and put it in Kenya, and expect people to 
use it as effectively" (Senior manager - Major Airline IT Vendor). 
The development of more complex and sophisticated statistical models and 
relational databases for the modelling of revenue management is, however, 
subject to diminishing returns. Airlines experienced in revenue management are 
aware that there are higher returns to be accrued by using better the reasonably 
sophisticated revenue management systems they already have. This is because 
, they recognise that there is ample scope for improving present strategy 
formulation and decision making processes within the organisation, and for 
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developing better organisational capabilities to improve the blending of local 
market information with the airline's own internal information. 
"Competitive advantage really comes from systems, but as much comes from how 
you use them. You don't just learn to use a system well. You figure out better ways 
to use it. You figure out better ways to understand the interaction between pricing 
and yield management, between scheduling and yield management, between yield 
management and distribution. There is ample room to continue to improve your 
knowledge" (Senior Consultant - major Airline IT Vendor). 
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8. Airline Sales Offices and Local Market 
Information 
"Deregulation and liberalisation pose important threats for the previously protected 
incumbent airlines which they affect. ... Competitors will 
be able to work in all 
areas of the marketing mix, without their rivals being able to claim government 
protection. Planning horizons generally become much shorter. There will be no 
point in airlines undertaking detailed long-term planning if the marketplace is very 
unstable. Instead, the skills that will be needed will be those of maintaining 
flexibility, so that business policies can be adjusted as changing circumstances 
dictate" (Shaw, 1990, p. 10 1). 
Headquarters is responsible for managing operations and administration 
processes, and ultimately, for setting the plans and devising the commercial 
strategy of the airline in its various markets. Sales offices have an increasingly 
active role in airline strategy; they convey local market information to 
headquarters, often with justifications for price change requests, requests for 
increased budgets for incentives to travel agents, and justifications for variations 
in sales. The qualitative and tacit information sales offices acquire is recognised 
as important by senior managers. 
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"I think there will always be some room for the tacit information in strategy. It 
could diminish. Within this industry especially to some extent 'if you fly it, they 
will come'. "Ibe real battle is in yield, not in load factor. Anybody can fill their 
airplanes with price. The key determinant of success is your ability to get your 
yield up. The key way of getting the yield up is to get more full fare passengers on 
board. And that has to be done through the sales force. That is exactly what they 
are doing. They are the providers of that information, they are the promoters of the 
product, they are the relationship managers of the deals that we have in place, but 
they are also the eyes and the ears of the airline. " (Corporate sales manager - 
Major American airline) 
Airlines go to great lengths to acquire market information, but they experience 
much difficulty in getting that information across to the senior management so 
that it can be used for strategic decisions. This is because the information upon 
which the relationship between top management and sales offices is based was 
acquired informally, outside the organisational boundaries. Also, senior 
management finds difficulty in basing a decision on informal information 
acquired by someone else in the organisation. 
"One of the things that I have to do is approve or reject all of the corporate deal 
proposals that we have and a lot of it qualitative. Yes, you can know some factual 
data about how much business the company has that we can potentially get, but 
you're going to have to believe what the rep is telling you, or the corporate account 
is telling you" (Corporate Sales Manager - Major American Airline). 
"It's informal. You know what discount levels the other carrier's going to go in 
with, basicallyjust by being in the market place. It's all informal. I think it's what 
causes frustration to a lot of senior management of the airline that are used to very 
factual numbers that are valid, whereas ours are all by feel" (Area Manager - Major 
European Airline). 
The information procured in the markets through sales representatives is more 
often than not well understood by the managers of the sales offices. However, the 
same level of understanding cannot be reached by headquarters, which has to 
manage centrally such resources as fleet, revenue management, and crews. 
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"Tbe formal system actually asks more questions than it gives answers. But where 
the information lays outside us, is clearly more in the revenue side, there is more 
qualitative information to be found. But on the cost almost everything can be 
easily systematised. The cost you have control over, the revenue you don't 
because it comes from outside. It's just the nature of the beast" (District manager - Major European Airline). 
Information on costs and operations of the airline is abundant. It is generated and 
codified by the airline in such a way as to be divisible and to find neat places 
inside the structure of the organisation. However, the same cannot be said for the 
information acquired in the day-to-day selling of its products in each market. 
Symptoms of the difficulty that even the most sophisticated of airlines feel in 
using the market information acquired by its sales offices are the attempts to 
model and internalise this information in conjunction with trying to generate as 
much information as possible in order to take decisions. Too much information 
delays strategic decisions and blurs the assessment of the relevance of vital bits of 
information. 
"American Airlines probably gets more information than we can use. We're very 
analytical as a company. " (Area Manager - Major American airline). 
This section will analyse the contents and importance of local market information 
as well as the ways in which airlines acquire and use it in their strategic 
endeavours. It will start with a general overview of the role of airline sales offices 
in airline strategy. It will study the interaction of the sales offices with travel 
agencies and their relationship with corporations for the sale of corporate travel. 
These interactions constitute the main processes of acquisition of local market 
information used increasingly in airline strategy. Finally, it will examine the 
exchange of information between the sales offices and headquarters in order to 
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expose some of the difficulties that airlines have in making use of this external 
information, even though top management recognises it as important. 
8.1 The Role of Airline Sales Offices 
Traditionally, the main role of the sales offices was to manage the local 
distribution of the airline's products and the financial transactions with the points 
of sale. However, with intensified competition and the emergence of CRS 
technology and information technology in general, there has been a shift in the 
role of sales offices. Increasingly, this role is to inform headquarters of local 
market conditions and provide it with competitive information to be used in 
strategy. The relationship between sales offices and travel agents has evolved into 
an intense exchange of competitive information. This is because by giving travel 
agents focused sales incentive programmes (which are private agreements), 
airlines have managed to create a set of less obvious market forces, which greatly 
distort the markets. Incentives to travel agencies, albeit expensive, are very 
effective tools to bias the information travel agents sell to their customers in 
favourof specific airlines. The increased importance of the role of travel agents 
in the airline distribution chain has increased their bargaining power. Airlines 
have invested yet more resources in the monitoring of travel agency sales 
activities, and in the building of information exchange relationships with them in 
order to tap into these sources of information. This external information is a 
powerful fuel for the strategic processes of airlines. Airlines, however are not 
. completely at ease when it comes to basing vital strategic decisions on it. 
235 
"We, airlines, all to a degree tend to work internally, but that internal combustion 
system has to be fuelled by some external mechanism. And that external 
mechanism is the information that is gathered at some point about the markets" 
(Commercial Manager - Major European Airline). 
The nature of the airline business and the increasing competition in many markets 
has meant that the competitiveness of airlines is increasingly determined by their 
ability to use highly perishable and qualitative market information. Medium and 
long-term strategic plans are guidelines compiled from the accumulation of 
tactical information. 
"An airline is very much based on tactics, day-to-day actions, reactions, etc. 
Strategy is taldng all the tactical information, from all the departments that are 
consulted and you put it into one big pie, and say: 'Here's what we want to do. 
Then it serves as guidelines to our day-to-day running of the airline, more of a 
reference sort of thine' (Senior Manager - Major American Airline). 
"Our speciality is local information, so we're interested in competitive information 
about what the other guys are doing in the same market we work in. We get our 
direction from headquarters, they say 'This is important to us, and this is what we 
would like you guys to find out'. And generally, we know how to go about doing 
that. It is up to us to figure out how to get into the specific accounts [points of 
sale], how to identify which accounts we want to go to, and draw in the 
information that is available to us to do that" (District Sales Manager - Major 
American airline). 
The main purpose of sales representatives is obviously to promote sales. 
However, in order to promote his airline's products, the sales representative must 
acquire much information about the competition and the airline's main points of 
sales in order to identify opportunities and focus his promotion efforts. 
Increasingly, with the sophisticated information systems which extract and 
process information from the CRS reservations, the visits by airline sales reps to 
the points of sale are in response to variations in sales which the airline deems 
significant and worthy of investigation. 
236 
"We have access to information that allows us to see what the agency sells for the 
competition, and then we go to the agency and say Wiere does that come from? ' 
And then we go after that account to try and shift the traffic over to us" (Sales 
Representative - Major American Airline). 
Sales representatives have to determine which agents are most important for the 
airline, and what the airline's market share is for particular destinations in each of 
those agents. They then must procure competitive information to identify reasons 
behind the variations in market share, such as confidential pricing mechanisms or 
incentive programs which are affecting sales. 
"I can find that [competitive information] because my guy sitting in Abu Dhabi, 
calls me up and complains that his fare is bad. lbat's why you need to be savvy, if 
you're a sales manager or if you're a sales representative, and pay attention to 
those kind of things. And you pay attention to those kind of things by, maybe you 
check your computer, maybe you see newspaper ads and you double check to see 
that you have the same fares as the other guy. You visit your accounts [and ask] 
'How's everything going? ' You do that in your own way, shape or form" 
(International Sales Manager - Major American Airline). 
"Sales reps these days spend most of their time analysing die accounts, looking for 
opportunities. Are they performing the way they should be? Are there weaknesses 
that they can point out that we can correct and change? Are there opportunities that 
this account has that we can capture more business from? The sales reps' main 
knowledge is in knowing how to use the information that is available to them. 
They know a lot about the competition, they know a lot about the markets, the 
customers, all of those things, because they're not going to succeed if they don't, 
not today! " (Area Manager - Major American Airline). 
Competitors' pricing and incentive programs in each significant point of sales arc 
of paramount importance, not only because they are very influential factors in 
sales, but because they constitute hidden market forces. Override commissions 
and private fares are not openly published in CRS displays; they are private 
agreements between airlines and each of the points of sale. Travel agents are 
points of interaction between the airlines' product and customers. So, the sales 
, 
consultant, working in travel agents dealing with customers, is constantly exposed 
to unstructured and tacit information. This cannot be captured by the reservations 
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information used by airlines to determine variations in market share per flight 
relative to specific competitors. 
'Ve get as much infort-nation as possible [from travel agents]; for example, what 
prices do our main competitors have, what promotion activities they deal with, 
what sales activities do they work with, how aggressive they are, what markets 
they push more than others, and so on. We get that information through our 
representatives [sales offices]. We are relying on their feedback, on their 
information. If they cannot sell us for some reason, then they identify the reasons 
behind it. 'Mat in itself drives the feed of information that we might be looking at. 
... Don't forget they [sales offices] are living in the market place! Being 
represented there makes it easier, quicker and reliable to get competitive 
information" (Sales Manager - Major European Airline). 
Some airlines constantly check their competitors' fares and schedules by 
employing teams to monitor the CRS displays. This process has to be done 
manually, since the regulations prevent the 'hosting' of CRS by airlines, and no 
CRS has yet marketed a product to alert airlines to changes in competitors' prices 
and inventory. Because CRS are owned by airlines, the vested interests of their 
owners prevent any such products being marketed. An airline relying simply on 
reservations information and revenue statistics for each market will overlook vital 
market signals. As an example, whereas a competitor's fare may show in the CRS 
as 1100, in reality, it may be 05. Another case may be that whereas a competitor 
is charging the same fare, it may be giving heavy overriding commissions to 
certain travel agencies. From an airline's perspective, it is vital to receive these 
market signals. 
"So, when you compete, if everything is published, you know how to react to your 
competitor, but what if they are unpublished? Somebody is selling from certain 
agencies 35 per cent discount of the fare, so how do you get best information about 
this? It's from contact networks! That comes from your airline's sales force, it 
comes from the sales guy in London calling up a few agencies, having a few 
contacts, taking them out to lunch and finds that BA has cut a special deal just for 
next week because of some festival or football match" (Senior Manager - Major European Ailrine). 
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"We initiated a special fare in the Gulf, effective April 1. To prepare for that, we 
needed certain information. So, we went out to a certain area, to a certain amount 
of representatives and we said, 'We are looking for the least expensive fares that 
are taking place from now until the end of May. Who has them? What are their 
restrictions? How do they compare with the lowest published fares in the market? 
How are their sales programs? Etc. "' (Sales Manager - Major American Airline). 
Many airlines still rely very much on published fares and monthly variations in 
sales to determine the effectiveness of their products and to adjust strategy. Given 
the competitive intensity of the business and the specific seasonality of markets, 
given the fact that competitive information to justify variations in sales is highly 
perishable, and the existence of hidden market forces, a systematic and structured 
monthly review of strategy is proving increasingly inadequate. Greater strategic 
flexibility is required. More external information is procured, and more 
qualitative analyses are performed. An increasing practice to counter the 
problems of relying on published fares and monthly variations in sales is the use 
of NHDT booking and market share information in relation to specific competitors 
at particular destinations, in conjunction with specifically tailored and focused 
airline sales incentive programs. Local market information is a vital addition to 
these tools. This information is increasingly being used as an input to strategy, 
thereby achieving a greater level of flexibility and a more timely response to 
market signals. 
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8.2 Relationship with Travel Agents 
8.2.1 Travel Agent Incentives and Airline Competition 
Some airlines have developed extremely effective sales programs. Sales 
programs therefore consist of sales objectives and a mix of incentives offered to 
the different types of agents to acquire market share and high-yield passengers. 
With the improvement of the sales monitoring capabilities provided by CRS and 
MIDT technology, airlines are able to improve the returns on the investments they 
make in incentive programs to travel agents. 
I think it's very similar with everybody. You pay incentive money overrides to 
those accounts that provide you with the extra share" (Commercial Manager - 
Major European Airline). 
"... It is a two way street! If you want to be my partner, then you've got to sell me 
at a time when I need the traffic. You've got to sell some business class 
passengers, some first class passengers, and I'll help you with leisure passengers to 
maybe get a sharper price" (Director of Commercial Sales - Major American 
Airline). 
Sales programs aim to take advantage of the depýndence of many travel agents on 
the substantial revenue that these incentives provide. Airlines can stimulate 
agency loyalty, leverage specific markets and specific segments of traffic in an 
extremely focused, responsive and flexible manner, providing they use that local 
market information in their strategic decisions. 
I would say that for the most part it is successful, or we wouldn't continue it. So 
the perception is that it works. Agencies want extra incentive money. 'rhey build 
it into their budget, and they plan on spending the extra dollars that they can earn 
sometime in the next twelve months. 'Mey'd better perform if they want to get 
paidthatmoney. We have the ability now to instead of just saying collectively just 
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give me an extra per cent of all of your dollars, we set targets in those markets" 
(Commercial Director - Major American Airline). 
The returns that airlines get from effective incentive programs go beyond the extra 
revenue and additional market share. Airlines also achieve a better relationship 
with agents in terms of exchanging competitive information. Travel agents that 
have incentive agreements with an airline are keener to provide competitive 
information, because a principal variable of incentive programs is the volume of 
sales associated with market share. What began as a means to encourage the 
travel agents to distort markets, is increasingly used as a means to persuade the 
travel agents to share competitive information with airlines. Today, many 
incentive programs aim to achieve a balance between shifting market share, and 
providing the agents with an incentive to engage in a relationship of intense 
information exchange. 
"The thing that we like, because of our relationships, is that if someone sees 
something that may go away from us, they will tell us, they will want us. They will 
say 'Hey, help me get through this' and we will use what we have to do it. Those 
are our customers - our distributors" (International Sales Manager - Major 
European Airline). 
"They'll tell you immediately if they didn't make their incentive programmes and 
they'll love to come in and tell you here's why I couldn't. They come up with all 
kinds of ideas. It's not purely numbers, it's different aberrations that will happen" 
(Area Manager - Major European Airline). 
For a given airline, the strategic importance that a certain destination has varies 
constantly, almost on a daily basis. This means that airlines' strategies for each 
market also vary constantly, which in turn means that to remain competitive, 
airlines are forced to acquire a vast amount of external information. It also means 
that, to remain competitive, airlines are forced to be responsive in processing this 
information and in communicating it to middle and senior managers, who have 
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the power to adjust strategy and product specifications according to the needs of 
each market. The improved monitoring capabilities that airlines have at their 
disposal to develop focused incentive programs can become useful for airline 
strategy only if senior managers make use of the qualitative information acquired 
by sales offices to develop their strategic plans and allocate resources to each 
market. 
"I make the programs that the sales guy takes to sell. And if he says, 'We got to 
change this', and I say, 'WhyT, he says 'Because..., the competition is doing this'. 
And I know that because nobody is selling my tickets any more" (International 
Sales Manager - Major American Airline). 
Apart from the investment that airlines make to subsidise the strong bargaining 
power of travel agents through higher commissions, they are investing 
increasingly in their sales forces. Airlines need more and more focused and 
responsive sales forces to form links with travel agencies that go far beyond 
institutional relationships, into personal relationships, capable of exchanging 
qualitative and sensitive information. Airline sales representatives constitute 
important assets for the sales offices. 
". .. You're expected to have relationships with your accounts [travel agencies] that 
will withstand those periods when there may be some antagonism in the industry, 
or in certain situations and stuff. If you deal with me every day, every week for 
three or four years and things are going well, somewhere within those three or four 
years we're going to have a problem, ups and downs, but if you recognise that I do 
the best for you all the time, even if I can't give you what you want today, you know that I can't give it to you because I have done everything I could to try and 
make it happen and I couldn't" (Sales Manager - Major European Airline). 
The value of a sales representative for an airline is not merely dependent on their 
working experience in the airline business. His/her network of contacts and 
relationships with travel agencies and corporations may leverage the airline's 
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sales significantly in particular regions. It is normal practice for sales reps to be 
'head-hunted' from other airlines. 
"When Eastern fell, I was told to go out and find who was the best rep Eastern had 
in Boston and hire him. And I did! I asked travel agents, and in fact I asked 
Eastern's manager, after they closed up. I said, 'Who is the best person you have 
on your payrollT He told me, and then I went out and checked that person with 
travel agents and corporate accounts, and they agreed. The store closes [Eastern's 
bankruptcy] and somebody has to buy the shelves! " (Sales Manager - Major 
American Airline). 
8.3 Relationship with Corporations 
There are few airlines today focussing on the business traveller. Examples 
include SAS, American Airlines, and United. 
"Me trend now over the last 3 to 5 years is to really know the corporations. If in 
1995 we had 2 more business passengers in every flight, we probably would have 
doubled our profits" (Corporate Sales Manager - Major American Airline). 
Airlines focussing on the business segment realised, that in order to minimise the 
competition from other carriers, they could search for business passengers, not 
just in travel agents, or by merely offering frequent flyer cards, but by negotiating 
with corporations which are significant sources of business traffic. The ways 
airlines go about seducing premium traff ic vary. Options depend on the presence 
and competitive position of each airline in each market. They also depend on the 
ability of airlines to procure market information about the business traveller, about 
the travelling habits of corporations, and about the market forces that rule 
negotiations with corporations. The market for corporate travel is very 
% information intensive. Information is required about the population and travel 
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needs of corporations in the different countries and regions of each country, about 
other carriers' discount rates to corporations, about the potential to by-pass certain 
travel agents. Also, developing contact networks capable of exchanging the type 
of market information of interest to the airline requires expert acquisition and use 
of information. Basically, airlines target the corporate travel market in three main 
ways: 
- By negotiating directly with corporations, and attempting to by-pass 
the travel agents. 
- By negotiating with business specialist agents 
- By targeting the corporation directly, but without by-passing travel 
agents, making corporations buy the tickets through travel agents at a 
discount, and giving the agent a special incentive (e. g. an override). 
Few airlines have the market presence and the bargaining power to be able to 
negotiate directly with the corporations and by-pass the travel agents. The ones 
that follow this strategy normally do so in their home markets, and in the regions 
where they are clearly dominant. Often that gives the airlines enough customer 
base to leverage corporate sales abroad. There is an increasing number of 
multinationals willing to centralise their travel with one or two airlines,, if the 
incentive is sufficient to justify the effort to set and enforce a corporate travel 
Policy. Airlines which deal directly with corporations and by-pass the travel 
agents need to acquire the most information about corporations' travel needs and 
about the market forces which dictate what incentives are adequate to buy the 
different types of traffic from corporations. This market information is strongly 
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qualitative, exists in informal channels, and is difficult to verify and validate. It is 
collected by sales reps, whose list of clients includes corporations. 
"You don't really know. You get a sense for what the market place is doing. You 
trip over competitor contracting information. You have them telling you, 'Hey, I 
want to stay on your airline, but the other guys are offering me this. There is a lot 
of information that floats around and that's one of the qualifiers before we do a 
deal" (Senior manager - Major American airline). 
"You know what's going on because there is a market place. It's not a perfect 
market place, but there is a market place. I could tell you what the going rate for a 
company with 1000 business class sectors between London and New York is. I 
can tell you what the going rate is for each airline to get that business" (Area 
manager - Major European Airline). 
American and United Airlines are examples of the few airlines which have a sales 
force dedicated to the promotion and marketing of corporate travel. They have 
realised the merits of that specialisation for two main reasons: (1) the returns on 
investment are clearly high. One deal with a corporation can bring a few hundred 
regular business travellers to the airline; (2) the higher degree of difficulty in 
terms of information acquisition in order to compete in the corporate travel market 
by-passing the travel agents justifies a specialised sales force. 
"A lot of the bigger corporations pretty much do it [corporate deals with airlines]. 
United actually changed its whole workforce around to create a corporate sales 
group" (Senior manager - Major American Airline). 
This specialisation goes far beyond the breeding of specific technical or analytical 
skills. It is a clear specialisation in information procurement, acquisition and use. 
Even though the type of information the sales reps procure in corporate travel 
does not differ extensively from that procured by sales reps in travel agents, the 
networks of contacts required for acquiring information about corporations and 
I 
the market forces of corporate travel are different. The sales rep needs to know 
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which corporations to target and must then develop an extensive network of 
contacts in the corporate world. This is a difficult task if one considers that the 
setting and enforcing of corporate travel policies by corporations is a practice still 
in its infancy. 
44... the corporations are very immature when it comes to handling traffic. It's an 
immature business [corporate travel]" (Corporate Sales Manager - Major European 
Airline). 
Such negotiations with large corporations have to be carried out at a high level, 
(i. e., president, or chairman). Access is difficult. Business-specialist travel 
agencies, for example, are well aware that once airlines get information about 
their clients, they can attempt to by-pass them. So they tend to demand incentive 
deals linked to volume of sales, overrides on many routes, and low business class 
prices. They realise that much of the bargaining power they enjoy is attributable 
to the market information they have, which airlines would like to acquire. To 
maximise their usefulness to their clients they need to achieve considerable 
discounts from airlines. 
8.4 Relationship with Headquarters 
The relationship between headquarters and sales offices is difficult. This is 
mainly because the sales offices are constantly bringing external information into 
the airline. Headquarters, especially in the most sophisticated airlines, has a 
tendency to work very much with the powerful information systems available and 
ýthe statistics they generate. This feeds the tendency already in place of airlines to 
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be very much dependant on operational information for their decisions. Friction 
between sales managers and route, fleet or yield managers is common. The 
former possess information about the airline's strategic position in the various 
markets; the latter have information mostly from mathematical exercises for 
maximizing revenue and utilizing resources. The latter work with utilisation 
statistics and predictions based on historical information. They have tangible 
measures on which to base decisions and interpret results. The former work with 
tacit constructs and with informal information. Their efforts often produce results 
which are difficult to quantify or measure in tangible terms. It is therefore not a 
surprising tendency of airlines to be very operationally oriented and let operations 
guide strategy instead of strategy guide operations. However, sales managers 
depend on headquarters for vital strategic decisions, and would like headquarters 
to take into account of the market information they acquire. 
"I had the Hawaiian market. One of the problems you ran into was that there was 
nothing you could hardly do as market manager to manage the market because the 
system overrode you, I wanted to change the aeroplane from Portland to Honolulu 
from a 747 to a DCIO and I would make that request to the scheduling people, and 
we would figure out how much incremental revenue, or cost savings, whatever, 
Was going to be associated with whatever reason I wanted to make the move. So I 
had a number when I was done. If I made this move, I could do X. OK? And they 
go away and they come back and maybe two weeks later and they would say, 'You 
know, if we make that move, we're going to loose this 737's ability to fly from 
Cleveland to Miami, and that 737's revenue is worth more than you're going to 
saveoverhere". I would have to say'What do you want me to do? 'Tliere is 
nothing I can do with this thesis! Sowequitdoingit. After awhile anda lot of 
passionate fights went on, a lot of manipulation of the system. Uts of things went 
on for those who understood the system well enough to manipulate it" (Area 
Manager - Major American Airline). 
Sales offices normally send headquarters requests for change of product 
Specifications: prices, schedules, capacity, sales programs, budgets, etc. In order 
, to maximise the utilisation of resources and minimize the costs, headquarters 
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attempts to quantify and measure in tangible terms that which is intangible. This 
means that much of the intangible information associated with the various 
proposals from the markets is lost, or at least not taken into account, and that the 
only dimensions to measure the importance of the proposals are increased 
revenue, reduced costs or improved utilisation of traditional resources, such as 
fleet, crew and capital. 
This means that the medium to long term needs of the various markets are not 
considered. On the one hand, the volatility of many airline markets and the 
competitive intensity of the business tempts airlines to maximise short-term 
profits out of present circumstances, and not to plan for the future. On the other 
hand, the nature of the distribution chain and the market forces that rule it, such as 
incentives for travel agents, dictates that market presence and scale of operations 
are important determinants of success. High yield comes from business 
passengers. To capture business traffic, airlines need the scale of operations and 
the market presence to negotiate either with the business specialist agents, or 
directly with corporations. To achieve market share, airlines need to be 
significant sources of revenue for travel agents in the various markets if travel 
agencies are even to consider negotiating incentive programs with them. Neither 
of the above market positions is achievable through short-term investments, or by 
strict maximisation of resource utilisation. 
"Give the sales offices more attention and more autonomy to benefit from the 
advantages of having a feet for the local market places" (Commercial manager - Major American Airline). 
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It is therefore ironic, but not surprising, that airlines invest resources in sales 
forces to acquire market information in order to be closer to the reality of the 
markets, but yet find great difficulty using this information for strategy. 
"I think that you have to give market managers an opportunity to actually fail and 
you have to trust those men. If they tell you they are going to deliver x number of 
seats even though they can't prove they're going to give you those number of seats, 
and they have commitments from their suppliers - giving them more autonomy or 
taking more of a risk with them, and seeing if they deliver or not. If you go to 
Japan, with wholesalers we have a handshake. They live on their word and their 
commitment to you and you've got to convince the guys back here that their word 
is good enough, and that is very difficult. You've got to kind of back them up a 
little bit and say, Tou try it and if it doesn't work then we've got to deal with it'. 
You've got to give them the opportunity to deliver" (Area manager - major 
American airline). 
The negotiation processes which take place between headquarters and sales 
offices involve the interaction between parts of the organisation which have 
different operating interests and different types of power within the organisation. 
There is competition for resources and sales between the various sales offices of 
an airline. Each sales manager is accountable for the results in terms of volume of 
traffic, revenue, and yields of his market. There is frequent competition for such 
resources as capacity, which is controlled by the operations department in 
negotiation with the commercial department. There is competition for advertising 
budgets, for travel agency incentive programs, etc. These are resources which 
greatly affect the performance potential of each market and constitute pillars of 
airline strategy. 
'There was basically tension built into it because, as an example, I had the 
Hawaiian market and Frank Clark at tile time had the international transcontinental. 
And if the international transcon. either fed the Hawaiian market or Hawaii was an 
extension, who had the passenger from New York to Honolulu? They were flying 
Frank's transcon service to LA, but they were connecting to my aeroplane where I 
was using his aeroplane from LA to Honolulu. So right away you get these big 
arguments over whose seats, and whose prices get put on, whose inventory you 
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take out. That was a very contentious operation for about two years. As a matter 
of fact, one time the president brought us in one time and told us that we had to 
quit fighting" (Former sales manager - major American airline). 
Most major strategic measures taken in a market involve discussions and 
negotiations with the pricing and yield management department, with the 
scheduling and operations department. These negotiations are often subject to the 
set of social forces that the organisation of an airline constitutes. 
'Nobody would be happy if you played by the rules and restrictions, and they 
weren't. You were in a matrix organisation, so you had all of the responsibility 
and none of the authority. So you had to sit down and negotiate with everybody: 
scheduling, pricing, yield management. You had teams. You had to get them on 
board and you had to get them to think the way you wanted them to think and then 
to see if they actually could execute. And we basically found out that you couldn't 
do it, for the most part. The decisions would end up being a measure of power and 
influence rather than the logic of the thing. The mathematical logic was very rarely 
worked out. If you had a lot of leverage, a lot of influence, knew your way around, 
you could have some success, but the airline itself may not have been better off 
(Sales Manager - Major American airline). 
8.5 Conclusions 
Strategic flexibility and responsiveness in the airline industry come from the 
capability to blend internal information with external information and qualitative 
market information with quantitative information. Airlines must combine the 
capability of acquiring and using market information with the other capabilities of 
the organisation. The difficulties they experience in using external information 
are symptoms of the difficulty of blending those capabilities. External 
information is hard to control, mostly informal and qualitative by nature. Internal 
information conforms to the organisational structure, is neatly codified and 
scientifically analysed, but by itself is of little use in such a competitive business. 
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Many airlines today possess very sophisticated information systems, operational 
processes and decision support systems. These play a vital role in their tactical 
processes. However, by themselves, these do not make an airline competitive. 
"Everything is technology related today, and you can have too much technology if 
you don't use it. If you have somebody just looking at the numbers, that's no 
good. If you just talk price and about the pie charts, then that's all you'll talk about. 
You won't have a relationship with the market. Technology for technology's sake 
is a waste of time. The reason you have technology is because somebody needs it. 
You don't just create it because you can and I think we've done some of that" 
(Vice-president - Major American Airline). 
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CHAPTER IX 
CASE STUDY: USING REVENUE 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
9. Case study: Using Revenue Management 
Systems 
"rhe system isn't strategic but how you use it is" (Air Transport If orld, August 1996) 
This case study will describe the experience of a small airline in attempting to 
make use of a simple segment-based non-interactive revenue management system, 
which it acquired in the hope of substantially improving the strategic management 
of its markets. The case study illustrates much more than an airline's attempt to 
implement an information system. It describes the reality of attempting to use 
information in such a way as to be useful to strategic decisions. Air X had put its 
hopes of improving its strategy-making processes by acquiring the sophisticated 
information system, but then realised that strategy requires much more 
'information than that provided by information systems. It requires the use 
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different types information from different sources inside and outside the 
organisational boundaries. 
The first movers in revenue management, such as American Airlines, have 
developed information systems incrementally since the 1960s, when they began to 
realise the importance of having accurate inventory controls, to the modem 'True 
Origin and Destination Interactive Selling' revenue management systems, which 
constitute the cutting edge of that technology. Revenue management systems 
demand much investment on the part of the organisation to make use of them. 
That aspect of revenue management is not appreciated by many airlines. They are 
well aware of the strategic potential of these systems, but less aware of the 
powerful organisational capabilities required to fulfil that potential. The airlines 
which have developed them, and who make good use of them, are symbols of 
sophistication and strategic responsiveness, and therefore well respected by their 
less experienced rivals. Analysing exhaustively the constructs of the incremental 
learning processes that the first movers on revenue management underwent in 
order to reach the level of sophistication they enjoy today would be ideal. This 
would produce evidence to suggest that the use of the systems demands a far 
greater investment than the acquisition of the systems, and therefore much harder 
to imitate. However, this would require detailed and longitudinal research, and 
would constitute a large research project in itself. Instead, a more feasible option, 
which can better contribute to the larger picture on the strategic use of information 
in the airline industry, will be drawn. 
253 
This case study relates to the experience of a small European airline in acquiring 
and implementing a relatively simple segment-based revenue management 
system. The airline owns close to 40 aircraft and serves 60 destinations 
worldwide. It has a fairly simple point-to-point route network. The bulk of its 
operations is concentrated in Europe, where it serves 30 destinations, Africa and 
South America. It serves four destinations in North America, five destinations in 
South America, ten destinations in Africa, and one destination in Asia. The 
airline employs approximately 9,000 staff and carries some 3.5 million passengers 
per year. Air X is a state-owned carrier and is undergoing a major re-structuring 
program, which was a condition imposed by the European Community in 
exchange for state aid. To perform the re-structuring program, which involves 
fundamental change in the organisation, Air X employed the services of a major 
international Consulting firm. This was the first time the airline had used 
consultants. The airline was being assisted by specialists in organisational change 
in its re-structuring process, which, amongst other projects, involved the 
implementation of a revenue management system. The difficulties in using the 
system, which caused the airline great perplexity, also provided a challenge to the 
consulting firm. 
"Essentially, [the consultants] provided us with a vital hard methodology of work 
which forced the old ways. Also the name [of die consulting firm] stamped on our 
re-structuring project did us no harin in getting acceptance by Brussels for die 
approval of the much needed state subsidy" (Re-structuring project manager - Air X). 
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9.1 Top Management Discontinuity 
As with many state-owned carriers, the government appoints the people who run 
the airline. Hence, whenever there is a change of government, there is also a 
complete substitution of the airline's top management. This causes fundamental 
problems of discontinuity in the running of the airline. Even when there has been 
no change in the government, top management positions in the airline have been 
characterised by high turnover. The main reasons behind this are (1) the frequent 
industrial relations conflicts (especially involving the pilots' union), where the 
political leverage and internal influence of the unions are such that even the 
government's political proteg6es are frequently sacrificed in concessions to the 
unions; and (2) escalating and recurring financial losses by the airline over the 
previous 20 years which had become increasingly hard to justify and fund with 
taxpayer's money. 
Learning the intricacies of the air transportation business takes considerable time. 
By the time top management has become reasonably proficient in the operation 
and running of the airline, there is generally either an industrial relations conflict 
or a change in government, which causes the complete replacement of top 
management. The result is that top managers arc well aware of the short life span 
of their positions, and thus very reluctant to introduce major changes. More 
importantly, top managers are reluctant to devise and implement medium or long 
term projects, as they feel they may very well see the costs or failures of tile 
projects attributed to them, while any merits and benefits of the projects are 
attributed to the next management team. However, the previous management of 
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Air X was forced to initiate a major re-structuring program because European air 
transport regulations now require that state aid be authorised by the EC. The EC 
authorises state aid only to those carriers which present real re-structuring plans. 
The discontinuity in the airline's management and its reluctance to inconvenience 
the unions or start much needed major re-structuring initiatives, when added to the 
fact that the airline has traditionally been managed by politicians rather than 
professional commercial managers, constitutes the main force behind the 
organisation's natural resistance to change. 
Amongst the initiatives included in the re-structuring of Air X are down-sizing 
and renovation of its workforce, especially its key managers, the division of the 
company's departments into cost centres, the upgrading of the information 
technology and market management infrastructure, the formulation of a corporate 
strategy, and the general reduction of operating costs through higher productivity. 
Partial privatisation, plans are also on the medium-term horizon. The focus of this 
case study is on the upgrading of the information technology and market 
management infrastructure, and on the company's corporate strategy formulation 
process. In the course of upgrading the information technology infrastructure, Air 
X has initiated four main projects: 
(1) the implementation of a revenue management system 
(2) the acquisition of management information data tapes (MIDT) to 
automate the sales force 
(3) the development of a frequent flyer programme 
(4) the building of a central management information system (MIS). 
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9.2 Management Information Deficiency 
The relevance of the management information system project (project (4)) to the 
use of the revenue management system is that route managers need information to 
be aggregated and consolidated by the organisation, for it to be of any use to the 
development of strategic guidance and goals to the company. Project 4 attempted 
to address this need. The building of a central management information system 
was the first project to commence. Only upon commencement of the project did 
Air X realise that there was more to the initiative than the mere acquisition and 
implementation of the technology. The architecture of the system and its 
organisation were dependent on the information which would go into the system. 
Air X was then forced to think about what information was relevant for 
management, what form it took, and where it was. 
"No doubt I will build the system and buy the administration tools for it, but it is 
more difficult to feed the system with the right information to manage the 
company. That is my main worry" (MIS Project Manager - Air X). 
In order to find the answers to the unexpected questions which the project 
generated, it was decided that top management and the heads of all departments 
involved would be consulted about what existing information should be included 
in the system, and what other information could be gathered to complement this. 
"We are developing a management information system to aggregate information 
for management decision-making. For that we consulted the various departments 
about which indicators should be developed. Most had little or no idea of what to 
change. We have a problem in deciding what management information to develop, 
so we have to start by using what already exists" (MIS Project Manager - Air X). 
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This consultation revealed more fundamental problems behind the symptoms of 
management information deficiency. It was discovered that much information 
about the operations of the company was duplicated in different locations. When 
the information was compared, it exhibited fundamental inconsistencies. The 
duplication of the information was partially caused by the discontinuity and the 
incompetence of the various Air X managers teams who had 'visited' the airline 
throughout the years. As a result there had been incoherence in the purchase and 
implementation of information systems, and some systems were totally 
incompatible. 
"Most of the information we have in the various departments is simply 
incompatible with each other. Information is physically impossible to transfer 
between systems" (MIS project manager - Air X). 
"Each department has its information, which is not aggregated or in many instances 
not even compatible with others. In meetings each person takes his own sct of 
figures. Sometimes there are major discrepancies - 10% in revenue is not unusual - 
sometimes due to incomplete information, sometimes due to simple calculation 
errors. It is not unusual to spend important meetings arguing about the numbers 
and calculations instead of discussing the central issues" (MIS project manager - Air X). 
Other problems of a more psycho-social nature were revealed. The rivalry 
between departments, in particular between the commercial and finance 
departments, was a major difficulty. There is restricted access to the president 
and his board of directors, so much of the information conflict between the 
departments is over which should inform the president about the quarterly 
operating results of the airline. The reporting of the operating results requires 
integration between information from the finance department and information 
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from the commercial department in order to correlate the results of each route, 
flight, commercial initiative, etc. This has never been achieved. 
"Finance produces financial reports totally independently from what management 
needs. The attitude is that they have the finance technical know-how, so they 
produce the information they think should be produced. The result is that other 
departments find it difficult to digest the reports and management gets financial 
information totally unaggregated and in excessive quantities. We at least know 
what is relevant and what is not! " (Commercial Director - Air X). 
"Ibe guys over at the commercial department think that we [finance] are here to 
work for them. We think differently. We are the finance people: if anyone should 
be informing the president about the company's financial operating results, it 
should be us! " (Finance Director - Air X). 
The result is that Air X is still trying to obtain information about results of its 
operations by route, and by flight. The information about revenue by route and 
indirect costs by market area is the property of the commercial department, which 
receives it directly from the sales off ices, which manage travel agencies' sales. 
They are trying to desegregate it to give values by flight. However, all 
information about direct costs is the property of the finance department, which 
receives that information directly from the operations department (crew expenses, 
maintenance, etc. ) and from the suppliers of fuel, catering, etc., who send their 
invoices to finance. Each department insists that the other should supply it with 
reports so that it can add them to its own information and compile a master report 
for the president. 
".. 
-Ibe government ownership of the company has never promoted cost control. Also, the departments are rivals and isolated from each other and very reluctant to 
share any information. They are used to report information on up, but never 
horizontally. 
... They know 
how much they spend per year in total, but the data is 
only itemised in operations, not in the commercial department (by flight or by 
destination, etc. ). This is why we have duplicate information processing and 
different numbers to measure the same stuff. So, the fierce fights about the validity 
and integrity of the data dominate top level meetings, which should be about wider 
and more important things" (Senior consultant - Consulting firm employed by Air X). 
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Route managers are the users of the revenue management system. They belong to 
the commercial department, and are still awaiting information about the 
attribution of operating costs to the different flights, the determination of break- 
even revenues for each flight, and for the specific economic importance of each 
market to the company. They need this information in order to develop a sense of 
how much the market should be defended -a trade-off with revenue 
maximisation, frequent accurate and timely operating results of each route, etc. 
This type of information cannot be supplied by the revenue management system; 
indeed, it is needed to reap the benefits from the use of the system. 
"'Ibere are as yet no estimations of costs by line, by segment, by flight. I'lierefore 
there are no estimations of the break-even points, either by average fare, total 
revenue, or load factors. I will do my best, but it would be nice to have some 
targets! " (Route Manager - Air X). 
The result of this management information deficiency is that the company does 
not have the information to monitor the results of their strategic efforts. It also 
complicated the task of setting strategic objectives. 
"rop management does not know exactly which routes are more profitable than 
others. That, plus the isolation of the sales offices in terms of market information, 
means that management does not know where die company is losing money, how 
much it is losing, and, most importantly, whyl This is why their corporate strategy 
is not in touch with realityl" (Senior consultant - Consulting firm employed by Air 
1%) - 
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9.3 Lack of Historical Information 
Revenue management systems consist of statistical models which require vast 
amounts of flight specific historical information organised according to the 
specific parameters that supply the models. This historical information has to be 
statistically significant and representative of the economic and competitive 
circumstances of each market. This poses two main problems. First, information 
is required on the performance of the specific fare levels which compose business 
class (class Q and economy class (class Y). These are known in revenue 
management as subclasses of C and Y. For an airline which has never used these 
subclasses in the market, it is impossible to have readily available historical 
information about them. Second, the advent of European liberalisation is 
increasingly causing great transformation in competition in European markets, 
where airlines have entered and abandoned routes, have started operating 
combined routes, etc. This means that even if any structured historical 
information existed, it would not be representative of current European markets. 
To address the first problem, Air X seriously considered buying fare information 
from a train operator which used revenue management in order to begin testing 
and calibrating the models and heuristics of the system. This idea was quickly 
abandoned because the information had absolutely no relevance to the business of 
air transportation. Air X had been using, for some years, four main fares: 
business fare, full economy, advance economy and special economy. Even 
though the different fares had respective restrictions on their use (e. g., 21 day 
advance purchase, Saturday night stay, refundable or non-refundable, etc. ), the 
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seat inventory allocation of those fares had not been strategically controlled. Air 
X did not impose limits on the number of seats offered at each fare level. Also, 
the fares were not codified as subclasses of Y or C, as the revenue management 
system requires. Air X simply processed the different monetary values of each 
fare in its sales. 
"Tbe revenue management system also exposed some basic inadequacies of our 
reservation system namely the storage of flight information per subclass of C and 
Y, speed of operation, and technical compatibility with other information systems 
in terms of architecture" (Route Manager - Air X). 
Using existing information, a careful solution to this problem was devised. Air X 
would extract from its reservation system data on the last few years of operation 
of those fares, and class them as belonging to class C or three subclasses of Y by 
devising a corresponding scale of one to four in which the monetary values of the 
fares would fall. They would then be indexed to the various subclasses that tile 
revenue management system requires. By calculating the revenue that each flight 
generated and relating it to the specific mix of fares sold, and to the number of 
seats that remained empty, Air X managed to begin building some sort of 
historical database which at least related to its own flights. At the time of writing, 
the processing of this data is still taking place. At this point a fundamental 
revenue management problem became obvious - Air X had not been manipulating 
the number of seats allocated to each fare level on each flight (it had no means of 
doing so rationally). It had not made the strategic decision of allocating seats for 
the higher fare paying passengers who tend to reserve their flights at short notice 
before departure. This meant that the historical database that had been improvised 
, 
by the airline was useful only to determine the elasticity in terms of price and time 
before departure of the lower fare paying passengers, who tended to fill up the 
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flights before the higher premium passengers made their reservations. So, Air X 
could obtain some idea of the variations in demand of the low fare paying 
passengers, but because there had never been an appropriate cushion of seats 
deliberately left for the full Y and business fare paying passengers, historical 
information on their behaviour was non-existent. 
"Looking back on that I ask myself how we could have been so stupid I We put 
conditions on the fares, but not on the number of seats allocated to those fares. I 
mean OK, so the business passengers could not buy discount fares, but even if the 
poor guy wanted to pay premium prices, he could never get a damn seat with us. 
No wonder the front of our plane [business class] is so small today, and no wonder 
our average fares were so ridiculous! But then again I suppose we didn't have a 
way of controlling the number of seats anyway" (International Sales Manager - Air 
X). 
At this point, Air X concluded that the only way to learn about the premium fare 
paying passengers was by experimentation - trial and error - and using local 
market information, not simply by pressing a button on the revenue management 
system. 
"ro know the fare values to set for the various subclasses, the user should know 
what the competition is charging and how time and price sensitive the subclasses 
are. So, really, we need to try out different fare structures and see what happens I 
think! He also should be aware of any special offers from Ole competition. For that 
he needs help from the sales officesl" (Network Manager - Air X). 
As discussed elsewhere, American Airlines had intentionally left a generous 
number of seats for the business passengers to reserve, knowing very well that 
many of these seats would fly empty, in order to study the variations in demand 
for the higher fares. This knowledge came more easily to the first movers, 
because they had been developing the system from the very beginning, and thus 
, 
constituted a derived learning curve of their experience. 
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9.4 Implementing and Using the Revenue 
Management System 
Air X purchased its revenue management system in 1992. At the time of writing 
(1997), Air X was still not using the system. To begin using the system, Air X 
realised that it would need market information in order to give some indication of 
what type of initial fare structure to apply in the different markets, and that it 
would also need a continuous feed of information from its sales offices. The 
initial reaction was one of some panic and asking the planning department for 
competitive information. 
'Ve do not have regular information about competitors. I have repeatedly asked 
the planning department for competitor information, but without any success. We 
don't know how or where to get that sort of information. Marketing reports are just 
too expensive, and we haven't the structures in place to process that information to 
our benefit. Our market segmentation is just non-existent. It is based on hunches 
and intuition rather than concrete information"' (Network Manager - Air X). 
The planning department's plans were simply based on the revenue results from 
each sales office, which were in the form of financial spreadsheets containing only 
numbers. Based on this information, with no qualitative information to explain 
variations in sales, the planning department simply dictated the budgeted sales 
objectives to the sales off ices based on what the company would like to happen, 
instead of what the markets dictated. 
"We negotiate targets with our delegates [sales managers] once a year. 17liese are 
based on our business plan. The targets are imposed 'top-down', depending on the 
variations from the previous targets, rather than based on information provided by 
the delegates" (Commercial director - Air X). 
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"Our business plans are derived from past plans and variations of results from 
objectives. We have three business plans. A more general business plan, what we 
call a strategic plan - similar to a sort of mission statement, devised and written by 
one person, archived and read by no one. We also have an 'exploration plan' 
which is more specific in content. It says things like 'We should increase focus on 
Africa, or America, reduce operational costs... '. It is devised by a small group of 
two or three people, and very rarely read. Finally we have the most specific of 
plans: it contains specific operational objectives for the year; e. g., we will increase 
capacity on the LIS-LHR route by 10 per cent, etc. That plan is our an operational 
guide, and is used often in meetings to compare progress" (Sales Manager - Air X). 
At this point, the project team realised that the planning department was the 
wrong source from which to solicit market information, and that it would have to 
tap directly into the sales offices which managed the markets. To assist in the 
calibration of the system and in providing complementary market information to 
run the system, Air X is now consulting both the route managers about what 
information they need from the markets, and the sales offices about what market 
information they possess which may be useful to the route managers and market 
planners. 
"Me market information we need here is clues about variations in sales to different 
destinations. Competitive information stuff, things like competitors' offers, change 
of schedule, new guys in the area [new entrants], etc. ... 7bese are all things that the 
sales offices, and especially the promoters, are exposed to in their day-to-dayjobs, 
but which is not reported. J think it is because it is very ad hoc and less formal 
stuff, also because the guys in the field do not have the incentive or the motivation 
to report that information. VAien I talked to them, they said that sometimes they 
report it when it is pretty major things, but the guys at head office just have no idea 
what to do with it! " (Consultant - Consulting firm employed by Air X). 
In this integration effort, another problem materialised. Air X's sales office 
managers are typically people who have been in the company for a long time and 
who have been offered these positions as a recompense for their work and through 
their influence in the company. The sales office managers have traditionally been 
regarded more as ambassadors of the country than as commercial managers. Air 
X has problems in controlling the activities of its sales offices. 
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"Sales delegates are pretty influential people in this company. Large variations 
from the sales objectives are very rarely questioned or investigated, and when they 
are, they normally blame it on the sales targets" (International Sales Manager - Air 
X). 
"Me two most powerful staff in this company are pilots and delegates. Delegates 
are individuals who went through the ranks, many for 10-20 years, not necessarily 
in a functionally related position, before they are promoted to delegates. They 
have enormous high level influence and power in the company. Delegates can be 
monitored, but are very difficult to control" (Commercial Director - Air )Q. 
To counter this, the company is hiring new sales managers who will be replacing 
the existing managers, (whose average age is close to 55) after undergoing a 
training program to give them experience in the sales areas. The market planning 
of the company was not congruent with the market conditions because of the lack 
of competitive information, but on the other hand the sales office managers did 
not procure, or report the information because they had no incentive to do so. 
There were no effective communication channels for that information to reach the 
market planners, who in turn did not know how to use it. So, the inadequate sales 
targets were causing poor motivation of the sales office managers to procure 
competitive information in the knowledge that the information would not used by 
the market planners. Opening a much needed communication channel between 
the route managers and the sales office managers also proved a difficult task. 
'Ve need more information about markets and competitors' tactics. The 
delegations should in theory be good sources of this information, but in practice we 
receive little or no information from them. Most are almost like normal travel 
agents with little or no connection to [Air X]" (Route Manager - Air X). 
"Tbe system was very inconvenient for the organisation of [Air M. It exposed 
many problems, and provided us with tools for performance evaluation, which is 
something people fear, even though they want performance prizes. Route 
managers do not have strong relationships with sales offices and delegates in terms 
of information, but carry all the responsibility. Now that cannot continue! " 
(Network Manager - Air X). 
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"Sales delegations report directly to the commercial director, and they are 
horizontal to the route managers. This is a lack of delegation which makes the 
flow of information from local markets onto the route managers very difficult" 
(Consultant - Consulting firm employed by Air X). 
There are frequent joint meetings between the route managers, market planners 
and the sales office managers in order to build a communication channel for 
competitive information. In these meetings, there is an acute communication 
problem - route managers talk of subclasses of Y and C, tolerance levels, seat 
buckets, historical trends, statistical probabilities; and the sales managers talk of 
more budget for travel agencies' commissions, competitive sales programmes, 
promotion efforts, etc. The route managers and the market planners instinctively 
want the sales managers to quantify the qualitative information they have, because 
it is what the revenue management system requires, and the sales managers want 
the route managers to talk in airline sales language. Here, Air X learnt yet another 
lesson - blending technical and quantitative information with qualitative 
information is difficult. 
I think route managers should have sales experience out there in the market. I 
think I can never be at my best if I haven't seen or acted at the other end of the 
market. At the moment, for example, I do not know how to interpret the advice of 
the various sales delegates, or indeed what kind of information I can expect from 
them, or know what kind of information they have access to in the market, or what 
influence they can have over demand or yield. ... At the moment, sales 
delegates 
are more like ambassadors of [country], rather than commercial sales managers" 
(Route Manager - Air X). 
It was in attempting to use the revenue management system that Air X realised 
that revenue management was not just a 'push button' technology, but that it 
actually required a considerable re-structuring of the company. Air X had to 
become technically competent in the use of the system, but most importantly, to 
put strategic thought into the system in order to perform the revenue management 
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activity. To formulate most of these strategic thoughts, Air X requires 
information which lies outside its organisational boundaries and which is not 
neatly codified to fit the system. Also, competitive information is not process- 
driven or routine; it is event driven. So, there has to be a communication channel 
that is constantly open and flexible in the type of information which it carries. 
There has to be a way of blending the competitive external information with the 
technical internal information at head office in order to make the result useful and 
intelligible to market planners and route managers. This caused problems for the 
organisation's existing hierarchy and processes. The company is being forced to 
think strategically - something which it is clearly not accustomed to doing - in 
order to feed the system with the right information to operate and complement the 
statistical predictions of the system. This is essential if Air X is even to begin 
extracting benefits from the system. 
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CHAPTER X 
FROM PRACTICE TO THEORY 
10. From Practice to Theory 
Using the airline industry as the foundation for the research instead of conforming 
to a particular discipline or stream of literature has produced findings which 
further the understanding of the link between information and strategy simply by 
determining what uses airlines make of information, how and why. The main 
findings of the empirical research will be the foundations for the discussion of this 
chapter. These can be summarised as follows: 
- Airlines tend to resist the acquisition and use of external information 
and to concentrate on the internal quantitative information for strategy. 
The trend towards valuing external information has followed the 
intensification of competition provided by deregulation. However, the 
difficulty in blending internal information with the external is still 
evident. 
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- There has been a clear evolution from using information for efficiency 
to using information for strategic flexibility. The CRS was created to 
automate the task of making a reservation, but has since evolved to 
automating the travel agents, and to generating vital competitive 
information for airlines which is used in frequent flyer programs, rI 
revenue management systems and management information data tapes. 
- Retail automation has given travel agents strong bargaining power. 
Airlines began giving financial incentives to travel agents for shifting 
market share, biasing the information travel agents provide consumers, 
but creating a set of less obvious market forces wVich are difficult to 
monitor. 
- The sophisticated computer systems developed by the airlines, such as 
revenue management systems, need to be supplemented by external 
market information in order to be useful. This type of information is 
acquired informally by sales representatives from travel agents, but 
finds entry to the organisation difficult. 
- Airlines feel great difficulties in using external information. This is 
illustrated by the case study of Air X, which have experienced 
tremendous difficulties in using the external information needed to 
supplement a recently acquired revenue management system. 
This chapter will serve to expose the theoretical underpinnings of the research and 
to use theory to conceptualise and discuss the issues found in the empirical 
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research. The research was empirically led in order to avoid the limitations that 
following a single theoretical strand would impose. Hence, the research does not 
follow the convention of identifying a single appropriate academic discipline, then 
reviewing the various theories and works within it, and building a research 
approach from the review of a single literature., This unconventional approach has 
been followed because there is no obvious single theoretical foundation to 
examine the strategic use of information in the airline industry. Instead, there are 
several perspectives from several academic disciplines which support this 
research. 
Choosing industrial economics as the theoretical perspective for this research, for 
example, would have produced useful results about the mechanics of the industry 
(Boulding, 1966). However, industrial economics is largely concerned with the 
use of more conventional resources, such as technology, capital, labour, 
concentrating on maximising the economic returns of the firm and the economic 
efficiency of the industry. These matters are important, and are dealt with in the 
development of the airline industry, but they are not fundamental to this thesis. 
Information is not actively considered as a fundamental resource in industrial 
economics. Indeed, many economic models require the assumption of perfect 
information. Although facing the problem of imperfect information has meant 
increasing the dynamics of economic models (Lamberton, 197 1), the use of 
information is not a central subject of debate within this discipline. 
The strategic management perspective sees strategy as the relationship between 
'the organisation's resources and the environment. But academic debate in this 
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discipline concentrates on looking inside the organisation to find answers to deal 
with the uncertainty and diversity of the environment. It is the convention in this 
discipline that in order to produce strategic change to adapt to the environment, 
the structure of the organisation and the processes of making strategy must be 
changed. Whilst these are important factors in the functioning of organisations, 
they alone are incapable of making and sustaining an organisation's 
competitiveness. The strategic use of information is an underlying assumption in 
strategic theory since it assumes that to achieve competitive advantage firms need 
to know something their rivals do not. But such theory dedicates little attention to 
where and how this knowledge is acquired. Choosing the strategic management 
perspective as the sole theoretical basis of this research would perhaps produce 
results to optimise the structure and strategy processes of the organisation, but 
would ignore a vital aspect - the use of external information. 
Information systems literature deals with the importance of information systems 
to the organisation. It provides examples of the benefits of information systems to 
companies, and of their contributions to competitive advantage. It gives useful 
recommendations on developing and implementing information systems. There 
are streams of literature in this discipline that go much beyond the merits of 
information systems as a means of automation, such as management information 
systems, or strategic information systems. These recognise the importance of 
information as a resource, but are well aware that the information system by itself 
cannot provide competitive advantage, and that strategy also requires information 
other than that contained in the systems or in the organisation itself 
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In contrast to the lack of focus on the strategic use of information in any academic 
discipline, the airline industry is fully aware of its importance. The airline 
industry is a rich environment in which to study the strategic use of information. 
Airlines have to be extremely responsive in competitive markets. They possess 
I 
very sophisticated information systems which emphasise the use of information as 
a resource rather than a mere means of automation. These systems are very useful 
in supporting strategic decisions, but airlines also recognise very well the 
importance of acquiring and using external and informal information to make 
strategy. This information is essential to make full use of the sophisticated 
systems by supplementing their contents. It is also needed to supplement the 
internal and formal information of the organisation to produce the total 
information package required for strategic change. The airline industry, rather 
than a single stream of literature, was chosen as the foundation for this research. 
The positioning of this chapter at the end of the empirical parts of the thesis 
emphasises that the research was guided by practice and supported by theory. 
This section will demonstrate how various streams of literature provide the 
foundation for this empirical research on the airline industry. 
10.1 Notions of information 
One major epistemological question concerns the role of knowledge in social 
, systems, both as a product of the past and as a determinant of the future 
(Boulding, 1966). Academic debate has long recognised, the importance of 
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information and its trade for the firm and the development of economic activity in 
general. There is plethora of perspectives. Economists talk about symmetric and 
asymmetric information for market efficiency, sociologists debate the influence of 
power and culture on the communication of information and group relationships, 
technology policy specialists discuss the diffusion of technical information and 
inter-firm co-operation, and information technology people talk of strategic and 
management information systems. Each perspective has its own merits and is 
moulded by the purposes it fulfils. 
Inequalities of information are both the stuff of economic activity and a source of 
difficulties for its participants. Inequalities of information generate uncertainty, 
allowing for speculation in the value of products and inaccuracies in the 
calculation of levels of risk. Professional activities owe their economic function 
to the inequality of information between the professional and his client; what the 
latter is buying is most of all the superior knowledge of the former (Arrow, 1984). 
Schumpeter (1934; 1942) criticised the focus of his peer economists on rigid 
patterns and invariant conditions. He argued that the sort of competition that 
mattered came from innovations, and that the effect of an innovative act of an 
entrepreneur, and the response of the economy to that effect, was responsible for 
economic evolution. To innovate, to do something new or differently, 
information is required. Lamberton (1993) claims that it was a step forward in 
economics to split assumptions of asymmetry of information into asymmetry in 
information, and asymmetry in the ability to gather information. He advises that 
trade-off possibilities between other components, such as inquiring, gathering, 
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processing, computing, communicating, and deciding, must also be considered in 
the study of organisations. 
So, what is information? Information is normally seen as being constituted by sets 
of data. As Maguire et aL (1994, p. 20) explain, "though the dividing lines are 
quickly blurred in practice, the usual hierarchy is that the term data refers to 
isolated items that build up into information, which in turn contributes to 
knowledge". Arrow (1984, p. 168) considers infonnation to be the negative 
measure of uncertainty. In a statistical concept of information, he calls a signal 
"any event capable of altering the individual's probability distribution; in more 
technical language, the posterior distribution of signals conditional on the 
observation of one may, in general, differ from the prior, " and claims that "This 
transformation of probabilities is precisely what constitutes the acquisition of 
information. " Beckett (1971), defines information as the gap between what is 
known at the moment, and the level of knowledge that is achieved after receiving 
the next message. 
But information per se does not reduce uncertainty, it can be much more than the 
mere negative measure of uncertainty. Macdonald (forthcoming) argues that "It is 
a truism that information reduces uncertainty; it is less appreciated that 
information is also required to deal with uncertainty that cannot be reduced. " 
Information, when used, often raises more questions than it answers. Received 
information may therefore be used to draw awareness to different avenues of 
uncertainty, which in a sense is creating uncertainty. Maguire el aL (1994, p. 122) 
ý observe that "A corollary is seen in that the difficulty of posing a question is 
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proportional to one's lack of knowledge of the topic. " Casson (1995) reasons 
that information is a resource because it helps improve the quality of decisions 
which affect the utilisation of other resources. Bartlett and Ghoshal (1994, p. 80) 
illustrate the socio-economic shift which gave emphasis to the role of information 
as a resource for strategy: 
"In the benevolent high growth environment that followed World War 11, strategy, 
structure and systems offered much needed discipline, focus and control. Today's 
economic environment is different. Overcapacity and intense competition are the 
norm in most global businesses. The lines separating businesses have bluffed as 
technologies and markets converge, creating new growth opportunities where 
traditional business intersect. And most notably, the scarcest corporate resources 
are less often the financial funds that top management controls than the knowledge 
and expertise of the people on the front lines. " 
Although the concept of information as a resource seems the most useful in this 
research, there is no ready answer to the question of what information is. What is 
clear is that the value of information depends on the benefits that flow from its use 
(Marschak, 1974). As information is used, it can become more valuable as more 
potential uses are realized and its meaning better understood (King el al., 1989). 
Information and the organisational capability to handle information have been 
i recognised as capital, and expenditures on information are expected to generate 
future flows of income (Lamberton, 1965; Weizsdcker, 1984). But appropriating 
investments in information requires the creation of organisational capabilities to 
enquire, communicate and decide (Lamberton, 1989). However, information has 
peculiar economic characteristics, making market transactions inherently difficult. 
Therefore, information is a resource which organisations cannot easily buy in 
accordance to their needs, like raw materials, machinery or labour. Information is 
intangible and hard to price. It is hard to demand, because the buyers do not know 
what it is that they do not know. It is hard to sell, because sellers cannot display 
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their wares without giving them away in the process. It is characteristically 
expensive to produce, but cheap to reproduce. When sold, it remains with the 
seller (Macdonald, forthcoming). It can also be costly to receive, and requires an 
irreversible investment by the receiver in order to understand and use it (Arrow, 
1984). 
Exchanging information instead of buying and selling it overcomes much of the 
uncertainty and the problems of pricing in market transactions (Rogers, 1982). 
Informal information networks are good means of producing some equilibrium in 
the exchange of information (von Hippel, 1987). The common interests of 
network members ensures the relevance of information and filter out members 
who are not providing or receiving adequate value for their information 
(Macdonald and Williams, 1992). However, the characteristics of information 
and those of organisations, suffer from a high degree of incompatibility. And 
organisations have difficulties in exchanging information with the outside world. 
They tend to prefer internal information or atte 
I 
mpt to internalise the external by 
seeking ownership and control of information, just as they would do with any 
other valued resource (Forsgren, 1989). The difficulties of trading in information 
tend to leave organisations open to random influences, while successful pursuit of 
efficiency tends to lead to unresponsiveness to change (Arrow, 1984; Lamberton, 
1992). 
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10.2 Information and Strategy 
Several typologies of firms in an industry have been set forth in the strategic 
management and organisational behaviour literature. The general proposition is 
that the fit between strategy and its context, whether it is the environment which 
changes (Hofer, 1975; Prescot, 1986) or the organisation. structure (Chandler, 
1962; Rumelt, 1974), has signifitcant implications for the performance of firms. 
Mintzberg (1979) and Thompson (1961) showed how structure can influence 
strategy and decision-making while hindering adaptation to the external 
environment. Chandler (1962) argued that different strategies required different 
organisational forms to support them. His view was that structure follows 
strategy. Contingency theorists argue that the fonn an organisation takes is a 
function of the environment (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1970). Mintzberg, Millar and 
others talk about organisational configurations that bring strategy, structure and 
context into natural co-alignment (Millar, 1986,1987; Millar and Mintzberg, 
1984). One recurring message in strategy literature is that organisations must 
adopt a form that is appropriate to their strategy and to the competitive 
environment in which they exist. 
Two well-known theories of business strategy recognise commonalities amongst 
firms in the way they compete, and provide notions of strategic groups: those of 
Miles and Snow (1978) and of Porter (1980). Miles and Snow (1978) view the 
firm as a complete and integrated system in dynamic interaction with its 
environment. Their representation of four types of competitive strategy 
(Defenders, Prospectors, Analysers and Reactors) emphasises the firm's response 
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to competitors" actions and changing environmental conditions. Porter (1980) 
argues that there are two basic types of competitive advantage: cost leadership and 
differentiation. Whilst cost leadership means producing and distributing products 
more efficiently than competitors, differentiation means the ability to provide 
unique and superior value to the buyer by offering product features different from 
those of rival firms. Although they are two extremes of a continuum, both 
strategies imply that the firm knows something its competitors do not. The former 
emphasises efficiency and the latter emphasises flexibility. Successful 
entrepeneurship is based on superior information (Punset and Sweeney, 1989), 
and the strategic use of information in the competition of firms is an underlying 
assumption in strategy. Yet it receives little attention from strategic theorists. 
The airline industry is an extremely turbulent environment. The deregulation and 
liberalisation processes have eased entry barriers considerably in many important 
markets and allowed greater ability of airlines to adjust the capacity they offer and 
their prices. The seasonal nature of the business and its dependency on disposable 
income make it a very cyclical industry. The combination of the highly perishable 
nature of the product, the high fixed costs and the strong price sensitivity of 
passengers means that airline competition is aggressive, and that the margin for 
strategic errors is minimal. Efficiency is very important, but the need for market 
information and for the strategic flexibility to deal with such environmental 
turbulence is paramount. 
Whittington (1993) presents a useful taxonomy of approaches to theories of 
% strategy, which, he considers, differ along two fundamental dimensions: the 
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outcomes of strategy, and the processes by which it is made. He identified four 
schools of theorists: 
The Classical School, typified by Chandler and Porter, which gives 
managers a profit-maximising role in an ordered economic world. 
Basic economic'rules govem the firm's future. 
The Processual School, typified by Mintzberg, Cyert and Marsh, which 
sees strategy as a social process, a function of the firm's internal 
tensions. 
The Evolutionary School, typified by Williamson, which sees 
efficiency as paramount in dealing with an implacable environment 
where the market, not managers, makes the important choices. 
- The Systemic School, typified by Marris, which sees the ends and 
means of strategy as controlled by the cultures and powers of the local 
social systems in which it takes place. Managers are mere agents of 
these complex social systems. 
The Classical and the Processual Schools deal with the uncertainty of the 
environment by concentrating on what goes on inside the firm. The Processualists 
and the Systernics deal with the uncertainty of the environment by considering it 
so dominant that only a passive role is left for managers. This clearly leaves little 
room for the role in strategy of the information acquired from the environment. 
Christensen et aL (1982, p. 164) define strategy as "the match between 
qualification and opportunity that positions a firm in its environment". Strategy is 
, generally perceived as matching the organisation's capabilities and resources to its 
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environment. But explaining just how the environment's information is found, 
screened, acquired, and used by the firm to match itself to environmental 
conditions is not seen as particularly relevant to strategic theory. Much strategic 
theory does not concern itself with learning and the acquisition and use of 
information (Macdonald, 1996). 
The general view of management activity is that it is concerned with taking 
decisions. Categorisation of these decisions seems to be blurred in a continuum 
from operational, through tactical, to strategic decisions. Differentiating factors 
seem to be aspects such, as time horizon, longevity, broadness of impact, the 
concreteness of plans, and the organisational level at which decisions are 
commonly made (Rumelt, 1979). Some argue that there is good reason to drop 
the word tactics altogether and to refer simply to decisions as more or less 
strategic, depending on their importance to the firm's future (Mintzberg, 1987). 
Others claim that strategy is a framework within which tactical moves are made 
and that tactics implement strategy (Steiner, 1979). What is clear is that strategy 
is made up of decisions based on information. The very recognition that a 
decision is required implies use of information. 
Strategic decision-making is a very complex activity and many strategic decisions 
are not readily amenable to quantification (Steiner, 1979). In order to cope with 
environmental change and uncertainty, strategy requires flexibility. Strategic 
flexibility is an essential principle in strategy. It enforces the interaction between 
the firm and the environment. It consists of a strategic response to the unforeseen 
, (Eppink, 1978). It enables a course of action to be modified in accordance with 
281 
an encountered situation which may deviate from prior anticipations (Hart, 1937). 
It requires learning, because unanticipated aspects of unforeseen events and 
surprise occurrences may shift preferences (Shackle, 1938) and invalidate 
assumptions on which strategies were originally made (McKinsey, 1932). One 
dimension of dealing with the uncertain environment is to improve the 
organisation by organising "transactions within governance structures that have 
the capacity to work things out" (Williamson, 1985, p. 79). The other is clearly to 
identify what it is that needs to be worked out. This implies the acquisition of 
information from the environment to identify events which were unforeseen by 
the organisation and to mount adequate responses to these events. Strategic 
flexibility implies the identification of need or opportunity to do something 
different and refers to the firm's ability to modify its strategies, to perform 
strategic change. The ability to acquire new information and knowledge, to make 
a judgement, to develop new concepts and new strategies to adapt to 
environmental conditions has been termed 'business intelligence' (Dedijer and 
Mquier, 1987). What is clear is that any change requires new information which 
is most likely to be found beyond the boundaries of the firm (von Hippel 1988). 
Internationalisation theory has provided a useful focus for coping with imperfect 
knowledge and for understanding how firms and individuals obtain information 
from the foreign environment (Welch, forthcoming). The international business 
environment provides a useful arena for analysing the means by which firms 
acquire the necessary information to enter and operate in foreign markets. A 
variety of studies in different countries showed that informal information 
, networks and transfer mechanisms play a vital role in the process of 
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international isation (Reid, 1984; Benito and Welch, 1993; McAuley, 1993; 
Welch, 1996). Despite the proliferation of formal means, such as computer 
databases, decision-makers tend to favour informal rather than formal means of 
information collection and transfer to cope with the demands of foreign markets. 
Much of this work was influenced by the Uppsala model, developed by 
researchers at Uppsala University. The model concentrates on the gradual 
acquisition of information about the foreign environment and the integration of 
this information for use by the firm (Johanson and Wiedershein-Paul, 1975; 
Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). It is concerned with the acquisition and transfer of 
tacit and embodied information, informal methods of information transfer, and the 
role of those who give and acquire information. The Uppsala School also 
explores the role of network relationships in facilitating the multilateral exchange 
of information (Johanson and Mattsson, 1988). It suggests a fundamental 
incompatibility between control, change and flexibility. The more information is 
internalised and channelled within the firm, the easier it is to exert control, but 
controlling information diminishes its usefulness in the learning required for 
flexibility and change, both of which require the acquisition and use of 
information (Holm, Johanson and Thilenius, 1991; Kobrin, 1988)., External and 
informal information is essential for airline strategy (e. g., economic or social 
events which may affect travel to particular destinations, competitor incentive 
programs, confidential pricing mechanisms, and reasons for lost sales). 
"ractics is about dealing with hot information, which needs to be acted upon very 
swiftly. We then aggregate this information up to the top to provide the big picture 
and to justify shifts in our strategy, through identifying patterns of problems to be 
solved. The formal stuff is just for reference" (Area Manager - Major European Airline). 
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No ready prescriptions are offered for rendering compatible the characteristics of 
the organisation with those of information in order to improve the firm's ability to 
procure, acquire and use information. However, the Uppsala School does at least 
address the acquisition and use of information for strategy (Macdonald, 1996). 
10.3 Information and the Organisation 
Dealing with information is the whole purpose of the organisation. (Macdonald, 
1996). All organisations process information; they gather information from the 
environment whatever the products they make or the processes or services they 
perform (Maguire et aL, 1994). Arrow (1979) remarked that specialization in 
information gathering is the most important economic benefit of the organisation. 
Profit may even be considered the measure of an organisation's success in the 
pursuit of information and knowledge (Sweeney, 1975). Mangaliso (1995) claims 
information is useful to the organisation to the extent that it helps improve 
decision-tpaking, and hence the operating efficiency and effectiveness of the 
organisation. 
While reducing costs through increasing efficiency is important for firms' 
competitiveness, they also need a degree of flexibility to innovate, to respond to 
competitors' actions and to changes in environmental conditions. However, there 
is a trade-off between efficiency and flexibility. Change requires flexibility. 
Xhange, however, disrupts efficiency. Organisational efficiency can be a major 
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obstacle to organisational flexibility. There seems to be an increased emphasis on 
using information for efficiency rather than flexibility. Perhaps this is because of 
such factors as pressures for maximisation. of returns to shareholders, managers 
with short-term contracts, assessed by performance indicators which emphasize 
efficiency and low cost structures. Re-structuring efforts for privatisation, and 
modern management methods, such as quality management, management by 
objectives, and just-in-time production, all point to slimmer and more efficient 
organisations. The technological development in the airline industry, for 
example, facilitated vastly the use of information for efficiency. Sophisticated 
information systems automated many operational tasks such as inventory control 
and cost management, and can isolate costs or details of operations at the press of 
a button. This combination between pressure for efficiency and the availability of 
powerful technology to automate tasks and readily generate an immensity of 
operational information tempts managers to rely almost totally on operational 
information for strategy. it is much easier to find, for example, the costs of a 
flight to New York, than to find the reasons for an increase or indeed a decrease in 
demand. The airline industry is incredibly information intensive. There is a sea 
of operational information available inside organisations, with which managers 
are well accustomed, and which is often the basis for assessing their performance. 
How can such organisations stand back and reflect about using information 
differently, or about using different information than that which they already have 
to produce strategic change? 
The resource-based view of the firm conceives a firm as seeking to acquire, hard 
, to imitate, valuable resources and capabilities. This quest for differentiation is a 
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process that develops distinctive capabilities which differentiate a company 
strategically, fostering beneficial behaviours not observed in competitor firms. 
(Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Barney, 1991; Lippman and 
Rumelt, 1982). These capabilities are developed by combining and using 
resources and/or other capabilities with the aid of organisational routines which 
imbed organisational knowledge acquired through learning. Consequently they 
have a strong tacit dimension which makes them difficult to imitate (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Grant, 1992). Quinn and Friesen (1992) list three characteristics of 
a learning organisation: (1) it must have a commitment to knowledge by 
promoting methods to encourage the collection and dissemination of knowledge 
and ideas throughout the organisation, including research, discussion groups, 
seminars, hiring practices; (2) it must have a mechanism for renewal, promoting 
an environment where knowledge is incorporated into practices, processes and 
procedures; (3) it must possess an openness to the outside world by being 
responsive to what is occurring outside it. Argyris (1976) identified two types of 
learning that can occur in organisations: adaptive learning and generative learning. 
Adaptive learning can be, for example, comparing budgeted against actual figures 
and taking appropriate action. Generative learning, however, requires new ways 
of looking at the environment, challenging assumptions, goals and norms. The 
key message is that the learning organisation requires new skills and capabilities. 
Itami (1989) argues that invisible assets, which are based on information, are the 
only source of long term competitive edge for the firm and that research and 
development as information-gathering activities add to the invisible asset base of 
, the firm by producing a flow of information. Itami (1989) also advises that 
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information received from the environment must not be merely stored within the 
firm, it has to be transmitted to appropriate decision-makers quickly and 
accurately. It has to be used in strategic decisions. However there is considerable 
difficulty not only in acquiring such information, but in relaying strategic 
information to the top without diluting, distorting and delaying it ( Bartlett and 
Ghoshal, 1994). 
Information is a source of power in organisations (Pettigrew, 1972). Power gives 
control and control is necessary to keep the organisation together. This enforces 
top management's preference for internal and operational information, which 
poses no threat to power and control. Most information that is generated and 
processed in an organisation is subject to social and political biasing. Information 
is gathered and communicated in a context of conflict of interests. Often 
information is produced in order to persuade someone to do something to suit a 
particular interest. Information can be used as an instrument of power. This 
undermines rationality (Feldman and March, 198 1). Acquiring external 
information not easily controllable by the hierarchy of the organisation may 
undermine power structures and social systems. Efficiency-type knowledge, 
according to Nelson and Winter (1973), is stored in routines, which are 
interdependent combinations of human skills, organisational attributes and 
technology. Effective maintenance of the interdependencies, and thus the stability 
of routines, requires a kind of organisational truce. The fragility of the truce and 
the individual vested interests that depend on it make anything that looks like a 
new initiative subject to scrutiny, and often defacto foreclosure. Suggesting that 
the organisation needs new information sources is therefore something which 
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many managers have no great incentive for doing. It is tempting therefore, to let 
operational information become the foundation for strategy. Such information is 
familiar and therefore easier to manipulate. 
Command of information and of information sources inspires confidence and 
represents competence. Decision-makers who are persuasive in securing 
acceptance for their decisions will request information, gather information and 
cite in ormation. Thus, the gathering and use of information in an organisation 
are part of the performance of a decision maker, or of an organisation trying to 
make intelligent decisions, recognising very well that the assessment of that 
intelligence is heavily procedural and normative. External and unusual 
information is inconvenient. The belief that more information characterizes better 
decisions engenders a further belief that having information in itself is good, and 
that a person or organisation with more information is better than a person or 
organisation with less (Feldman and March, 1981). The trend in organisations is 
therefore for information creation and retention, not for information acquisition 
(Lundvall and Johnson, 1994). There is a great deal of evidence that almost all 
organisational structures tend to produce false images in the decision-maker, and 
that the larger and more authoritarian the organisation, the better the chance that 
its top decision-makers will be operating in imaginary worlds (Boulding, 1966). 
American airlines developed the computer reservation system to automate 
inventory control mechanisms, then identified the opportunity to make increased 
rents and market power (much of which was unexpected) by automating the travel 
ýagencies. This generated much information (mainly transaction information). 
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The increased rent and market power that arose from that automation served , 
mightily to justify the heavy investments and to break the efficiency 'truce'. It 
also generated much strategic information about the influence that travel agencies 
had in customer choice of airlines and about travel behaviours. This information 
was used to inject an element of strategic flexibility, to segment the markets and 
to monitor the sales of travel agencies. Other airlines acquired this information 
and by being able to monitor the sales of individual travel agencies, they too 
realised the need to acquire external information for strategy, such as reasons for 
lost sales. 
To capitalise on the influence that travel agencies have over customer choice of 
airlines, and to facilitate the acquisition of this information, travel agency 
incentive programs were developed. The proliferation in the use of such incentive 
programs created a set of less obvious market forces. Information about these 
forces can be acquired only through informal channels. However, because this 
information is external and unusual to the organisation, it finds entry to the 
organisation difficult and much of this useful infonnation does not reach 
managers usefully. Air X's difficulties in making use of the acquired revenue 
management system are, to a large extent, related to the difficulties of combining 
with its own internal information, external market information that is qualitative 
and obtained informally. 
"Far from being alternative allocating structures, each with its costs, markets and 
firms are complementary and strongly interconnected. ... We have seen firms not simply accumulating and processing information, but engaged in the difficult task 
of understanding problems, selecting among multiple options, tentatively 
producing new solutions, all of them things are not included in the original data 
set" (Bianchi, 1995, p. 198). 
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The key message is that organisations depend on new uses of information for the 
strategic change required for dealing with changes in environmental conditions. 
This, more often than not, means that new information acquired from outside the 
organisational boundaries is needed (Macdonald, 1995). Ironically, the 
organisation is fine-tuned to reject external and unusual information, which is the 
information most important for its strategy. The problems of acquiring external 
information compatible with that already exploited within the organisation. lead to 
a logical preference for the use of internal information, even for change (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982). Therefore, managers are often conditioned to use mostly 
internal information and fill the gaps with their instinct, or feeling. 
"You can use what works today as a reference for what should work tomorrow. 
So, there isn't the precision of data available about the market environment and so 
you have to use the informal stuff to fill the story, and to give you the justification, 
or to give you the sense that you're making the right decision. It's about telling a 
plausible story. On the one hand there is a lot of intuition involved. You're saying 
'I think this make sense', or 'I feel this make sense'. It's about feel" (Commercial 
Director - Major American Airline). 
This attitude may not be considered very rational, but it has the virtue of being 
able to analyse very large systems in a crude and vague way. Rationalized 
processes can only analyse sub-systems in their more exact fashion, and being 
rational about sub-systems may be worse than not being very rational about the 
system as a whole (Boulding, 1966). 
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10.4 Information and Information Technology 
The need for organisations to take a strategic approach to managing investments 
in information technology has gained attention (Bakos and Treacy, 1986; Earl, 
1988; Venkatraman and Henderson, 1992; Porter and Millar, 1985; McFarlan, 
1984; Weill and Olson, 1989; Sheppard, 1990; Peters, 1990). This research was 
strongly influenced by Porter's (1980; 1985) models of competitive forces that 
affect industry structure. Information systems research, based on these models, 
began to describe the strategic potential of information systems. Attention was 
focused on the potential of information systems to affect the competitive forces 
identified by Porter: the threat of new entrants, threat of substitute products, 
bargaining power of suppliers, bargaining power of buyers, and rivalry amongst 
i existing competitors. Subsequently, several frameworks were developed to help 
companies to identify opportunities for such systems. Some researchers, such as 
Benjamin et aL (1984), Ives and Learmonth (1984), Johnston and Vitale (1988), 
Parsons (1983) and McFarlan (1984), used Porter's models of competitive forces 
and competitive strategies (Porter, 1979; 1980). Others, such as Porter and Millar 
(1985), Rockart and Scott Morton (1984), Ives and Vitale (1988) and Johnston 
and Carrico (1988) used a valued-added chain analysis to identify strategic 
opportunities for information systems. 
That some investments failed to deliver the anticipated objectives and that some 
companies became classic examples of how to use information technology for 
competitive advantage (Ward, Griffiths and Whitmore, 1990) contributed to 
I 
concentrate analysis on 'if and how' information technology contributes to 
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business performance. Of vital importance is the interaction between strategy, 
structure and information systems (Walton, 1989; Rockart and Short, 1989; 
Venk-atraman and Henderson, 1992). Information systems have been divided into 
two types: competitive information systems and strategic information systerns. 
The former are claimed to improve the costs of firms and the latter to support the 
creation and implementation of strategic plans (Huff and Beattie, 1985). Several 
frameworks were designed for strategic planning of information systems (Galliers, 
1991; Earl, 1990). Business process redesign also figures highly in many 
corporate agendas and was considered an evolutionary way of exploiting the 
capabilities of IT for more than just efficiency gains, to facilitate the redesign of 
business processes. A business process was defined as a set of related activities 
that cut across functional boundaries or specialisations, in order to realise a 
business objective (Davenport and Short, 1990; Scott Morton, 1991). 
Porter and Millar (1985) identify three specific ways in which the technology 
affects competition: it alters industry structures, it supports cost and 
differentiation strategies, and it spawns entirely new businesses. They maintain 
that the impact of information technology on differentiation strategies is dramatic. 
This differentiation is chiefly achieved through: custornisation of products 
(through increased automation), increase in the information content of the 
product, inter industry relationships, widening of the market reach and scope 
through telecommunications, and a greater centralisation of market segmentation 
policies. 
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The impact of information systems in the competitiveness of airlines is 
undeniable. A variety of software improved airlines' operational efficiency, 
assisting in the control of operations and the performance of cost management. 
Other systems had a more strategic impact. CRS affected airline competition to 
the extent that intervention was required through regulation. The vast increase in 
the bargaining power of travel agents and of passengers intensified the rivalry 
amongst airlines. CRS also generated data which enabled the development of 
revenue management systems, frequent flyer programs and MIDT. These systems 
provide very useful support tools for managers in segmenting markets and 
monitoring sales. But airline managers realise very well the limitations of such 
systems and of the data they generate. They need unusual information on a non- 
routine basis in order to make such systems work for the organisation instead of 
having the organisation working for the systems. Programmed decisions are 
repetitive and routine and have defined procedures for their handling. Decisions 
are non-programmed to the extent that they are novel, unstructured and 
consequential. There is no cut and dried procedure for handling them (Simon, 
1977). Information systems seem to produce information which is much more 
adequate for the programmed problems, but is less appropriate for dealing with 
non-programmed problems (Argyris, 1971). While the routine operations of the 
organisation are important sources of information, they are limited in serving tile 
organisation's higher level managers. To deal with this, managers tend to develop 
their own information sources - networks of contacts, informers, customers, trade 
organisations, and other personal sources who feed them external information on 
an informal, ad hoc basis. 
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"As regards our strategies, they are pretty much driven by informal information. 
Formal documented information is old news. We have tried to implement several 
information systems to formalise our tactics, but somehow the informal medium 
and methods have always prevailed" (International Sales Director - Major 
American Airline). 
Managers find formal systems of almost any type far too limited for their 
purposes, and there is considerable evidence that for strategy, managers favour 
informal sources of information to formal. Aguilar (1967) notes in his study of 
external information sources, that personal sources exceed impersonal sources in 
perceived importance by 71 per cent to 29 per cent. Sawy (1985) found that 
CEOs use external information sources with much higher frequency than internal 
information sources for strategy. Their reasons for doing so are: 
a) The data in the formal system may not be sufficiently rich. For 
example, Davidson and Trueblood (1970) point out that information on 
lost sales is often more significant for many decisions than carefully 
quantified data on completed sales transactions. Yet, formal systems 
often reject such intangible data. 
b) The formal system often ignores important qualitative data. These 
additional facts must be found outside the system, which generally 
collects and feeds the manager with information that can be easily 
measured and processed. 
c) In relying on documentation, much information verbal channels can 
provide is lost. Furthermore, verbal channels allow for the immediate 
feedback and interaction which managers apparently find so important 
(Mintzberg, 1973). 
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d) Formal systems are often weak in providing the external information 
which managers find so useful (Aguilar, 1967; Gore, 1956; 
Mintzberg, 1973). 
Information is a source of power in organisations and the channels through which 
it flows replicate the hierarchical structure of the organisation, posing no threat to 
structure and control (Pettigrew, 1972; 1987). Lambert and Peppard (1993, p. 
181) advise that "Information technology must share responsibility for much of 
the rigidity and inflexibility in organisations. By automating tasks IT cemented 
hierarchy with reporting systems, and rigidified behaviour through 
standardization. Indeed, often technology has not resulted in fundamental 
changes in how work is performed: rather it has allowed it to be done more 
efficiently. The irony is that IT can also break out of traditional models of 
organizing and facilitate new organisational forms which previously would have 
been impossible. " 
King el al. (1989) distinguish between information and information technology 
because they believe the strategic applications of information technology may be 
quite different from the potential strategic uses of information. While some kind 
of information technology is usually required to perform the evaluation or 
filtering function, adding value through increased timeliness or presentation 
format, a focus on the contents of the information system - the information - can 
suggest new opportunities that are not evident when the sole focus is on 
technology. The evolution in information technology from information 
ý processing to data development was instrumental in fulfilling management's need 
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for cross-referencing and cross-relating data arising from basic operational 
processes in order to exercise better control. Operational data is extremely useful 
in providing management with information about the running of the business 
instead of merely automating the tasks of the business. Also, the development of 
expert systems, knowledge based systems and decision support systems emerged 
in order to use the existing technology to provide assistance to top management 
decisions by imitating the rules and procedures associated with a particular 
expertise. This technology provides important contributions in supporting 
managers in their decisions. However, "research showed that a computerized 
information system is only a small part of the arrangement that needs to be put in 
place for supporting top-level decision-makere'(Somogyi and Galliers, 1994, p. 
24). "rhe impact of technological change depends on how and why the 
technology is used" (Somogyi and Galliers, 1994, p. 25). 
10.5 Concluding Thoughts 
The strategic use of information in the airline industry followed an evolutionary 
process which generated two main information powers (Monteiro and Macdonald, 
1996): 
(1) information capability - the ability to store, process and transmit vast 
amounts of information accurately; 
(2) the use of information as a resource, providing both the intelligence behind 
strategy (WIDT, frequent flyer programs, revenue management systems, local 
market information) and the means by which strategy is implemented. 
Information capability is associated with increasing internal efficiency and is 
marketed to other organisations, creating interdependencies which are sources of 
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much incremental revenue and market power. Information used as a resource 
allows an element of flexibility in strategy. 
Neither information power excludes the other. A degree of efficiency is essential 
to bring the firm's costs into line with those of competitors, and even the most 
flexible of airlines has to be efficient. Information capability arises from the 
internal capabilities of the organisation and its technology. But to use information 
as a resource, airlines are forced to supplement internal information and 
capabilities with information acquired from external sources (e. g., market specific 
events, competitor special promotions, travel agent incentive programs, and 
confidential pricing mechanisms). Of vital importance in airline strategy is the 
local market information acquired informally. External information is however a 
cause of serious difficulties. Blending external information with internal 
information, and blending qualitative information with quantitative, is something 
for which most organisations are not prepared, and for which no ready 
prescription can be offered. 
Competition in the airline industry will continue to intensify, putting yet more 
pressure on airlines' strategic use of information. Several large airlines have 
forged very powerful alliances and are already exchanging vast amounts of 
competitive information and know-how. Competition between these mightily 
powerful airline alliances, together with an inevitably vast development of their 
strategic thinking will undoubtedly generate a plethora of strategic innovations, 
changing the face of airline competition. This will make the airline industry an 
even richer environment to study the strategic use of information. 
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Interview Guide for Airlines 
1. General Orientation 
Basic information about company (routes, size, etc. ) 
What type of information they use to compete - tactics and strategy (about 
competitors, markets and customers) 
Where they get it from (the external information) - including formal and informal 
sources 
Global vision of information flows within the company and inflows from the 
outside 
If possible, give examples of past strategic decisions and ask what was the 
rationale behind them and what information was used. 
2. Commercial / Distribution Departments 
What percentage of your tickets is sold through travel agents? 
How is your airline's product marketed and promoted? 
Do you have promoters (sales representatives) that visit travel agents? Are they 
valuable information sources? For what type of information (market/competitors)? 
How frequently? 
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What information do promoters have to carry out their jobs? How do you/they 
decide which travel agents to visit? 
How do you monitor relative travel agent shares, or share of revenue generation? 
Do you use the Bank Settlement Plan to analyse market penetration? 
Who decides what type of incentives should be given to each travel agent? 
How do you find out what incentives other airlines are giving them? 
3. CRS - Computer Reservation System 
What CRS do you presently use? What modules? Why? 
To what extent do you depend on the CRS listing criteria for your sales and 
promotion of the product? 
Does the CRS provide you data about markets/competitors? 
What type of data do you buy/receive from the CRS you subscribe? 
How do you use such information and for what purposes? 
4. Reservations 
Who decides what CRS to subscribe with what modules? 
What do you think constitutes a good CRS? 
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What is the relationship between the CRS company and the airline? What 
information do you exchange? 
5. Sales Offices and Travel Agencies 
What is the role of sales offices in your airline? 
What type of information are sales offices exposed to in their markets? 
Are your sales offices and travel agents used as sources of market information? 
Do they convey market information to headquarters? 
What type of information do they provide you? 
With what frequency does that information supply take place? 
What other sources of market information do you use to analyse, and respond to 
market conditions? 
6. Route Management 
How does your route network fit in with the airline's overall strategy? 
How do you watch over competitors' tactics? (On each individual route; Per 
geograpWcal region) 
How are tactics decided on each individual route (frequency, capacity, etc. ), how 
frequently are they adjusted? 
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What infonnation is used to adjust the strategy adopted in each route? 
How are decisions to initiate/terminate routes, increase/decrease frequency or 
capacity offered, to change pricing and incentive policies, etc. taken? What type of 
information is used? 
[Give and example of a recent change in strategy in a particular market] What 
information was used to reach that decision? 
7. Revenue Management 
What do you think is the importance of a revenue management system? 
How has revenue management been done in the past? 
Did you develop your revenue management system in-house or did you acquire it? 
What do you look for in a good revenue management system? What made you 
select this one? 
Who takes the revenue management decisions? 
Are they based purely on the recommendations of the revenue management 
system? 
What other information do you use to complement or correct any 
recommendations from the revenue management system? How do you obtain such 
information? 
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8. Management Information 
What do you think are the essential management indicators of your airline? 
What are their strengths and weaknesses? 
Do managers use information other than that contained in the indicators produced 
internally? What kind? 
[If possible obtain internal reports and market statistics] - Do you find this 
information sufficient to manage you markets? 
9. Frequent Flyer Program 
No. of members, background information, promotions, mileage awards, etc. What 
distinguishes it from others? 
What sort of information does it store about its members? 
What is done with the information? Is it used in marketing? How? 
How do you get information about customer satisfaction? How do you process and 
react to it? 
Do you watch what your competitors' Frequent flyer programs are offering? 
How? Where do you get the information? 
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Interview Guide for CRS 
1. Background Information 
No. of airlines, travel agencies using it, products and services offered 
annual report (accounts, size, etc. ), market share per country of operation. 
What is your overall strategy.? 
What are your short/medium ten-n objectives? Are you targeting particular 
regions, airlines, etc.? 
2. Role of CRS 
What do you think is the importance of Computer Reservation Systems for airline 
competition? 
What roles can a CRS fulfil in airline strategy? How do you see it in the future? 
What is a CRS company normally used for in practice? 
Can a CRS be a source of strategic information (market, competitor, customer 
information)? Of what kind? 
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3. Relationship with Customers 
What distinguishes your CRS from the others? What are your strengths? 
What is your relationship with your owner-airline(s)? What infonnation do you 
exchange? What advantages does it get from owning you in the face of present 
CRS regulation (revenue, infonnation, influence, etc. )? 
What is your relationship with customer-airlines? What kind information do you 
exchange (technical support, market/competitor information, etc. )? 
How do you promote your products and services amongst airlines? What 
incentives do you offer? 
What is your relationship with travel agents? What kind of information do you 
exchange? 
How do you promote your products and services amongst them? What incentives 
do you offer them? 
Do you have many corporate users? 
What products and services do you offer them? 
What is your relationship with them? What information do you exchange? 
332 
Interview Guide for Travel Agents 
1. Background Information 
Market share, size, turnover, scope of operation, specialisation, etc. 
Do you have any corporate clients? What services do you offer them? 
What computer reservation system do you use? Why? 
2. Airline Promotion Efforts 
What tactics do airlines use to promote their sales with you? 
How frequently do airlines! sales representatives visit you? 
What does their work with you consist of? 
Do you think this is an effective way of promoting airline products? 
If no - How would you do it if you were an airline? 
3. Airline Incentives 
Do larger airlines normally give higher commissions? 
Do larger travel agents normally get Ifigher commissions? 
Do you think commissions are a good way of influencing your sales? 
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On what information do you think airlines base decisions to give different 
commissions to different travel agents? How do they have access to it? 
What other incentives do airlines offer? 
Do you think the CRS listing criteria is the strongest determinant in selling airline 
tickets? 
Do customers often express general preferences for particular airlines? 
Do you think ticket prices are the detenninant factors of selling seats? What other 
things do customers often request? 
4. Airline Information Procurement 
Do airlines seek to get information about their competitors from you (e. g. other 
airlines' commissions and confidential pricing)? 
Are there any typical patterns of events - changing tactics, retaliations? How 
frequently do these occur in individual routes? 
What do you think of airlines! use of MIDT information? 
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5. General Industry Trends 
What differentiates you from other travel agents? 
What do you think are the main capabilities to be successful in this business? 
What is your general strategy? How do you watch over your competitors? 
What do you see is the current role of a travel agent? 
What do you think of airlines' commission capping policies? 
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Interview Guide for Airline MIS Firms 
1. Background 
Size, turnover, scope of operation. In what markets do you operate? Who is the 
owner-airline or what is your ownership structure? 
What is your relationship with your owner-airline? What information do you 
share? 
Products and services offered. 
Who are your airline customers? 
2. Market Information 
How and where do you obtain information about products or services that airlines 
need? 
What kind of information do you exchange with your mother airline? (which 
airlines have what systems, ITAS technical support, etc.? ) What advantages does 
the airline get from owning you (revenue, market/competitor information, etc)? 
What do you think are the advantages of airlines buying systems from you rather 
than developing their own systems? 
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3. Competitive Advantage 
Inevitably, many airlines end up buying systems from the same vendors, what do 
you think is the potential for these systems to give these airlines competitive 
advantage over each other? 
What is the importance of revenue management systems/MIDT in the airline 
industry? 
Are the systems that you sell the same as those you have developed for your 
airline-owner? If no, what are the differences? 
Why does your airline-owner allow you to sell the same or similar systems as the 
ones it uses to its competitors? Does it not threaten its competitiveness? 
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